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Introduction 
The 2007 financial crisis ended with a downturn in economic activity around the globe; thus, 
motivating large-scale business cycle stimulus packages. ILO (2011) estimates that the G20 
economies spent $2 trillion, the equivalent of 1.4 per cent of world GDP, on fiscal stimulus. For 
Germany, the numbers are estimated at EUR100 billion; the equivalent of 4 per cent of 
German GDP (ILO, 2011). After 2010, the ongoing economic crisis in the euro area raised 
concerns about potential adverse consequences from budget consolidations. Until recently, 
however, the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal policy have been little researched, 
particularly for Germany. I empirically research the macroeconomic consequences of changes 
in governmental fiscal policy and conclude that a government’s spending and revenue 
decisions impact economic activity. A better understanding of the macroeconomic effects of 
fiscal policy was urgently needed; hence, my study is of high practical relevance. 
Conventionally, macroeconomic consequences of economic policy have been researched in 
structural vector autoregressions (SVAR). Fiscal policy SVAR models estimated for the U.S. are 
usually supportive for large fiscal policy effects on output. In one prominent example, the tax 
multiplier is estimated as -1.33, and the spending multiplier as 1.29 (Blanchard and Perotti, 
2002). SVAR models require untestable identification assumptions; thus, prompting the search 
for natural experiments as an alternative source of identification. In a particularly influential 
study, Romer and Romer (2010) construct a historical account of exogenous legislated U.S. tax 
changes and estimate a much larger tax multiplier of around -3. Applications of the SVAR 
methodology to Germany have generally found rather small effects of fiscal policy on output. 
In Hayo and Uhl (2014a), we use a natural experiment approach, closely following Romer and 
Romer (2010), and find strong effects of tax changes on output. Based on our evidence, one 
can conjecture that the tax multiplier in Germany might be as large as -2.4. The estimated tax 
multipliers are much larger than alternative estimates derived in fiscal policy VAR models for 
Germany. Implementing this study required intensive data collection processes; Uhl (2013) 
contains the documentation of these efforts. 
Most studies on the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal policy use aggregate nationwide 
data. In Hayo and Uhl (2014b), we estimate the consequences of federal tax policy actions for 
regional economic activity in the U.S. We find considerable variation in how regional output 
reacts to federal tax changes and that estimated state multipliers range between 
–0.2 in Utah and –3.7 in Hawaii. An econometric analysis of determinants behind these 
differences reveals that the size and composition of a state tax base is related to the strength 
of the local income reaction. These results improve our understanding of the precise 
transmission mechanism of fiscal policy shocks. In Uhl (2014), I estimate the consequences of 
U.S. state-level fiscal policies for local economic activity and conclude that state-level spending 
multipliers are relatively small, while tax multipliers are large. These results allow for assessing 
the consequences of subnational fiscal policies and provide stylized-facts on fiscal multipliers 
in a monetary union. It is interesting to note that estimated multipliers at the state level are 
comparable to estimates derived at the country level despite their different transmission 
mechanism. I also find that both increases in state spending and in state taxes improve out-of-
state output which suggests that spillovers among states or countries are relevant.  
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Inference on ‘fiscal multipliers’ in aggregate time series requires untestable identification 
assumptions. Asking economic agents directly about their responses to fiscal policy is an 
appealing non-standard alternative. Shapiro and Slemrod (1995), and follow-up papers, ask 
U.S. residents about their consumption responses to various tax changes. We extend on this 
research by directly asking the German population about their consumption and labor supply 
responses to a recent 2013 payroll tax change using a representative population survey (Hayo 
et al., 2014, Hayo and Uhl, 2014c, and Hayo and Uhl, 2014d). About 55 per cent of the 
respondents indicate that they have increased spending; suggesting that tax changes in 
Germany have a relatively large impact on consumption and, hence, on economic activity. 
Based on the evidence from this representative survey, the effects of tax changes on labor 
supply, however, are likely small. The relative dominance of consumption responses, vis-à-vis 
labor supply responses, is a conclusion that is also present in the aggregate time series 
evidence in Hayo and Uhl (2014a). One further noteworthy implication from our 
representative survey is that currently low interest rates reduce incentives to save as well as 
incentives for labor supply. 
My research is overall supportive for strong effects of fiscal policy on output. Estimates of 
the size of ‘fiscal multipliers’ provide stylized facts for economic theory, are relevant for the 
evaluation of business cycle stimulus packages, and inform on macroeconomic consequences 
of budget consolidation. Based on my research, one could conclude that business cycle 
stimulus packages achieve their objective of stabilizing output. Some aspects remain 
unaddressed, however. One that I find particularly relevant is that debt financed fiscal stimulus 
needs to be repaid; accordingly, overall welfare properties of activist fiscal policy remain 
unclear. 
This dissertation is a cumulative dissertation comprised of seven individual papers. The 
Appendix to this summary contains a list of abstracts of the papers constituting my thesis. 
 
 
Marburg, September 10th, 2014 
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Appendix: Abstracts 
[1] Hayo, Bernd and Matthias Uhl, 2014a, The Macroeconomic Effects of Legislated Tax 
Changes in Germany, Oxford Economic Papers, 66, 397–418. 
This paper studies the short-term macroeconomic effects of legislated tax changes in 
Germany using a five-variable vector autoregression (VAR) framework. Identification of the tax 
shock follows a recently proposed narrative approach. Based on a historical account of 
German tax legislation, the timing, size, and motivation of legislated tax changes are assessed 
and a time series of exogenous tax shocks is constructed. The VAR results indicate a substantial 
and statistically significant reaction of output following implementation of a tax change. In 
response to a one percentage point increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio, we observe a maximum 
output reduction of 2.4%. These results suggest that previous estimates of the effects of tax 
changes on output in Germany are downward biased. 
 
[2] Uhl, Matthias, 2013, A History of Tax Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
MAGKS Discussion Paper 11-2013, Marburg. 
This paper presents a historical account of legislated tax changes in the Federal Republic of 
Germany from 1964 to 2010, thus establishing a database appropriate for the 
macroeconometric analysis of the fiscal policy transmission mechanism. Ninety-five 
quantitatively important pieces of tax legislation are identified and characterized along several 
dimensions: Tax changes are classified as “endogenous” or “exogenous” with regard to current 
macroeconomic conditions, and their revenue impact and timing is reported. The evolution of 
tax acts is described, capturing changes in tax measures and associated revenue impacts over 
the whole legislative process. The exposition is also a comprehensive qualitative description of 
major tax changes and the motivation behind them over the last four decades. 
 
[3] Hayo, Bernd and Matthias Uhl, 2014b, Regional Effects of Federal Tax Shocks, Southern 
Economic Journal, forthcoming. 
This paper studies the effects of federal tax changes on U.S.-state-level income. Utilizing an 
exogenous tax shock series recently proposed in the literature, we find considerable variation 
in how federal tax changes affect regional income: estimated state income multipliers range 
between –0.2 in Utah and –3.7 in Hawaii. Analyzing the determinants of differences in regional 
tax multipliers suggests that size and composition of the state tax base help explain the 
observed heterogeneity in the transmission of federal tax policy. 
 
[4] Uhl, Matthias, 2014, State Fiscal Policies and Regional Economic Activity, MAGKS Discussion 
Paper 46-2014, Marburg. 
In this paper, I estimate a structural panel vector autoregression to study the consequences 
of changes in U.S. state government fiscal policies for short-term local economic activity. My 
main result is that the state-level spending multiplier is relatively small and the tax multiplier 
relatively large. After four years, the government spending multiplier is 0.6 and the tax 
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multiplier 2.6. This conclusion is robust across different model specifications. I also find that 
both state spending and state revenue shocks increase out-of-state output. 
 
[5] Hayo, Bernd and Matthias Uhl, 2014c, Taxation and Consumption: Evidence from a 
Representative Survey of the German Population, MAGKS Discussion Paper 20-2014, 
Marburg. 
Using a representative survey of the German population, this paper studies self-reported 
individual consumption responses to a recent payroll tax reduction. About 55 per cent of the 
respondents report that they spend the extra money, indicating considerable potential for tax 
changes to affect consumption and economic activity. Our analysis of the socio-demographic 
and economic covariates of consumption responses suggests, among other effects, that 
interest rates are related to consumption responses to tax changes, and that households with 
higher income have a higher propensity to consume. 
 
[6] Hayo, Bernd and Matthias Uhl, 2014d, Taxation and Labour Supply: Evidence from a 
Representative Population Survey, MAGKS Discussion Paper 38-2014, Marburg. 
We study the influence of taxation on labour supply using a specifically designed 
representative survey of the German population. First, we investigate whether taxes generally 
matter for the labour supply decisions of our respondents. Around 41 per cent report taking 
taxes into consideration, which implies that the majority of the German population appears 
unresponsive to taxation. Second, we look at self-reported labour supply adjustments 
following a recently enacted payroll tax change. Only around 12 per cent of all respondents 
report an actual labour supply response, but we find evidence of an income, as well as a 
substitution, effect of the tax change. Our conclusion is that effects of taxes on labour supply 
in Germany are likely small. We analyse the correlation with economic and socio-demographic 
variables, and find that the self-employed are relatively more sensitive to taxation and that 
low interest rates reduce incentives for an expansion of the labour supply. 
 
[7] Hayo, Bernd, Florian Neumeier, and Matthias Uhl, 2014, Topics in Fiscal Policy: Evidence 
from a Representative Survey of the German Population, MAGKS Discussion Paper 12-2014, 
Marburg. 
This paper provides background information and basic descriptive statistics for a 
representative survey of the German population conducted on our behalf by GfK in the first 
quarter of 2013. The survey addresses important topics in fiscal policy, including: 1) public 
preferences on the composition of fiscal expenditure; 2) public preferences on public debt; 3) 
the effect of tax changes on consumption and savings; and 4) the effect of tax changes on 
labour market activities. 
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Abstract This paper presents a historical account of legislated tax changes in the Federal Republic of 
Germany from 1964 to 2010, thus establishing a database appropriate for the macroeconometric analysis of the 
fiscal policy transmission mechanism. Ninety-five quantitatively important pieces of tax legislation are identified 
and characterized along several dimensions: Tax changes are classified as “endogenous” or “exogenous” with 
regard to current macroeconomic conditions, and their revenue impact and timing is reported. The evolution of tax 
acts is described, capturing changes in tax measures and associated revenue impacts over the whole legislative 
process. The exposition is also a comprehensive qualitative description of major tax changes and the motivation 
behind them over the last four decades. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper is a historical account of quantitatively important tax legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany 
from 1964 to 2010. The article establishes a database for the econometric analysis of the macroeconomic 
transmission mechanism of tax shocks, and is also a comprehensive exposition of major tax changes and the 
motivation behind them over the last four decades. 
Interest in the macroeconomic analysis of fiscal policy has increased in recent years, including interest in the 
short-term output effects of changes in taxes and government expenditures (Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Blanchard 
and Perotti, 2002; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Romer and Romer, 2010). Regrettably, much of the extant 
literature utilizes U.S. data, which is problematic in the event that the fiscal policy transmission mechanism is 
country specific. And, indeed, the literature on Germany (e.g., Höppner, 2001; Perotti, 2004; Marcellino, 2006; 
Heppke-Falk et al., 2006) is inconclusive as to the sign, size, and statistical significance of fiscal policy effects on 
output, which is in contrast to the relatively unambiguous evidence found in U.S. data. Research on tax policy 
effects in Germany mainly relies on the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) structural vector-autoregression (VAR) 
approach for identification of exogenous policy innovations. Romer and Romer (2010) suggest a narrative 
approach for overcoming the identification problem. Rather than constructing artificial fiscal policy shocks based 
on the residuals of an identified VAR process, the authors use historical information on actual tax legislation to 
construct exogenous measures of tax changes, allowing consistent estimation of their macroeconomic 
consequences. Note that Romer and Romer (2010) criticize the structural VAR approach as being potentially 
downward-biased and, given the inconclusive state of the extant literature, an application to Germany seems of 
particular importance. The database established in this paper allows applying the narrative approach to analyzing 
the output effects of tax shocks to the case of Germany. 
Other fundamental aspects of the fiscal policy transmission mechanism remain underresearched, such as 
monetary-fiscal policy interactions (Muscatelli et al., 2004) and the effects of fiscal policy on financial markets 
(Akitoby and Stratmann, 2008; Afonso and Sousa, 2011). The narrative approach offers new perspectives on 
these topics. Conventional measures of tax shocks rely on official government accounts, which are available only 
quarterly, whereas narrative measures of tax shocks can be constructed at arbitrary frequencies. The quarterly 
frequency seems inadequate for modeling structural relationships in highly dynamic environments. Another 
concern about conventional measures is that tax changes are often anticipated prior to their implementation. The 
narrative approach allows tracking the evolution of tax changes over all stages of their formulation process and 
thereby facilitates capturing the formation of expectations on tax changes. This is useful for studying rational 
agents’ responses to “unanticipated” tax shocks, as well as their response to announced tax changes during the 
legislative process before their actual implementation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with a description of the narrative 
approach and proceeds to establish methodological principles for its application to Germany. The section gives 
an account of Germany’s tax system and its legislative process, describes guidelines for selection and 
characterization of important tax legislation, and discusses principles for assessing the motivation, size, and 
timing of tax shocks. Section 2 also introduces the key sources used to construct this history. Section 3 contains 
detailed case-by-case discussion of individual tax acts. Ninety-five important pieces of tax legislation associated 
with 845 distinct tax measures for the period 1964 to 2010 are identified and characterized along several 
dimensions. Important dates of the legislative process are collected and tax changes are classified as either 
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“endogenous” or “exogenous” with regard to current macroeconomic conditions based on a careful and extensive 
reading of official government documents. Finally, estimates for the law’s revenue impact are reported. 
The primary objective of the paper is to transform historical information on tax legislation into a time series 
suitable for econometric analyses. However, independent of empirical applications, the paper provides a 
comprehensive overview and discussion of tax legislation in Germany, creating an opportunity to draw qualitative 
conclusions about important characteristics of fiscal policy. The Appendix contains summary information on the 
tax legislation forming the basis of the paper. 
2 Methodological Principles 
2.1 The Narrative Approach 
Romer and Romer (2010) use the narrative approach to analyze the short-term output effects of tax changes, 
building on earlier work on the identification of monetary policy (Romer and Romer, 2004) and government 
spending shocks (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Ramey, 2011). The key characteristic of the narrative approach is 
that historical out-of-sample information is used to construct exogenous instruments suitable for making 
consistent inferences as to their macroeconomic consequences. 
To illustrate the narrative approach, consider a standard structural model of the economy with 
(1) t1-tt +)L(= BεyAAy  
at time t, t=1,…,T, where yt is a K×1 vector of endogenous variables including output, tax revenues, and, 
potentially, other macroeconomic variables such as government expenditures and interest rates. A and B are 
fixed K×K matrices representing contemporaneous relations, A(L) is a lag-polynomial, and εt are structural 
innovations. The reduced-form of Equation (1) is the VAR model in Equation (2) 
(2) t
1-
1-t
1-
t BεAy)L(AAy +=  
where the reduced-form innovations can be defined as t
1-
t = BεAu . 
The key challenge is that a priori observed innovations in macroeconomic variables ut cannot be differentiated 
in exogenous policy innovations εt and endogenous comovements. Conventional solutions to this identification 
problem make direct assumptions about the matrices A and B, either by assuming a Cholesky-ordering of 
variables (Fatás and Mihov, 2001) or by following the structural VAR approach in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
Noteworthy identification assumptions of the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach include estimates on the 
automatic response of taxes to changes in output and the causal ordering between government expenditures and 
taxes. Rather than hypothesizing about A and B in order to recover policy innovations εt, the narrative approach 
directly constructs tax innovations ∆Tt. The narrative approach respects that tax innovations are discrete 
decisions, formulated in political processes and implemented through tax legislation. Hence, by constructing a 
legislative history of tax changes, relevant tax innovations can be identified. From official government documents, 
such as budgetary reports and the law code, it is then possible to assess the timing and size of legislated tax 
reforms and thereby construct a time series of tax innovations ∆Tt for each t. Tax legislation typically consists of a 
multitude of distinct tax measures ∆Ti,t, i=1,…,Nt to be implemented at time t, thus 
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Sections 2.2 to 2.4 describe principles for identification and characterization of tax changes ∆Ti,t. 
The collection of legislated tax changes ∆Ti,t does not yet solve the identification problem as tax legislation 
may react to contemporaneous macroeconomic innovations. Romer and Romer (2010) argue that most tax 
legislation has a single predominant motivation, identifiable through official government documents. Tax changes 
may be a reaction to current macroeconomic deterioration and attempt to stimulate the business cycle or be 
implemented in order to finance recent expansions in government expenditure. As these innovations react to 
structural macroeconomic shocks, they are endogenous. However, some tax changes are implemented for 
reasons unrelated to contemporaneous macroeconomic conditions. Policymakers may increase taxes in 
consolidation efforts. Those tax changes are related only to past policy decisions and are independent of 
contemporaneous macroeconomic conditions. Also, some tax changes are undertaken for ideological or 
structural reasons. Parts of the tax system are designed to achieve social-political objectives, such as regulations 
related to tax allowances for children. The tax system is also regularly used to create behavioral incentives, for 
example, by increasing the cost of energy usage or by rewarding investment in social housing. An important 
category of structural tax changes involves technical adjustments in the tax code, sometimes required to comply 
with rulings of the constitutional court or with international law. The tax system is an important determinant of 
economic growth, and policymakers frequently implement tax reforms to improve the economy’s structure and 
hence enhance conditions for long-term growth. Consolidation efforts and tax legislation motivated by structural 
considerations are “exogenous,” and hence are valid instruments for estimating the macroeconomic 
consequences of tax changes. Using the superscript x to denote exogenous tax changes, after assessing the 
motivation of each tax measure ∆Ti,t one obtains a series of exogenous tax shocks for each t 
(4) 㺌xtN
1i
x
t,i
x
t TT = D=D  
which can be included in Equation (2) as an exogenous variable to study the macroeconomic effects of tax 
changes. Section 2.5 describe principles of assessing the motivation behind tax changes ∆Ti,t. 
The narrative approach has at least three advantages over the benchmark structural VAR approach of 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). First, artificially constructed tax innovations in a structural VAR framework may not 
coincide with actual policy innovations. The narrative approach emphasizes that tax changes are implemented in 
a political process and, by construction, identifies true policy changes. Second, cyclical adjustment, as used in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), may be an incomplete solution to the identification problem. Cyclical adjustment 
usually assumes that once systematic influences of economic activity are removed, the tax series is no longer 
related to structural innovations in output. This is problematic in the case that noncyclical influences, such as 
exchange rate or stock market movements, affect output and taxes or induce tax policy reactions. Cyclical 
adjustment also assumes that policy reaction to cyclical fluctuations is approximately constant across time, an 
assumption not borne out by either this narrative or that of Romer and Romer (2009a), both of which find that 
countercyclical policies were less frequent in the 1980s and 1990s. Third, the narrative approach requires no 
additional assumptions such as about the causal order between expenditures and taxes (Blanchard and Perotti, 
2002) and is flexible to use in other VAR applications. In fact, expanding the VAR system to study the effects of 
tax changes on the trade balance, exchange rates, or government expenditures (Romer and Romer, 2009b) is 
possible without requiring additional identification assumptions. 
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The narrative approach offers a useful perspective on alternative applications such as monetary-fiscal policy 
interactions (Muscatelli et al., 2004) and the effects of fiscal policy on financial markets (Akitoby and Stratmann, 
2008; Afonso and Sousa, 2011). Conventional measures of fiscal policy often rely on changes in official 
government accounts, implying that they are available only quarterly, whereas the narrative approach allows 
constructing measures of fiscal shocks at arbitrary frequencies. The quarterly frequency is problematic when 
investigating highly dynamic environments. Also note that changes in budgetary figures are regularly anticipated 
prior to their materialization because tax measures are extensively discussed in parliament and media throughout 
their formulation process. Hence, rational agents may take appropriate action in response to policy innovations 
before the same materialize. This timing relationship makes it difficult to model structural relationships with 
conventional budgetary measures of tax changes. 
The narrative approach also has the advantage of being able to account for the formulation of tax changes 
over the legislative process, and thereby facilitates capturing expectations as to tax changes. This history of tax 
legislation collects important dates in the legislative process that are expected to proxy for dates at which new 
information emerges. Three steps in the legislative process seem particularly important: (1) publication of the 
draft bill, (2) recommendations by the leading parliamentary committee; and (3) resolution by the mediation 
committee of Bundestag and Bundesrat. This history provides measures for the revenue impact of tax legislation 
for each of these versions of the act and thereby tracks the evolution of expectations on future tax changes over 
the legislative process. Note that while some changes may be partially anticipated prior to these events, concrete 
details on future tax changes, including revenue forecasts and details on legal provisions, only truly materialize at 
these stages in the legislative process. 
One shortcoming of this history is the empirical focus on quantitatively important tax legislation, corresponding 
to the emphasis on changes in aggregate tax liabilities deemed relevant for the fiscal policy transmission 
mechanism by standard Keynesian models such as the IS-LM model and by the majority of modern dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models. While the congruence between quantitatively and otherwise important tax 
legislation is large, the history constructed here is ill-suited to study effects of purely structural changes in the tax 
system. In fact, even though important reforms of the corporate or value-added tax codes have often been 
implemented as revenue-neutral, they may have important structural effects. 
2.2 Legal Context 
Table 1 provides an overview of the most important tax types covered in this history. For the sake of brevity, 
exotic taxes, such as taxes on illuminants or decks of cards, are excluded from Table 1; however, these tax types 
are covered in the historical account. The range of considered taxes includes income taxes, corporate taxes, 
excise taxes, transfer taxes, and the value-added tax. In contrast to work dealing with the United States, social 
insurance is not covered here as in Germany this is financed by contributions rather than taxes, and hence is not 
part of the federal budget except as federal block grants to the social insurance institutions. As a consequence, 
changes in social insurance are not treated as tax changes and are not covered in this narrative. 
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Table 1 Covered tax types 
Tax type Legal foundation Short-description 
Branntweinsteuer Branntweinmonopolgesetz (BranntwMonG) Duty on spirits 
Einkommenssteuer Einkommenssteuergesetz (EStG) Broad income tax 
Energiesteuer Energiesteuergesetz (EnergieStG) Energy tax 
Erbschaftssteuer Erbschaftsteuer- und Schenkungsteuergesetz (ErbStG) Inheritance tax  
Feuerschutzsteuer Feuerschutzsteuergesetz (FeuerschStG) Insurance tax on fire insurance 
Gewerbesteuer Gewerbesteuergesetz (GewStG) Local business tax 
Grunderwerbssteuer Grunderwerbsteuergesetz (GrEStG) Land purchase tax 
Grundsteuer Grundsteuergesetz (GrStG) Property tax 
Körperschaftssteuer Körperschaftssteuergesetz (KStG) Corporate income tax 
Kraftfahrzeugsteuer Kraftfahrzeugsteuergesetz (KraftStG) Automobile tax 
Mineralölsteuer Mineralölsteuergesetz (MinÖStG) Taxes on fossil fuels 
Schaumweinsteuer Schaumwein- und Zwischenerzeugnissteuergesetz 
(SchaumwZwStG) 
Sparkling wine tax 
Solidaritätszuschlag Solidaritätszuschlaggesetz (SolzG)  “Solidarity surcharge,” an additional levy on 
individual and corporate income taxes 
Stromsteuer Stromsteuergesetz Electricity tax 
Tabaksteuer Tabaksteuergesetz (TabStG) Tobacco tax 
Umsatzsteuer Umsatzsteuergesetz (UStG) Value-added tax 
Vermögensteuer Vermögensteuergesetz (VStG) Wealth tax 
Versicherungssteuer Versicherungssteuergesetz (VersStG) Insurance tax 
Notes: Table reports German titles and English descriptions of tax types covered in the narrative. Insignificant types are excluded. 
The inclusion of some tax measures warrants special justification. The child benefit (Kindergeld) is partially 
designed to protect the minimum income needed to raise a child and, hence, is systematically part of the tax 
system even though it has a social transfer component. Changes in child benefits are formally treated as tax 
changes and covered as such in the narrative. The German tax code historically granted investment allowances 
for specific investments (Investitionszulage), such as for investment in border regions between East and West 
Germany, as well as for investment in eastern Germany after reunification. As they are financed and paid directly 
out of accrued tax revenues, they are formally treated as taxes. Similar reasoning applies to employee savings 
allowances in various forms. In general, measures that are treated as tax changes in official sources are included 
in this history. 
The detailed discussion of individual tax acts also reports important dates of the legislative process. The 
introduction of a draft bill in parliament marks the beginning of the legislative procedure. The draft bill is usually 
combined with a statement on the introduction of the bill that justifies and explains intended changes, and that 
provides a forecast of the law’s revenue impact. Shortly after being introduced in parliament, the bill is debated in 
the Bundestag, which is the lower chamber in Germany. Formally, this step is known as the first reading. After 
discussion in parliament, the draft bill is passed to a specialist parliamentary committee, which for most laws is 
the finance committee (Finanzausschuss). The leading parliamentary committee passes a recommendation for 
potential augmentations of the original bill. This recommendation is accompanied by a report that contains useful 
information on the motivation of the law as well as updates on revenue forecasts. In the second reading, the law 
is again debated in Bundestag and afterward put to the vote in a third reading. 
The action to be taken by the Bundesrat, Germany’s higher chamber, depends on whether the law is a statute 
requiring assent (Zustimmungsgesetz) or a bill to which the Bundesrat may object. (Einspruchsgesetz). Consider 
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first statutes requiring assent. If the Bundesrat denies its assent, the mediation committee 
(Vermittlungsausschuss), which works as a go-between for both chambers, might be convened by the 
government, the Bundestag, or the Bundesrat. In the event the mediation committee suggests changes to the 
law, the bill is put to another vote in the Bundestag. Afterward, it is again forwarded to the Bundesrat. This step 
can be repeated a maximum of three times as the government, the Bundestag, and the Bundesrat may each call 
in the mediation committee once. After passing Bundestag and Bundesrat, the head of state (Bundespräsident) 
needs to sign the law and it is forwarded for publication in the Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt, BGBl). 
If the law is an Einspruchsgesetz, the Bundesrat may demand that the mediation committee be convened. 
The mediation committee attempts to find an acceptable compromise and only when no compromise can be 
found may the Bundesrat formally object to the law. A potential objection may be overruled by the Bundestag by 
simple majority. 
2.3 Identification and Characterization of Important Tax Legislation and Tax Measures 
The first step in the narrative approach is to identify relevant tax laws. The Finanzbericht, an annual budgetary 
report of the Federal Ministry of Finance, provides extensive discussion and description of tax acts beginning with 
the year 1964. Over the period 1964 to 2010, a total of 297 pieces of tax legislation are mentioned in this 
publication. Usually, however, these laws have very minor revenue effects. To make the narrative more 
accessible and tractable, I follow a two-fold selection mechanism to discover the more important tax legislation. In 
a preliminary analysis, I take from the Finanzbericht the total expected revenue impact of the law on an annual 
basis after full implementation and divide it by the GDP current at the quarter of the law’s publication. In the event 
the total expected revenue impact exceeds 0.1 percent of GDP, the law and all its tax measures are included in 
the narrative. Occasionally this selection criterion is inadequate. Some tax legislation implements only few tax 
measures, but fails to pass the 0.1 percent threshold by a small margin. These measures often have larger 
revenue impacts than negligible measures included in the history simply because they are combined with 
important tax measures in unified legislation. A strict application of the above criterion would imply that well-
defined tax shocks of considerable importance are omitted and so I make an exception in these cases. This 
relativization also helps avoid the situation that tax measures from omitted laws in their combined aggregate 
constitute a significant tax shock at any point in time. Also, the revenue forecast for the total effect of a law in the 
Finanzbericht is sometimes misleading. Tax legislation may combine permanent and temporary measures that 
partially offset each other. While the temporary effect of such legislation may be small, its permanent effect can 
be substantial. In rare cases, the prospective revenue impact of the total law given in the Finanzbericht fails to 
reflect that the law’s impact increases over time because the impact of some of its measures accumulates over 
time. In all these cases, the tax act and all its tax measures are included in this history. This selection procedure 
ensures that all significant tax shocks for the period 1964 to 2010 are included and results in a total of 95 pieces 
of important tax legislation. In comparison, Romer and Romer (2010) identify 50 important pieces of U.S. tax 
legislation over the period 1945 to 2007. 
For each of the important tax laws, I extensively describe the legislative process. Important dates, such as the 
date the bill was introduced and the date of the first reading, are included. There are two stages during the 
process at which the law may change: first, after the resolution of the leading parliamentary committee, and 
second, in the mediation committee. Primary sources for this information are the online archives of the 
Bundestag, which contain all relevant printed papers (Bundestag Drucksachen) published since 1976, allowing 
construction of the legislative history of tax acts. Note that printed papers prior to 1976 are not publicly available. 
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Nevertheless, I am able to determine the date of each law’s publication based on the law code published in the 
Federal Law Gazette. Sometimes, the law is introduced in two identical versions by both the government as well 
as by the parties forming the government. In that case, the reported date of the draft is the earlier one. The date 
of the committee action is chosen as the date of a proposal of resolution, which is important, as sometimes the 
accompanying report is published the following day. 
The tax laws identified as important typically change more than one piece of the tax code and, in fact, tax laws 
can contain as many as 50 or more distinct tax measures. The next step is identification of tax measures for each 
of the identified important tax laws. The Finanzbericht contains discussion of important tax measures as well as 
revenue forecasts itemized by tax measures. This history covers 845 tax measures in 95 important tax laws. 
These tax measures are first qualitatively described and then coded according to several dimensions. First, the 
date the tax measure is expected to be implementend is collected from the law code. Thus, the focus is on the 
date tax liabilities, rather than accrued tax revenues, are changed, as is the case with the original Romer and 
Romer (2010) narrative. In the event the tax measure is only temporary, the date the tax measure is expected to 
phase out is also presented. 
Timing the tax measures is difficult in a few cases. Changes in depreciation rules typically affect tax revenues 
for many years after the measure has phased out because present and future depreciation is affected over the 
whole lifespan of an investment good. Given the focus on changes in tax liabilities, the tax shock is timed 
according to the range of investment goods for which the measure was relevant. Sometimes, measures have 
retroactive components. In such cases, the implementation date is given as the date of publication in the Federal 
Law Gazette. This is done because publication of the act marks the formal end of the legislative process, implying 
that tax measures become legally binding around that time. Also note that some measures required the consent 
of the European Commission. In such cases, it was verified that such consent has indeed been granted. 
However, there was little evidence that the Commission’s consent was critical, so it seems warranted to base the 
timing of tax measures on the actual law code. Note that following Romer and Romer (2010), tax shocks are 
assigned to the period in which they are enacted when they are implemented before the middle of that period, 
and to the next period otherwise. 
2.4 Measuring Revenue Impacts and the Construction of Tax Shock Series 
The parliamentary rules of conduct mandate that any draft bill must be accompanied by a forecast of revenue 
effects. These forecasts are included in the statement on the introduction of the bill, revised in the report of the 
leading parliamentary committee, and summarized and potentially updated in the Finanzbericht. Generally, 
prospective revenue impacts after full implementation at an annual level (volle Jahreswirkung) and revenue 
forecasts for budgetary years are reported. Due to retroactive or temporary components, as well as in the 
situation where the tax measure will take time to have its full impact on actual tax revenues, the two figures may 
differ. The prospective revenue impact after full implementation at an annual level is my standard measure for the 
size of the tax shock. While revenue figures may differ across budget years, this is a single, transparent number. 
Also, it is the best proxy for the importance of the tax shock as the focus of this history is on changes in tax 
liabilities rather than in actual tax revenues. In some rare cases, the annualized prospective revenue impact after 
full implementation is not readily available. In those cases, revenue forecasts from budgetary years are used to 
construct an annualized revenue forecast after full implementation. Note that the Finanzbericht 1968 contains 
information for the impact only on budgetary years. However, Übersicht über die Steuerrechtsänderungen seit 
1964, published by the Federal Ministry of Finance, contains proxies for the effect after full implementation at an 
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annual level. All revenue forecasts reported in the case-by-case discussion are in billions of Euro. For the actual 
empirical applications, tax shocks are normalized by annual GDP. 
Identifying correct revenue impacts is difficult in two situations that arise with some frequency in the narrative. 
Changes in depreciation rules typically have accumulating revenue impacts as they affect taxes on investment or 
business decisions over consecutive years. The annualized revenue impact then represents averages over all 
affected investment vintages. The German tax code historically had various tax benefits for home ownership, 
regularly offering tax deductions for eight consecutive years. In these cases, I was able to reconstruct precisely 
the series of steps in which tax liabilities changed. 
This history supports the construction of two classes of tax shock series based on either the announcement or 
the implementation effect. The implementation effect measures actual innovations in tax liabilities, and best 
corresponds to ∆Tt in Equation (3). To construct the series, the case-by-case discussion reports the 
implementation date of tax measures or, in case a tax measure is temporary, the exact time span for which it is in 
effect. In the construction of the series, temporary tax measures are removed by an equal-sized tax shock in the 
opposite direction once they expire. One-time revenue effects are treated as a one-period temporary measure. 
Extensions of tax measures as well as retroactive components are not included, following Romer and Romer 
(2010). In the case-by-case discussion, the implementation effect associated with each piece of tax legislation is 
reported under the heading Implementation. Note that in order to keep the presentation manageable, the removal 
of temporary measures once they are phased out is not represented in the table. 
An act’s announcement effect is designed to capture the act’s importance in a single number. Extensions are 
included in the announcement effect, as the announcement of an extension may be useful information. The 
announcement series does not reflect the timing of tax measures, which could be important because some 
measures are announced up to four years before their actual implementation. Also, it does not distinguish 
between temporary and permanent tax measures. However, the announcement effect allows tracking changes in 
the tax acts during the legislative process and hence is computed for all three potential versions of the law, 
namely, the draft and the versions following resolutions by the leading parliamentary committee and by the 
mediation committee. Changes in the announcement amount may then reflect “unanticipated” changes in the total 
amount of the legislation. The detailed case-by-case discussion reports the announcement effect at the draft and 
publication stages of the process, as well as potential changes due to suggestions of the leading parliamentary 
committee and the mediation committee. 
Two other special complications arise. Reunification changed the GDP basis of the revenue forecast provided 
in official government sources around 1990. Specifically, revenue forecasts for laws discussed in the 
Finanzbericht for 1991 rely on figures for a unified Germany, while revenue forecasts reported earlier were based 
on West Germany only. As a consequence, the GDP measure used to standardize the tax shock is adjusted at 
that time. However, none of the tax legislation passed during the reunification process in 1989/1990 was 
quantitatively important. Also, beginning with 2001, all revenue figures are in Euro. Before that date, revenue 
figures are transformed into Euro using the official exchange rate 1 EUR = 1.95583 DEM. 
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2.5 Classifying Motivation of Tax Changes 
The motivation behind tax measures is inferred from official government sources. By rules of parliamentary 
procedure, motivation and intent must be explained in a statement on the introduction of the bill. In the event a bill 
is changed during the legislative process, the leading parliamentary committee’s report contains justifications and 
explanations of potential changes. Furthermore, protocols from discussions in the two parliamentary chambers, 
Bundestag and Bundesrat, are helpful in assessing motivations for tax changes. The Finanzbericht contains 
explanations and, sometimes, classifications of the motivations behind law changes. Note that prior to 1976, 
documents such as the draft of the bill or protocols of parliamentary debates are not publicly available. However, 
the Finanzbericht classifies motivation for all tax measures during the time span when other official documents 
are not available. This classification is sufficient for categorizing the tax measures. 
Extending the work of Romer and Romer (2010), tax measures are assigned to one of the following 
categories of motivation. I consider three endogenous classes of tax changes: spending driven (SD), 
countercyclical policies (CC), and policies driven by a recent macroeconomic shock (MS). Tax policies introduced 
for countercyclical reasons with the aim of offsetting current deviations of actual from potential output are clearly 
endogenous. Tax changes might be enacted to finance an increase in government spending. The increase in 
government spending can be interpreted as a structural innovation in the spending equation; hence, this tax 
change is an endogenous reaction to an important contemporaneous macroeconomic shock. However, this 
classification seems too narrow in the case of Germany. First, policymakers sometimes react to important policy 
events, such as the introduction of the Euro, reunification, and completion of the European common market. Also, 
sometimes policymakers increase taxes in response to an economic deterioration, with the intention of offsetting 
reductions in tax revenues. Neither type of reaction is exactly countercyclical nor spending driven, so I have 
labeled the category containing them “macroeconomic shocks.” 
I consider two classes of exogenous tax changes, those aimed at budget consolidation (C) and those 
implemented for structural reasons (S). Tax measures concerned with budget consolidation are related only to 
past spending and tax decisions and, hence, are exogenous with regard to contemporaneous macroeconomic 
conditions. Other tax policies are implemented for structural reasons. Policymakers might lower taxes in an effort 
to stimulate investment or consumption with the objective of improving structural conditions for long-term growth. 
Other measures in this category are undertaken to offset structural regional disparities or to promote social 
equity. Moreover, tax changes sometimes are made to increase the efficiency of the tax system, to create 
behavioral incentives, or because the constitutional court deemed former regulations unconstitutional. Both 
consolidation and structural tax measures are unrelated to contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks and thus 
are valid instruments for estimating the macroeconomic effects of tax changes. 
In most cases, tax measures can be unambiguously assigned to one of the above categories, but in a few 
instances, alternative interpretations of the motive behind a tax change are feasible. These alternative 
assignments are explicitly stated in the detailed case-by-case analysis. Sometimes, tax acts are focused on a set 
of centerpiece tax measures, while implementing subordinate tax changes to offset their revenue effects. These 
subordinate measures are deemed to have the same motivation as assigned to the centerpiece measure as all  
measures together form a common package. In the event that separate tax measures combined in one law have 
different motivations, such is accounted for in this history of important tax changes in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.
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3 Important Tax Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany1 
Gesetz zur Beschleunigung des Wirtschaftswachstums (Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz)2 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
11/09/2009 (CC: -8.482 bn €) 11/12/2009 12/02/2009 12/04/2009 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/18/2009 12/30/2009 (CC: -8.482 bn €) 12/30/2009 (CC: -0.05 bn €) 
01/01/2010 (CC: -7.402 bn €) 
 
At the time of writing the Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz, Germany was still in a recession as a consequence of the most recent 
financial crisis and, in essence, the law was a countercyclical stimulus. Noteworthy tax measures of the law were an expansion in child 
allowances and child benefits, changes in the corporate tax code related to loss carry over in case of takeovers, and reduction of the value-
added tax rate to 7 percent on overnight stays in hotels. 
The law’s quantitatively most important tax measures was an increase to 7,008 € in the tax-free amount for dependent children and 
the increase in child benefits of 20 € (§§ 32 and 66 EStG) effective 2010. The Finanzbericht reported an annualized revenue impact of 
-4.61 bn €. The second most important tax measure had to do with changes in § 8c KStG, which limits loss carry over in case of company 
acquisitions implying that losses of the acquired company are not deductible. The new rules in § 8c KStG sec. 1 made loss carry over 
unlimited for acquisitions within concerns. Also, loss carry over was allowed insofar as it does not exceed cookie jar reserves of the 
acquired company. Changes in § 8c KStG sec. 1a allowed loss carry over in case of takeovers made with the intention of recapitalization. 
This exemption had been introduced in the Gesetz zur verbesserten steuerlichen Berücksichtigung von Vorsorgeaufwendungen 
(Bürgerentlastungsgesetz Krankenversicherung) signed July 16, 2009, however, the measure had initially been restricted to 2008 and 
2009. With the Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz, the tax exemption was made permanent. The combined prospective revenue impact 
after full implementation given in the Finanzbericht was -1.34 bn € at an annual level, expected to be implemented with the beginning of 
2010. Unfortunately, the available revenue forecast does not allow distinguishing the components that were new tax measures from those 
that were mere extensions. To account for the law’s extension, I subtract the revenue forecast for the original measure introduced by the 
Bürgerentlastungsgesetz Krankenversicherung, which leaves an implementation effect of -0.445 bn €. Note that the revenue forecast for 
the full measure including the extension is included in the announcement effect of the law. The most controversial measure of the law was 
the reduction of the value-added tax rate to 7% on overnight stays in hotels (§ 12 UStG). The measure was effective January 1, 2010 and 
was expected to lower revenues by -0.945 bn €. 
Other measures of the law had only small revenue impacts. Changes in § 6 sec. 2 EStG eased deduction for low-value assets and 
were expected to change revenues by -0.4 bn € effective 2010. Restructuring of companies was eased (§ 6a GrEStG), which changed 
revenues by -0.2 bn € effective 2010. Changes in § 8 sec. 1 GewStG affected local business taxes on renting and leasing. The expected 
revenue effect was -0.08 bn € effective 2010. The inheritance tax code was changed in § 13a ErbStG and § 19 ErbStG. Changes in § 19 
ErbStG included a reduction of tax rates in favor of close relatives, expected to become effective at the beginning of 2010. The prospective 
revenue impact was -0.37 bn €. Changes in § 13a ErbStG eased company succession. The change was retroactive for inheritances in 
2009, hence; the tax shock is assigned the date of publication. Its expected revenue effect was -0.05 bn €. Changes in § 4h EStG and § 8a 
KStG affected the interest deduction ceiling rule that had been introduced with the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz 2008 signed August 
14, 2008. The change in § 4h sec. 2 EStG increased exemptions from the interest deduction ceiling rule. The measure was expected to 
come into effect at the beginning of 2010 and was expected to change tax revenues by -0.1 bn €. Also, the Bürgerentlastungsgesetz 
Krankenversicherung had temporarily introduced a tax threshold of 3 m € initially designed to be phased out by the end of 2009. With the 
new rules, the threshold of 3 m € became permanent. I follow the convention of setting the implementation effect of the measure to zero, 
while allowing for an announcement effect of -0.06 bn €. The new § 4 h EStG sec. 1 was implemented at the beginning of the year 2010 
and was expected to change tax revenues by -0.2 bn €. In essence, changes allowed for the shifting of deductible interest expenses 
across time. The provision also allowed deductible interest expenses from 2007 onward to be transferred across time, and hence had a 
retroactive component. 
                                                          
1 Recall the following abbreviations for categories of motivation: CC: countercyclical, MS: macroeconomic shock, SD: spending-driven policy, S: 
structural, C: consolidation. Under Draft and Publication, the announcement effect of the law at that stage of the legislative process is reported. When 
applicable, changes in the announcement effect after suggestions by the leading parliamentary committee and the mediation committee are given. Under 
Implementation, the implementation effects associated with the tax legislation are given. 
2 BGBl. 2009, 81, pp. 3950–3956. 
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Finally, changes in § 50 sec. 3 EnergieStG adjusted tax relief for bio fuels. Basically, the tax measure prolonged the time periods for 
which high tax reductions are granted. Initially, the tax deductions were to be reduced at the beginning of 2010, 2011, and 2012. Under 
new regulation, the tax reduction was to remain at the old level until the end of 2012. Hence, the measure affected revenues in several 
steps in 2010, 2011, and 2012, while at the beginning of 2013, the tax reductions are back on track. The Finanzbericht quoted a revenue 
impact after full implementation of -0.127 bn € as well as effects on budgets in 2010, 2011, and 2012. To identify a sequence of shocks, 
the effects in budgetary years are taken. This results in a tax shock of -0.052 bn € at the beginning of 2010, of -0.102 bn € (total) at the 
beginning of 2011, and of -0.127 bn € (total) at the beginning of 2012. However, only the first tax shock is within the time horizon of the 
analysis. To compute the announcement effect the maximum effect of -0.127 bn € is used. The measure was designed to affect tax 
liabilities at the beginning of 2010, but it required the consent of the Commission of the European Communities, which was not obtained 
until April 29, 2010. 
The opening sentence of the statement on the bill described the law as a reaction to the real economic effects of the 2007 financial 
crisis. It was clearly stated that the law was designed as a countercyclical reaction to the recent deterioration in economic growth with the 
intention of obtaining “stable and balanced” growth. Following the statement on the bill, the law’s tax measures were intended to deliver 
speedy stimuli for investment and consumption. Indeed, real GDP growth in the previous year was -5.2% in the third quarter and -2.2% in 
the fourth quarter of 2009. Although leading business cycle indicators at that time suggested a recovery, actual growth rates were still 
much lower than normal, hence leaving room for business cycle policies. Wolfgang Schäuble, finance minister at the time, acknowledged 
in his opening of the parliamentary debate that business cycle prospects were less gloomy than previously. Yet, he also spoke of 
“uncertainties” as to the extent and sustainability of the recovery. Mr. Schäuble acknowledged future risks for economic growth, such as 
higher unemployment, a credit crunch, and an increased incidence of company insolvency. Günther H. Oettinger, at that time head of state 
of Baden-Württemberg, explicitly labeled the law a business cycle policy in the final debate in the Bundesrat. Specifically, the largest 
component of the law, which was the increase in child benefits, was justified as increasing private demand. A slight complication in the 
classification of motivation arises because some of the tax measures—such as the reduction of taxes in case of company succession or 
the increase in the interest deduction ceiling rule—may have had structural motives. Still, from a careful reading of the introduction of the 
bill, as well as of the parliamentary debate, the primary motivation behind the tax measures was to compensate for the real economic 
deterioration following the financial crisis. In the speech mentioned above, Mr. Schäuble argued that changes in the taxation of 
inheritances and companies introduced by the bill will ease the burden of the economic crisis. The exemptions from the interest deduction 
ceiling rule were justified in the introduction of the bill as a relieving small and medium-sized companies from adverse consequences of the 
financial crisis. Changes in tax reductions for bio fuels were justified by decreased demand due to the recent economic deterioration. The 
single most controversial tax measure of the law was reduction of the value-added tax rate to 7% on overnight stays in hotels, which was 
regarded as clientele policy by the broad public. Given that observation, it may not be surprising that the government was relatively quiet 
on the motivation behind that part of the law. At best, the tax measure is justified on grounds of removing competitive disadvantage with 
other member states of the European Union. Still, here and elsewhere, I take the official government position at face value. Therefore, the 
general motivation of the law is also assigned to that specific tax measure. 
The law did not change substantially in the legislative process. In total, the Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz represented a tax 
shock of size 7.407 bn € in the first quarter of 2010. 
Gesetz zur Umsetzung steuerrechtlicher Regelungen des Maßnahmenpakets “Beschäftigungssicherung durch 
Wachstumsstärkung”3 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
11/13/2008 (CC: -4.378 bn €) 11/25/2008 12/02/2008 12/04/2008 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/05/2008 12/29/2008 (CC: -4.378 bn €) 12/29/2008 (CC: -0.263 bn €) 
01/01/2009 (CC: -4.115 bn €) 
 
At the time of writing the law, Germany was moving into a recession and in reaction to the economic deterioration following the financial 
crisis, the grand coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) decided to implement a stimulus package. This 
law contained the tax measures of the program. Noteworthy tax measures included an increased allowance for the deduction of craftsmen 
expenses and a temporary reintroduction of the declining balance method of depreciation. 
The quantitatively most important component of the law was reintroduction of the declining balance method of depreciation (§ 7 sec. 2 
EStG) for investment made in 2009 and 2010. It can be difficult to measure the size and timing of revenue impacts of changes in 
                                                          
3 BGBl. 2008, 64, pp. 2896–2898. 
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depreciation rules. The Finanzbericht reported an annualized effect of the measure after full implementation of -2.52 bn €, which is close to 
the reported average effect over the five consecutive budgetary years 2009 to 2013. The figure -2.52 bn € hence seems a reasonable 
proxy for the annualized impact on tax liabilities. Deciding when to phase out the temporary depreciation rule seems more difficult as the 
tax measure will affect liabilities far past the end of 2010 as an implication of the declining balance depreciation is that depreciations will be 
high initially, but then fall below the linear depreciation. Hence, the revenue impact of the tax measure quickly returned to zero (or may 
even have turned sign) as declining depreciations undercut the linear depreciations. The way I decided to treat depreciation in this 
narrative is to take the range over which new investments are affected as a basis for the timing decision. This gives an annualized tax 
shock of -2.52 bn €, implemented at the beginning of 2009 and phased out at the end of 2010. § 52 sec. 23 expanded special 
depreciations in the years 2009 and 2010. The annualized impact of that measure was -0.095 bn €. 
The measure in § 35a sec. 2 EStG increased allowances for craftsmen expenses from 600 € to 1,200 €. The annualized impact after 
full implementation was given as -1.5 bn €, expected to be implemented at the beginning of 2009. In contrast to the other tax measures, 
this was designed to be permanent. Also, the law introduced an exemption of new cars from the automobile tax. The measure was 
retroactive for all cars bought after November 5, 2008. Following the standard practice, the date of publication is given as the 
implementation date. Defining the lifetime of the measure is complicated by the fact that the exemption was granted for a longer time span 
for environmentally friendly cars. Still, the exemption was granted at a maximum until December 31, 2010, which is chosen as the phase-
out date of the measure. Over the full lifetime of the measure, the expected revenue impact is -0.57 bn €. Given that the tax measure is in 
place for 26 months, I assign an annualized revenue impact of -0.263 bn €. 
At the time of writing the law, the economic outlook was gloomy. Actual growth rates for the previous year were marginally positive in 
the third quarter, but turned negative in the fourth quarter of 2008. Nearly all economic observers expected a deep recession in 2009 as a 
consequence of the most recent financial crisis. The law was explicitly labeled as a stimulus package. Hence, the overall categorization of 
the law as a countercyclical policy is straightforward. Specifically, in the statement accompanying the introduction of the bill, the law was 
described as a response to the recent financial crisis. The temporary reintroduction of the declining balance method of depreciation was 
intended to stimulate investment. The expansion in special depreciations was supposed to temporarily improve business solvency and 
investment. The exemption of new cars from the automobile tax was designed to increase car sales, with the intention of stabilizing the 
business cycle. In course of the second reading in the Bundestag, Reinhard Schultz (SPD) of the coalition government justified the 
increased allowance for workmen expenses by claiming that doing so would increase private demand. In the final debate in the Bundesrat, 
the law was widely accepted as a countercyclical measure across parties, although there was some debate as to whether its range was 
sufficient. Taken together, classification of the law as a countercyclical policy is unambiguous. 
Within the legislative process, the law was not changed substantially. The total announcement and implementation effect of the law 
correspond to -4.343 bn €, both in the first quarter of 2009. 
Gesetz zur Förderung von Familien und haushaltsnahen Dienstleistungen (Familienleistungsgesetz - FamLeistG)4 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
10/16/2008 (S: -2.24 bn €) 11/13/2008 12/02/2008 (S: -0.03 bn €) 12/04/2008 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
12/05/2008 12/17/2008 12/18/2008 12/19/2008 
Publication Implementation   
12/29/2008 (S: -2.27 bn €) 01/01/2009 (S: -2.27 bn €)   
The primary purpose of the Familienleistungsgesetz was to increase child benefits and the tax-free amount for children. Note that the total 
amount of the law falls short of the 0.1% threshold by a small margin, but as the law consisted mainly of one quantitatively important 
measure, it is included in the narrative. 
The most important tax measure of this law was the increase in child benefits for the first two children by 10 € and by 16 € for 
additional children and the increase in the tax-free amount for children from 5,808 € to 6,024 € effective 2009. The measure was expected 
to change tax revenue by -2.14 bn € on an annual basis. Of somewhat lesser importance were the changes in § 35 a EStG, which 
expanded allowances for household employment and so called Minijobs (insignificant employment). The measure was expected to change 
tax revenues by -0.13 bn €, effective at the beginning of 2009. 
The statement on the introduction of the bill reported welfare-political reasons for the tax change. The increase in child benefits was 
intended to increase family income. The staggered increase in child benefits for families with more than two children is reported as being 
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especially beneficial for households with many children. It is also reported that existing rules for household employment are too 
complicated and require simplification. The expansion in allowances for household employment was expected to promote family home 
care and to promote reconciliation of work and family life. In the opening speech in the first parliamentary reading, Mrs. Lydia Westrich 
(SPD) from the coalition government also reported welfare-political reasons for the increase in child benefits. She additionally justified the 
reform of household employment as reducing illegal employment in that area. Dr. Ursula von der Leyen (Federal Minister for Family Affairs, 
Senior Citizens, Women and Youth at that time) justified the increases in child benefits by referring to increases in costs of living, reporting 
that since the last adjustment in 2002, costs of living had changed substantially. This suggests an additional motivation, as child 
allowances are constitutionally required to cover the minimal living cost of children. Taken together, exogenous, structural reasons seem to 
have been responsible for the law change and the law is classified as being driven by structural reasons. 
In the legislative process, the law was altered only modestly. The tax-free amount for children was originally designated as 6,000 € but 
was later increased to 6,024 €. The report by the leading parliamentary committee suggested technical reasons for this change. The total 
announcement and implementation effect of the law corresponded to -2.27 bn €, both in the first quarter of 2009. 
Gesetz zur Sicherung von Beschäftigung und Stabilität in Deutschland5 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
01/27/2009 (CC: -7.47 bn €) 01/30/2009 02/11/2009 02/13/2009 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
02/20/2009 03/05/2009 (CC: -7.47 bn €)  (CC: 03/05/2009 -3.11 bn €) 
 (CC: 04/01/2009 -1.53 bn €) 
 (CC: 01/01/2010 -2.83 bn €) 
 
The law was part of the second stimulus package passed by the coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD in course of the financial crisis and 
contained two important tax measures concerned with adjusting the income tax tariff and temporarily extending child benefits. In addition to 
these tax-related aspects, the law contained expansions in government expenditures, most noteworthy among which was an investment 
package worth 16.9 bn €, along with a car-scrap bonus. 
On the revenue side, the bill had only two quantitatively important measures. The first was a single, one-time 100 € payment in child 
benefits. The expected annualized revenue impact of that measure was -1.53 bn €. For the majority of beneficiaries, the one-time child 
benefit was expected to be paid in April and May 2009. Hence, the tax measure is treated as a tax increase in the second quarter of 2009 
and a tax decrease in the third quarter of 2009. Unfortunately, it is difficult to arrive at more precise implementation dates as the child 
benefit is paid out in a rolling procedure. Still, the first cohort of beneficiaries receives the child benefit at the beginning of the month, and 
the last at the end of the month. This allows choosing April 1, 2009 as the implementation date and May 30, 2009 as the phase-out date, in 
the event specific dates are desirable. The second measure was a change in the income tax tariff. Specifically, the tax-free amount, as well 
as the tax tariff, was adjusted in two steps, one retroactive for 2009, the other effective 2010. Regrettably, the revenue forecasts do not 
allow directly distinguishing the effects of the first step from the second, but taking revenue effects based on budgetary years offers a 
solution. Accordingly, the initial shock is chosen as -3.11 bn €, and the second as -2.83 bn €. These changes were intended to be 
permanent. 
Identifying the motivation behind the tax law is straightforward. At the time of passage, the economy was in a recession, with little sign 
of immediate recovery. The statement on the introduction of the bill declared it as a reaction to the financial crisis. Specifically, the 
temporary expansion in child benefits, as well as the reduction in income taxes, was intended to increase aggregate demand. In the 
parliamentary debate, finance minister Peer Steinbrück claimed that the economy was in the worst recession since creation of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and proposed the need for a demand stimulus. 
Changes within the legislative process had no effect on the revenue impact of the law. Its announcement effect was -7.47 bn €, 
implemented in the second quarter of 2009 and in the first quarter of 2010. 
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Gesetz zur Fortführung der Gesetzeslage 2006 bei der Entfernungspauschale6 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
03/03/2009 (S: -2.53 bn €) 03/05/2009 03/18/2009 03/19/2009 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
04/03/2009 12/09/2008 (S: -2.53 bn €) 12/09/2008 (S: -2.53 bn €)  
The Gesetz zur Fortführung der Gesetzeslage 2006 bei der Entfernungspauschale reintroduced commuter tax allowances previously 
abolished by the Steueränderungsgesetz 2007. In a ruling on December 9, 2008 the constitutional court decided that the changes brought 
about by the Steueränderungsgesetz 2007 were unconstitutional and in effect reintroduced the commuter tax allowance. 
Prior to 2007, commuters had been allowed to reduce taxable income by 0.3 € per kilometer commuting distance. The 
Steueränderungsgesetz 2007 changed that regulation by restricting deductible expenses to commuting distances longer than 20 
kilometers. Changes brought about by the Steueränderungsgesetz 2007 also removed the possibility of deducting public transport 
expenses if they exceeded the lump-sum allowances. As another side effect of the 2007 regulation, accident costs were no longer 
deductible as extraordinary financial burdens. A ruling by the constitutional court on December 9, 2008 in effect reintroduced the commuter 
tax allowances retroactive to the first kilometer of commuting distance since 2007. The Gesetz zur Fortführung der Gesetzeslage 2006 bei 
der Entfernungspauschale was only a matter of form in regard to the commuter tax allowance, but it also reintroduced the increased 
allowance for public transport and for accident costs. Unfortunately, the available proxies for the revenue impact of the measure do not 
allow distinguishing the effect of the reintroduction of the lump-sum allowance for commuting expenses from the allowances for public 
transport and accident costs. However, it is clear that most of the revenue impact derived from the change in the lump-sum allowances, 
which in effect was reintroduced by the constitutional court’s December 9 ruling. It thus seems reasonable to time the full tax shock in 
accordance with that ruling and hence the tax shock -2.53 bn € is dated December 9, 2008. 
It is easy to classify the motivation behind this law. In its main parts, the law followed the ruling of the constitutional court. In cases 
where the government deviated from the ruling of the constitutional court, it is clear that sociopolitical reasons were the driving factors. The 
Gesetz zur Fortführung der Gesetzeslage 2006 bei der Entfernungspauschale was motivated by structural reasons. 
The law constitutes an exogenous tax shock of size -2.53 bn € in the first quarter of 2009. 
Gesetz zur verbesserten steuerlichen Berücksichtigung von Vorsorgeaufwendungen (Bürgerentlastungsgesetz 
Krankenversicherung)7 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
02/20/2009 (S: -9.33 bn €) 03/19/2009 06/17/2009 (CC: -2.905 bn €) 
06/17/2009 (S: -0.345 bn €) 
06/19/2009 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
07/10/2009 07/22/2009 (CC: -2.905 bn €) 
07/22/2009 (S: -9.675 bn €) 
07/22/2009 (CC: -2.655 bn €) 
01/01/2010 (S: -9.675 bn €) 
 
Initially, the law was designed to expand tax allowances for health insurance and long-term care contributions in compliance with a ruling 
by the constitutional court requiring that such expenses should be treated as part of the minimum income needed to exist. Within the 
legislative process, however, the law became augmented with additional measures largely designed to accommodate the economic 
deterioration following the financial crisis, but unrelated to the initial intentions of the law. 
Changes in § 10 EStG and related parts of the income tax code expanded allowances for contributions to health and long-term care 
insurance. The measure was expected to change tax revenue by -9.47 bn € on an annual level effective 2010. In comparison to this 
measure, changes in § 10 sec. 1 no. 1 EStG, § 32 sec. 4 sent. 2 EStG, and § 33a EStG are of minor importance, basically being 
necessary technical adjustments. Taken together, the measures were expected to change tax revenues by -0.205 bn € on an annual level 
effective 2010. Note that in contrast to the Gesetz zur Fortführung der Gesetzeslage 2006 bei der Entfernungspauschale, the constitutional 
court ruling did not seem to have immediate impact on tax revenues. Also, the revenue impacts of the ruling were less clear than in the 
previous case, especially as the lawmaker had considerable discretion on precisely how to implement the court’s ruling. Hence, it seems 
warranted to base the timing of the tax measures on the law itself. 
Based on the report by the leading parliamentary committee, the tax legislation was augmented by additional measures. Changes in 
§ 20 sec. 2 UStG allowed companies with turnovers lower than 500,000 € to pay value-added taxes on actual revenues rather than on 
contracted sums, limited to the period July 1, 2009 to December 31, 2011. The effect of these changes was an immediate and one-time 
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liquidity effect for small companies, to be offset once the measure expired. Hence, the measure constituted a tax shock of -1.7 bn € 
effective retroactively for July 2009, to be offset by an equal-sized shock in the next period. The phase-out date of the temporary measure 
was beyond the time horizon of the narrative. A slight complication arises because companies in East Germany had higher thresholds until 
the end of 2009 even before implementation of the law. So, for East German countries, the tax measure was a mere extension of existing 
law. The Finanzbericht put an estimate of -0.25 bn € on the extension. As the measure is an extension, it appears in the announcement 
effect of the law, but does not constitute an implementation shock. Finally, the law introduced two temporary measures reducing the 
corporate tax burden. § 8c KStG sec. 1a allowed loss carry over in case of acquisitions made with the intention of recapitalizing a 
company. Also, the Bürgerentlastungsgesetz Krankenversicherung temporarily raised the exemption limit in the interest rate deduction rule 
to 3 m €. Both tax measures were retroactive for 2008 and designed to phase-out at the end of 2009; hence, their implementation date is 
the date of publication. By later regulation in the Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz, both tax measures became permanent. Their 
combined revenue impact was -0.955 bn €. 
In the statement on the introduction of the bill, it was stated that the constitutional court had demanded that expenses for health and 
long-term insurance should be treated as part of the minimum income needed to exist. Given the structure of the German tax code, this 
had far-reaching consequences as the minimum income is not taxable. The law at hand contained the necessary adjustments in the tax 
code. Also, the initial set of tax measures underwent some minor adjustment due to the report of the Finanzausschuss. Based on the 
report, technical reasons seem to have been responsible for the changes. Specifically, no business cycle motivation is assigned to the 
minor adjustments in the initial set of tax measures. Classifying the motivation behind the new tax measures is also straightforward. The 
report of the leading parliamentary committee clearly stated the last financial crisis as the underlying motivation. The increase in the 
exemptions from the interest deduction ceiling is justified as strengthening medium-sized companies in economically difficult times. Similar 
reasoning is given for the changes in § 8 c KStG. In the second reading, Gabriele Frechen (SPD) from the coalition government stated that 
the increase in the threshold in § 20 sec. 2 UStG gave small companies a liquidity advantage in times of economic turmoil. Eduard Oswald 
(CDU/CSU) from the coalition government also stated that the recent financial crisis was responsible for alternation of the law within the 
legislative process. Taken together, the tax measures related to the deduction of health and long-term care insurance contributions are 
classified as motivated by structural reasons, while the other measures were countercyclical. 
Within the legislative process, the law was changed substantially. While the changes made to the original part of the law were modest, 
it was augmented with a group of countercyclical measures. 
Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz 20088 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
03/27/2007 (S: -8.915 bn €) 03/30/2007 05/23/2007 (S: 0.035 bn €) 05/25/2007 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
07/06/2007 08/17/2007 (S: -8.88 bn €) 08/17/2007 (S: 1.78 bn €) 
08/18/2007 (S: -0.155 bn €) 
01/01/2008 (S: -9.635 bn €) 
01/01/2009 (S: -0.87 bn €) 
 
The law was concerned with reforming corporate and business taxation and introduced changes in the income, corporate, and local 
business tax code. The basic idea behind the reform can be traced back to the coalition agreement between the SPD and CDU/CSU 
governments. In essence, the law reduced statuary tax rates while broadening the tax base. Of interest also was the introduction of a flat 
rate tax on capital income beginning in 2009. 
The law reduced the corporate tax rate from 25 percent to 15 percent effective 2008, which was expected to change tax revenues by 
-12.555 bn €. Also, the law reduced the local business tax burden starting in 2008 by changing the tax scale. This measure was expected 
to change tax revenue by -6.75 bn €. The law also changed other aspects of the local business tax. Changes related to the treatment of 
local business taxes in income taxation (§ 4 sec. 5b EStG, § 35 sec. 1 EStG) induced revenue effects of 6.18 bn € effective 2008. In 
essence, local business taxes were no longer deductible as business expenses. Other less important changes related to local business 
taxes had a net effect of 0.18 bn € effective 2008. 
Changes in § 34a EStG benefited retained earnings. The expected revenue effect of the measure was a change in tax revenues of 
-4.045 bn € on an annual level effective 2008. Changes in § 8b sec. 10 KStG limited exemptions from corporate taxation and were 
expected to change tax revenues by 1.18 bn €, retroactive with 2007. The law also changed some depreciation rules. Changes in § 7 sec. 
2 EStG abolished declining depreciation. This was expected to change tax revenues by 3.365 bn € on an annual basis effective 2008. 
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Changes to § 6 sec. 2 EStG abolished the immediate write-off of low-value assets. The expected change in tax revenues was 0.745 bn € 
effective 2008. Finally, some rather technical aspects in § 7g EStG related to special depreciations were changed, with an expected 
revenue effect of -0.155 bn € effective the day after publication. Changes in § 8a KStG, § 8b sec. 10 KStG and § 8 c KStG broadened the 
tax base. Changes in § 8a KStG were expected to lower tax revenues by -0.475 bn € effective retroactively May 2007. As an 
implementation date, I hence choose the day of publication. New regulations in § 8b sec. 10 were supposed to affect tax revenues by 
1.18 bn € effective retroactively for 2007. Changes in § 8c KStG were expected to change tax revenues by 1.475 bn € effective with the 
beginning of 2008. 
Importantly, the tax law introduces an interest deduction ceiling in § 4h EStG and § 8a KStG. The tax measure was expected to 
change tax revenues by 1.075 bn €, to be implemented retroactive to May 2007. Accordingly, I choose the publication date as date of 
implementation. Of interest also was introduction of a flat rate tax on capital income beginning with 2009, which was expected to change 
tax revenues by -0.87 bn €. Changes in § 1 AStG were designed to complicate the shifting of tax obligations to foreign countries with 
potentially lower tax burdens. The measures were expected to raise 1.77 bn € at an annual level effective at the beginning of 2008. The 
Finanzbericht also reported additional tax revenues of 3.89 bn € generated by “additional measures to secure the national tax basis.” It is 
unclear which measures of the law generated these revenues, making timing the tax measure difficult. Also, as argued by Romer and 
Romer (2009a), revenue forecasts for such components are extremely unreliable, either because the data basis for revenue forecasts is 
scarce or because the government may have a systematic incentive to misestimate such figures. The most sensible approach seems to 
omit the tax shock of 3.89 bn € from the analysis. 
In the statement of the introduction of the bill, it was stated that statuary tax rates in Germany were high compared to other countries, 
but at the same time, loopholes hindered the effectiveness of the tax system. As a solution, the statement on the introduction of the bill 
proposed a reduction in statutory tax rates accompanied by broadening the tax base. The proposal for a corporate tax reform had originally 
been raised in the coalition agreement between SPD and CDU/CSU. It had been proposed that a corporate tax reform should be 
implemented that strengthens international competitiveness and broadens the tax base. According to the statement on the introduction of 
the bill, one consequence of the tax law would have been an increase in investment, inducing higher consumption and economic growth. 
Also, the statement on the introduction of the bill claimed that the interest deduction ceiling not only broadens the tax base, but also 
strengthens the equity of companies by reducing incentives to borrow capital. In addition, the tax law is claimed to contribute to 
bureaucratic neutrality and to go some way toward reducing the variance in local business tax revenues. In the final debate in the 
Bundesrat, then finance minister Peer Steinbrück (SPD) restated several of these objectives: the tax law was supposed to strengthen 
international competitiveness, broaden the tax base, reduce the variance of local revenues, and, finally, increase bureaucratic neutrality. It 
is clear that the primary motivation behind the tax law was structural. 
Within the legislative process, the law experienced some technical alternations, none of which, however, were related to a change in 
motivation. In total, the law corresponded to an exogenous announcement effect of -8.88 bn €, to be implemented at various dates in 2007, 
2008, and 2009. 
Gesetz zur steuerlichen Förderung von Wachstum und Beschäftigung9 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
01/19/2006 (S: -5.57 bn €) 02/16/2006 03/15/2006 03/17/2006 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
04/07/2006 05/05/2006 (S: -5.57 bn €) 05/05/2006 (S: -4.09 bn €) 
07/01/2006 (S: -1.23 bn €) 
 
The law’s main measures were temporary extensions of depreciation allowances and allowances for the wage component of household 
renovation expenditures. 
The act expanded depreciation allowances for all investment made in 2006 and 2007. The annualized expected revenue impact was 
quoted as -2.41 bn €. Allowances for the wage component of home-care and household renovation expenditures were permanently 
increased effective retroactively for the tax assessment period 2006. The combined expected annualized revenue impact of both measures 
was given as -1.22 bn €. The law also introduced allowances for child-care expenses, changing tax revenue by -0.46 bn € retroactive for 
2006. Finally, in § 20 UStG, the law changed thresholds for paying the value-added tax on realized revenues rather than on liabilities. In 
the old Laender, the threshold was permanently raised to 250.000 € starting July 2006. In the new Laender, the increased threshold of 
500.000 € was extended three years to the end of 2009. The revenue impact of those measures was a change in the timing of revenues. 
The Finanzbericht reported a budgetary effect of the permanent increase in the threshold of -1.23 bn € in 2006 as well as of -0.25 bn € for 
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the extension in 2007. The implementation effect of just the extension is set to zero. The permanent increase in the threshold for West 
Germany is treated as a one-time levy to be offset by an equally sized shock in the next period. 
The statement on the introduction of the bill left it somewhat open whether the law was a response to recent deteriorations in output or 
whether it was intended to change potential output growth. Specifically, the opening statement on the bill reported that the law’s measures 
were intended to increase growth in economically difficult times. However, in the first quarter of 2006, the economy was growing by an 
annual rate of 2.85%, whereas growth had more sluggish in 2004 and 2005. Also, unemployment had been high in 2005, but the rates had 
already started to decline. Based on standard business cycle forecasts, there was little evidence for an approaching recession. This was 
also acknowledged by the government and indicated by Mr. Glos, Minister of Economic Affairs at that time, in the parliamentary debate. 
This macroeconomic background made countercyclical measures unnecessary, strengthening the interpretation that the measures were 
designed to change potential growth. Also, high unemployment rates at that time seemed to be more structural than cyclical. Note further 
that countercyclical reasons were given very little weight in the parliamentary debate accompanying the law. Still, given the somewhat 
indefinite categorization of motivation, a case-by-case study of the motivation behind these tax measures seems warranted. 
The extensions of the depreciation allowances were intended to increase investment and were limited to two years. Mr. Steinbrück, 
Federal Minister of Finance at that time, justified the temporary nature of the measure on grounds that another, broader reform would 
replace these allowances in 2008. Hence, the temporary nature of these measures per se does not indicate a countercyclical motive. Mr. 
Glos reported that the measure was intended to increase investment and to have a favorable impact on economic activity. The statement 
on the bill reported that the measure will foster growth, which fits the structural interpretation. Still, as an alternative interpretation, the 
measure may have been designed as a response to a temporary reduction in investment, and hence may be countercyclical. The 
increases in the thresholds in § 20 UStG were justified in the statement of the bill on ground that they provide small companies with 
liquidity advantages. Mr. Steinbrück, however, reported that the measure may help companies to survive the currently harsh conditions, so 
an alternative countercyclical motivation is possible. The increased allowances for renovation expenditures are justified by Mr. Glos as 
reducing moonlighting in that area, inducing me to choose structural reasons as the primary motivation for this measure. However, Mr. 
Steinbrück reported that the measure was intended to create new jobs quickly, which may be interpreted as an offsetting measure. Still, it 
seems much more likely that this was a structural response to permanently high unemployment. The motivation behind two measures was 
unambiguous. In the statement on the introduction of the bill, the increased allowances for childcare were justified on grounds that it 
improved reconciliation of work and family. The increases in allowances for home care have quantitatively negligible effects and received 
little attention in the parliamentary debate. It was, however, stated that the measure may help to reduce the notoriously high level of 
moonlighting in that area. Taken together, the primary motivation of the law appeared to be structural. As discussed above, for some of the 
measures, an alternative interpretation is possible, albeit improbable. 
Within the legislative process, the law was subject to only technical alternations, none of which had significant revenue impacts. In 
total, the law corresponded to a tax reduction of -5.57 bn € to be implemented at various dates in 2006 and 2007. 
Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 200610 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
02/24/2006 (SD: 7.648 bn €) 
02/24/2006 (C: 16.887 bn €) 
03/28/2006 05/17/2006 (S: -0.34 bn €)  05/19/2006 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
06/16/2006 06/30/2006 (SD: 7.648 bn €) 
06/30/2006 (C: 16.547 bn €) 
01/01/2007 (SD: 7.648 bn €) 
01/01/2007 (C: 16.547 bn €) 
 
The Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 2006 contained both tax and expenditure measures intended to help consolidate the budget. Parts of the 
additional revenues were also used to finance a reduction in social insurance contribution rates. 
The law’s most important measure was an increase in the value-added tax rate to 19 percent effective 2007. The measure constituted 
a permanent tax increase worth 22.945 bn € on an annual basis. The law also raised the insurance tax rate to 19 percent, with an 
expected annualized tax impact of 1.59 bn € effective 2007. Somewhat less important and of a rather technical nature were the changes in 
§ 24 Sec. 1 UStG related to tax benefits for the agricultural sector, which was expected to change tax revenues by -0.34 bn € effective 
2007. 
The motivation behind the law was clearly stated in the statement on the introduction of the bill. Tax revenue was running short of 
expenditures and, hence, a substantial increase in taxes was needed. One-third of the additional revenue in value-added taxes, however, 
was earmarked to finance a reduction in social insurance contribution rates. As such, the Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 2006 aimed at reducing 
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the burden on labor income by an increase in indirect taxes. Given that, formally, social insurance is not part of taxes, it seems advisable to 
treat social insurance expenditures as spending and, accordingly, that part of the law was spending-driven. Changes in § 24 Sec. 1 UStG 
were intended to compensate for the increase in the value-added tax rate and, other than that, received little attention in the official 
documents or in parliamentary debate. Following the usual practice, the measure is assigned the same motivation as the primary law, 
although an alternative structural interpretation may be possible. 
Within the legislative process, the law was augmented by the measure in § 24 Sec. 1 UStG related to value-added taxes on the 
agricultural sector. Taken together, the law increased tax revenues by 24.195 bn € effective 2007. 
Steueränderungsgesetz 200711 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
05/18/2006 (C: 4.389 bn €)  05/19/2006 06/29/2006 06/29/2006 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
07/07/2006 07/24/2006 (C: 4.389 bn €) 01/01/2007 (C: 3.841 bn €) 
01/01/2008 (C: 0.014 bn €) 
01/01/2009 (C: 0.534 bn €) 
 
The law combined a diversity of tax measures, most of them associated with only minor revenue effects. Of most interest is the reduction 
in the lump-sum tax break for commuters, a measure later ruled unconstitutional. 
Under new regulation, the commuter tax allowance only became applicable for the 21st kilometer of commuting distance. The 
measure changed tax revenues by 2.53 bn € on an annual basis, effective beginning in 2007. Later, the measure was ruled 
unconstitutional; see the discussion under Gesetz zur Fortführung der Gesetzeslage 2006 bei der Entfernungspauschale. Also of 
importance was the increased income tax rate of 45 percent on income above 250.000 € effective 2007, which was expected to raise 
1.3 bn €. A temporary reduction in taxes on profits for the tax assessment period 2007 induced a revenue change of -1.05 bn €. Other tax 
measures were of limited importance in terms of their revenue impacts. The change in § 4 Sec. 5 EStG limited allowances for home 
offices, with an expected revenue impact of 0.3 bn € effective 2007. Also, allowances for saving were reduced. The expected revenue 
impact was 0.75 bn € effective 2007. Another measure involved the limitation of child allowances for children under 25 years, changing 
revenues by 0.534 bn € effective 2009. Changes in the Bergmannprämiengesetz altered tax benefits for miners in two steps effective with 
2007 and 2008. Based on the Finanzbericht, the first change is associated with an expected revenue impact of 0.011 bn €, the latter with 
an expected revenue impact of 0.014 bn €. 
The statement on the introduction of the bill reported consolidation motives as justification for the changes. Further stated motives 
were related to simplification of the tax code or ideology, for example, the increased tax rate for the top income bracket. The law is not 
related to contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks; rather, the question is whether the law was a reaction to an inherited budget deficit or 
more structurally motivated. In the parliamentary debates, there was a clear emphasis on budget consolidation, with little or no discussion 
of alternative motives. Accordingly, the law is classified as being driven by a consolidation motive. 
Gesetz zur Abschaffung der Eigenheimzulage12 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
11/29/2005 (C: 5.893 bn €) 12/01/2005 12/14/2005 12/15/2005 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/21/2005 12/30/2005 (C: 5.893 bn €) 01/01/2006 (C: 0.737 bn €) 
01/01/2007 (C: 0.737 bn €) 
01/01/2008 (C: 0.737 bn €) 
01/01/2009 (C: 0.737 bn €) 
01/01/2010 (C: 0.737 bn €) 
 
The law abolished home owner benefits, with the presumable motive of budget consolidation. 
Home owner benefits were abolished for all owner-occupied dwellings built or bought after 2006. Previously, home owner benefits 
were paid for a total of eight consecutive years beginning with completion or acquisition of the dwelling. This is one example of a tax 
change affecting revenue in a series of steps. Unlike most depreciation rules, however, I am able to fully recover the sequence of shocks in 
this case. The fact that home owner benefits had been paid for eight consecutive years implies that eight cohorts of home owners obtained 
benefits in one assessment period, all having acquired their home in different years. In 2006, home owner benefits were no longer paid for 
                                                          
11 BGBl. 2006, 35, pp. 1652–1658. 
12 BGBl. 2005, 76, p. 3680. 
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newly acquired homes, implying that only those seven cohorts that had acquired homes between 1999 and 2005 obtained benefits. In 
2007, those who had acquired their homes in 1999 no longer received the benefit, leaving six cohorts. Continuing in this fashion implies 
that in 2012 only those who had acquired homes in 2005 still received the benefit. The full revenue impact for each cohort over the eight 
years is given in the Finanzbericht as 5.893 bn €, which, distributed over eight years, gives a series of revenue shocks in 2006, 2007, … , 
2013, each worth 0.737 bn €. 
Identyfing the motivation behind the tax measure is straightforward. The statement on the introduction of the bill reported that 
consolidation motives are the primary reason for the change. In the parliamentary debate, the measure received relatively little attention 
and no other motives were mentioned. Hence, budget consolidation was the motive for this tax measure. 
Within the legislative process, the law did not experience any noteworthy alternations. In total, the tax law had a volume of 5.893 bn € 
distributed over the years 2006 to 2013. 
Gesetz zur Beschränkung der Verlustverrechnung im Zusammenhang mit Steuerstundungsmodellen13 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
11/29/2005 (C: 2.135 bn €) 12/01/2005 12/14/2005 12/15/2005 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/21/2005 12/30/2005 (C: 2.135 bn €) 12/30/2005 (C: 2.135 bn €)  
The law does not pass the 0.1% threshold; however, as it consisted of only one tax measure and that measure changed tax revenue by 
0.09% of GDP it seems important enough to be included here. In essence, the law is concerned with closing loopholes in the income tax 
code. 
Changes in § 15b EStG removed the possibility of discounting losses based on tax-shelter schemes. The measure was expected to 
raise revenues by 2.125 bn € on an annual basis and was effective retroactively to November 10, 2005. Accordingly, the date of 
publication is chosen as the implementation date. 
As stated in the statement on the introduction of the bill, the motivation behind the tax measure was to increase tax justice and the 
efficiency of the tax system, as well as to raise additional revenue. In the parliamentary debates, the measure received relatively little 
attention and did not appear to be driven by any current macroeconomic distortions. Rather, the measure was regularly discussed in the 
context of consolidation motives. Hence, the law’s motivation was consolidation. 
Within the legislative process, the law did not experience any noteworthy alternations. The law had a volume of 2.135 bn € in the first 
quarter of 2006. 
Gesetz zur Förderung der Steuerehrlichkeit14 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
07/01/2003 (S: ? bn €) 07/03/2003 10/15/2003 10/17/2003 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/07/2003 12/16/2003 12/19/2003 12/19/2003 
Publication Implementation   
12/29/2003 (S: ? bn €) 01/01/2004 (S: 1.4 bn €)   
The law allowed taxpayers who had engaged in tax fraud in the past to declare their hidden income and pay a reduced tax rate of 25% on 
evaded income. In return, the taxpayers would no longer need to fear punishment for the past tax evasion. Such declarations were allowed 
only temporarily for 2004. The tax measure hence constitutes a tax shock at the beginning of 2004, offset at the beginning of 2005. The 
annualized revenue impact of the law was given as 5 bn €. Yet, it is clear from the debate accompanying the law that the original estimate 
of 5 bn € was overly optimistic. Accordingly, the revenue forecast used to assess the announcement effect of the law is set to zero. The 
true revenue impact was later reported as only 1.4 bn €. For the implementation series, the actual amount of 1.4 bn € is taken. 
It is clear that contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks were not the driving force behind this law; indeed, the statement on the 
introduction of the bill reported concerns about tax justice as primary reason. This is also the primary motive mentioned in the 
parliamentary debates. Accordingly, the law is classified as structural. 
In total, the law corresponds to a shock of 1.4 bn € at the first quarter of 2004. 
                                                          
13 BGBl. 2005, 76, pp. 3683–3684. 
14 BGBl. 2003, 66, pp. 2928–2932. 
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Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 200415 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
08/15/2003 (C: 14.332 bn €) 
08/15/2003 (CC: -15.05 bn €) 
09/09/2003 10/15/2003 (C: -0.165 bn €) 10/17/2003 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/07/2003 12/16/2003 (C: -6.982 bn €) 
12/16/2003 (CC: 6.61 bn €) 
12/19/2003 12/19/2003 
Publication Implementation   
12/31/2003 (C: 7.185 bn €) 
12/31/2003 (CC: -8.440 bn €) 
01/01/2004 (C: 4.976 bn €) 
01/01/2004 (CC: -8.44 bn €) 
01/01/2005 (C: 0.316 bn €) 
01/01/2006 (C: 0.316 bn €) 
01/01/2007 (C: 0.316 bn €) 
01/01/2008 (C: 0.316 bn €) 
01/01/2009 (C: 0.316 bn €) 
01/01/2010 (C: 0.316 bn €) 
  
The Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 2004 does not qualify as important according to the requirement of an announced tax impact of at least 0.1% 
of GDP; however, it contained both sizeable tax increases and tax decreases, partially offsetting each other. Also, the quantitatively most 
important tax decreases were only temporary, whereas the tax increases were permanent. Thus, it seems justified to include the law in the 
narrative. Noteworthy measures included partial implementation of the income tax tariff 2005 as early as 2004, as well as reductions in 
home owner benefits. 
Parts of the income tax tariff for 2005 that had been implemented by the Gesetz zur Senkung der Steuersätze und zur Reform der 
Unternehmensbesteuerung (Steuersenkungsgesetz - StSenkG) were put into effect ahead of schedule in 2004. Specifically, tax-free 
amounts and tax rates had to be adjusted in 2004 rather than in 2005. The measure was expected to change revenue by -8.93 bn € 
effective 2004. By former regulation in the Zweites Gesetz zur Familienförderung, the general household allowance was designed to be 
abolished in 2005. Under the new regulation, the household allowance was abolished in 2004, generating revenue of 0.49 bn € temporarily 
for 2004. Note that the original measures had an exogenous motivation, while the shift in timing was clearly endogenously motivated. The 
corresponding implementation effects of the original measures are set to zero, as otherwise it would appear that there was an exogenous 
tax shock in 2005, which is clearly not the case. This treatment is similar to the treatment of extensions and, indeed, the tax shocks in 2005 
can be seen as an extension of the endogenous temporary tax shock implemented by the law at hand. See also the discussion under 
Zweites Gesetz zur Familienförderung, and Gesetz zur Senkung der Steuersätze und zur Reform der Unternehmensbesteuerung 
(Steuersenkungsgesetz - StSenkG). 
Changes in § 9 EigZulG reduced tax allowances for home ownership. The new rules were applicable at the beginning of 2004. As the 
Eigenheimzulage is paid for a total of eight consecutive years, the tax measure implies a series of steps in tax changes (see the discussion 
on the Gesetz zur Abschaffung der Eigenheimzulage). The impact over a cohort of eight years is given as 2.525 bn € in the Finanzbericht, 
distributed over a series of eight tax shocks, resulting in a sequence of shocks at the beginning of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
and 2010, each worth 0.316 bn €. The Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 2004 also changed depreciation rules, with an expected revenue impact of 
2.495 bn € effective 2004. In § 9a EStG, the standard deduction for tax allowable expenses was reduced to 920 €. The annualized 
expected revenue impact is 0.39 bn €, effective with the beginning of 2004. The law also reduced tax allowances for commuting expenses, 
which was expected to raise 1.11 bn € effective in 2004. The law contained several other tax measures, all of which were associated with 
only very minor revenue impacts, sometimes as small as 2 m €. Coding of these measures matches that of the discussed measures, but 
for the sake of brevity, detailed discussion is omitted. 
At the time of the law’s passage, the economy had had only sluggish growth for almost three consecutive years, yet, at the same time, 
the budget was perceived to have a high structural deficit. Reflecting this state of affairs, the statement on the introduction of the bill 
suggests that the law was intended to consolidate the budget, while providing a business cycle stimulus. Sorting the actual tax measures 
between these two motivations is straightforward as the only countercyclical measures of the law were the partial shift of the income tax 
tariff from 2005 to 2004, and the related shift in the timing of abolishing the general household allowance. This was also clearly stated by 
Mr. Eichel, Federal Minister of Finance, in the first reading of the law. Shifting abolishment of the household allowance to 2004 was clearly 
justified in the opening statement on the bill as related to the shift in the income tax tariff; hence, the measure is given a countercyclical 
motivation. Other measures, when mentioned in the parliamentary debate, were unambigously associated with consolidation motives. 
                                                          
15 BGBl. 2003, 68, pp. 3076–3092. 
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Accordingly, the changes related to the income tax tariff and to the general household allowance are treated as a countercyclical measure. 
All other measures are treated as driven by consolidation motives. 
Within the legislative process, the law was substantially altered in the mediation committee. Most importantly, the committee 
suggested reducing rather than abolishing home owner benefits. Also, it suggested only partial implementation of the income tax tariff for 
2005 in 2004. 
Gesetz zur Neuordnung der einkommensteuerrechtlichen Behandlung von Altersvorsorgeaufwendungen16 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
12/09/2003 (S: -3.68 bn €) 12/12/2003 04/28/2004 (S: -1.215 bn €) 04/29/2004 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
05/14/2004 05/26/2004 05/28/2004 06/11/2004 
Publication Implementation   
07/09/2004 (S: -4.895 bn €) 01/01/2005 (S: 0.27 bn €) 
01/01/2006 (S: -1.38 bn €) 
01/01/2007 (S: -0.985 bn €) 
01/01/2008 (S: -1.005 bn €) 
01/01/2009 (S: -0.9 bn €) 
01/01/2010 (S: -0.895 bn €) 
  
The law was concerned with reforming the tax treatment of retirement provisions, in essence expanding tax benefits, thus resulting in lower 
revenue. The primary motive behind the changes was demands by the constitutional court. Formally, the law does not meet the threshold 
of an announced revenue impact of 0.1 percent of GDP. However, its budgetary effects increased substantially over the years, warranting 
coverage of it here. The step-wise increase in tax allowances for retirement savings is not adequately reflected in the full implementation 
effect given in the Finanzbericht. 
The quantitatively most important measures of the law were related to allowances for retirement savings. In essence, the law 
expanded allowances for retirement savings in a series of annual steps beginning in 2005. The revenue forecast in our official sources 
does not allow quantifying the effects of each step individually. However, the given budgetary effects for the years 2005 to 2010 are a good 
proxy for the revenue effects. Accordingly, the measure implemented a shock of -0.925 bn € in 2005, of -1.38 bn € in 2006, of -0.985 bn € 
in 2007, of -1.005 bn € in 2008, of -0.9 bn € in 2009, and of -0.895 bn € in 2010. Additionally, income from life annuities such as provided 
by the statutory pension insurance system was made subject to income taxation, resulting in 50 percent of newly allotted pensions being 
taxed in 2005. This number is designed to increase in annual steps until it reaches 100 percent in 2040. Strictly speaking, the measure 
introduced a series of revenue shocks until 2040. However, except for the change in 2005, the step-wise changes seem minor. The tax 
measure is hence coded as a permanent shock of 1.5 bn € in 2005. The law contained several other measures of minor importance. First, 
the law exempted contributions to certain pension schemes from taxation. This changed revenues by -0.28 bn € effective 2005. The 
standard income deduction for pensioners’ expenses was reduced effective at the beginning of 2005, thereby changing revenues by 
0.22 bn €. The law contained other measures of a technical nature that changed tax revenues by -0.245 bn € at the beginning of 2005. 
The constitutional court had demanded reform of the tax treatment of retirement provisions. Specifically, the quantitatively important 
parts of the law are designed to meet this demand by the constitutional court. The parliamentary debate did not actually mention any other 
motives, although a somewhat stronger emphasis was put on the social-political aspects of the reform. The law was motivated by structural 
objectives. 
Within the legislative process, the law was altered in technical detail due to suggestions by the leading parliamentary committee. No 
change in the primary motivation was evident. In total, the law corresponds to an exogenous shock of -4.895 € to be implemented at 
various dates between 2005 and 2010. 
  
                                                          
16 BGBl. 2004, 33, pp. 1427–1447. 
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Gesetz zur Änderung des Tabaksteuergesetzes und anderer Verbrauchsteuergesetze17 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
07/01/2003 (C: 2.508 bn €) 07/03/2003 10/15/2003 10/17/2003 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/07/2003 12/16/2003 (C: ? bn €) 12/19/2003 12/19/2003 
Publication Implementation   
12/29/2003 (C: 2.508 bn €) 03/01/2004 (C: 0.836 bn €) 
12/01/2004 (C: 0.836 bn €) 
09/01/2005 (C: 0.836 bn €) 
  
The law increased tobacco taxes in three equal-sized steps, effective March 2004, December 2004, and September 2005. The total 
annualized revenue impact of the law was given as 2.508 bn €, which, distributed equally over the three steps, produced an effect of 
0.836 bn € per step. 
In the statement on the introduction of the bill it was stated that the additional revenues should be use to finance a block grant to the 
social insurance institutions. However, there is no evidence whether the block grant was related to changes in social insurance spending or 
to social insurance contribution rates. Rather, the financial burden was merely shifted from the social insurance institutions to the general 
government. Following this interpretation, the law was not spending driven, but related to general budgetary concerns. In the parliamentary 
debate, the law received little to no attention. The motivation behind the law was consolidation. 
The law was altered during the legislative process, especially in the mediation committee, which suggested changes to the timing and 
the size of the tax rate change. Unfortunately, the available database does not allow constructing the revenue effect of the changes within 
the legislative process. Taken together, the law corresponded to an exogenous shock of 2.508 bn € to be implemented in three steps in 
2004 and 2005. 
Gesetz zur Änderung steuerrechtlicher Vorschriften und zur Errichtung eines Fonds “Aufbauhilfe” (Flutopfersolidaritätsgesetz)18 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
08/26/2002 (SD: 7.097 bn €) 08/29/2002 09/10/2002 09/12/2002 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
09/13/2002 09/20/2002 (SD: 7.097 bn €) 01/01/2003 (SD: 1.187 bn €)  
In August 2008, some parts of Germany were affected by a huge flood that caused devastating damages. This law temporarily raised 
taxes in order to pay for alleviating the consequences of the flood. 
The law delayed an already proposed tax cut for 2003 to 2004, raising 6.45 bn €. Originally, the tax cut was proposed in the Gesetz 
zur Senkung der Steuersätze und zur Reform der Unternehmensbesteuerung (Steuersenkungsgesetz - StSenkG). While the shift in timing 
was endogenous, the original measure had been exogenous. Or, in different words, the measure is a temporary endogenous tax shock 
exactly offsetting the permanent exogenous tax shock in 2003. As no tax change in 2003 actually occured, the implementation effect of the 
temporary measure is set to zero. Also, while tax revenue did indeed change in 2004, it is no longer clear that the timing of the measure 
was exogenous. Accordingly, the implementation effect of the original measure from the Steuersenkungsgesetz is set to zero as well. 
Originally, the general household allowances were designed to be reduced in 2003 due to regulations of the Zweites Gesetz zur 
Familienförderung. This was shifted to 2004, affecting revenues by -0.405 bn €. For reasons similar to those just mentioned, the 
implementation effect of both measures is set to zero. The same logic applies to technical changes in the income tax code originally 
implemented by the Steuersenkungsgesetz, affecting revenues by -0.135 bn €. The tax rate on corporate income was increased by 1.5% 
for 2003, raising 1.187 bn € on an annual level. 
In the statement on the introduction of the bill, it was stated that the flood had caused large damages and additional funds were 
needed to finance help and compensation. Specifically, the additional funds were supposed to be used as loans to affected people as well 
as for repairs to infrastructure. In fact, tax revenues were explicitly earmarked for expenditures related to the flood. The law was spending 
driven. 
Within the legislative process, the law did not experience any substantial alternations. In total, the law raised 7.097 bn € at the 
beginning of 2003. 
  
                                                          
17 BGBl. 2003, 66, pp. 2924–2927. 
18 BGBl. 2002, 67, pp. 3651–3653. 
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Zweites Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt19 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
11/05/2002 11/07/2002 11/13/2002 (S: -0.96 bn €) 11/15/2002 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/29/2002 12/17/2002 (S: -0.615 bn €) 12/19/2002 12/20/2002 
Publication Implementation   
12/30/2002 (S: -1.575 bn €) 01/01/2003 (S: -0.96 bn €) 
04/01/2003 (S: -0.615 bn €) 
  
The law does not qualify as important according to the 0.1% threshold, but it had two well-defined measures related to insignificant and 
household employment that changed revenues by -1.46 bn €. In total, the law had an announcement effect of 0.07% of GDP. It hence 
seems warranted to include it here. In addition ot the tax measures, the law contained a multitude of regulatory changes related to 
employment. 
The law’s quantitatively most important measure was the introduction, in § 35a Sec. 2 EStG, of allowances for the wage component of 
household services. The measure was expected to change tax revenues by -0.85 bn €, effective 2003. Related measures in § 35a Sec. 1 
EStG were expected to change tax revenues by -0.11 bn € effective 2003. The law further changed regulations on insignificant 
employment in § 40a Sec. 2 EStG, with an expected revenue impact of -0.615 bn € effective April 1, 2003. All measures were permanent. 
None of the measures discussed here were included in the original draft of the bill; the changes were introduced by the leading 
parliamentary committee and later adjusted and expanded by the mediation committee. The leading parliamentary committee’s report 
stated that the changes in § 35a Sec. 2 EStG were designed to fight moonlighting in the area of household employment, as well as to give 
incentives for creating employment opportunities in private households. The changes in § 40a EStG had been described as rather 
technical in the statement on the introduction of the bill; however, they were substantially expanded in the mediation committee. Judging 
from the debate in the Bundesrat, it appears that the changes in § 40a EStG were associated with a fight against moonlighting as well as 
with creating employment opportunities. In general, the tax measures were part of a larger reform project concerned with restructuring 
employment regulations. Hence, classifying the law as structural seems warranted. 
Disentangling the revenue changes between the mediation committee and parliamentary committee is difficult in this case; hence, the 
pragmatic decision was made to apportion the changes in § 35a EStG to the parliamentary committee, and the changes in § 40a EStG to 
the Vermittlungsausschuss. This apportionment reflects the body mainly responsibility for the respective changes. Taken together, the law 
represents a tax shock of -1.575 bn € in January and April 2003. 
Gesetz zum Abbau von Steuervergünstigungen und Ausnahmeregelungen (Steuervergünstigungsabbaugesetz - StVergAbG)20 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
28/11/2002 (C: 19.078 bn €) 01/16/2003 02/19/2003 (C: -1.407 bn €) 02/21/2003 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
03/14/2003 04/10/2003 (C: -13.77 bn €) 04/11/2003 04/11/2003 
Publication Implementation   
05/20/2003 (C: 3.9 bn €) 05/20/2003 (C: 4.4 bn €) 
01/01/2006 (C: -0.5 bn €) 
  
In 2000, Germany switched from the tax credit method to “50 percent taxation” (Halbeinkünfteverfahren). Under the tax credit method, 
retained corporate income had been taxed at a rate of 40 percent, potentially reduced to 30 percent in case income was distributed. Taxes 
paid on distributed earnings were then credited at the individual level. Under the new regulation, the individual was no longer granted a tax 
credit, but instead had to pay taxes on only 50 percent of income derived from corporations. As a consequence of the transition from the 
tax credit method to “50 percent taxation,” there was no longer any reduction of the tax rate on distributed income, thereby discriminating 
against retained earnings and hence requiring a transition rule. Indeed, corporations had been allowed to reduce their corporate tax burden 
in the transition period by up to one-sixth of distributed profits, provided they had sufficient allowances from the time period of the tax credit 
method. However, due to the changes to § 37 sec. 2a KStG, corporations were not allowed to reduce their corporate tax burden for 
distributed profits between November 4, 2003 and the end of 2005. The measure shifts the timing of revenues, but not necessarily the total 
tax burden, over the whole transition period. By later legislation in the Gesetz über steuerliche Begleitmaßnahmen zur Einführung der 
                                                          
19 BGBl. 2002, 87, pp. 4621–4636. 
20 BGBl. 2003, 19, pp. 660–667. 
26 
 
Europäischen Gesellschaft und zur Änderung weiterer steuerrechtlicher Vorschriften, the total remaining allowances from the tax credit 
period as of December 2006 were to be distributed equally over the time remaining until the end of 2017. 
The Finanzbericht gave a budgetary effect of 2 bn € for the measure in 2004 and 2005, which gives a good idea of the annualized 
impact related to the shift in timing. As the measure is retroactive, I choose the date of publication as the implementation date. The total 
budgetary effect of the measure is given as 5.5 bn € in the Finanzbericht, which leads to lower tax revenues in the period 2006 to 2017 of 
the same size. I have no information on the timing over the years 2006 to 2017, so I decided to distribute it equally over the 11-year period. 
This is in accord with the later regulation that allowances should be equally distributed over the remaining part of the transition period. This 
gives a shock of -0.5 bn € in 2006, to be offset by an equal-size shock outside the time horizon of this narrative. 
The law also changed the technical regulation of fiscal unities in § 14 KStG. The measure was expected to raise 0.1 bn €, retroactive 
for 2003. The law further abolished certain regulations in § 14 sec. 2 KStG that had allowed companies jointly holding a subsidiary to form 
a fiscal unity. The measure was expected to change revenues by 1.2 bn €. The measure was retroactive for 2003; hence, the date of 
publication is chosen as the implementation date. Changes in § 15 sec. 4 EStG were designed to limit loss offsetting in silent partnerships. 
Specifically, these losses now could only offset earnings from the same source of the previous year or of later years. The measure was 
expected to raise 0.3 bn € on an annual basis effective 2003. Changes in the general tax code were concerned with increasing 
transparency in matters of transfer pricing. Specifically, § 90 sec. 3 AO required companies to document explicitly how transfer prices were 
constructed, thus allowing tax offices to approve (or not) the appropriateness of transfer prices. The measure was expected to raise 
0.6 bn € on an annual basis effective at the beginning of 2003. The law also amended the international tax relations law 
(Außensteuergesetz). Sections 7 to 14 AStG were concerned with the taxation of income derived from foreign subsidiaries. Previously, 
such income was to some degree taxable in Germany in the circumstance that the foreign taxes paid were “low.” Under the new regulation, 
double tax treaties no longer generally excluded income derived from foreign subsidiaries. The measure was expected to raise 0.1 bn € on 
an annual basis, effective 2003. Given its retroactive nature, the measure was timed at the date of publication. Changes in § 8a GewStG 
were intended to close loopholes for local business taxes. Some municipalities had very low local business tax rates, which lowered total 
local business tax revenues, especially in larger municipalities. The new § 8a GewStG mandated that operating profits of subsidiary 
companies are added to the operating profits of the holding body in the event the local business tax rates of subsidiary companies are 
“low.” The measure was expected to raise 0.1 bn € effective 2003. 
Based on the statement on the introduction of the bill, the law intended to generate more revenue by closing loopholes and result in a 
more efficient and just tax system. Specifically, it was argued that the tax system had too many exemptions and put too much emphasis on 
creating behavioral incentives, leading to an overly complex tax system. The statement on the introduction of the bill claimed that this has 
damaged transparency and equity of the tax system, leading to resentment about the tax system, and to misallocations. It was also stated 
that an overly complex tax system imposes high bureaucratic costs. Given this background, the law was designed to close loopholes and 
simplify the tax system. It was also noted that the law was designed to create additional revenue. The only difficulty arising in classifying 
the motivation behind this law is whether the primary objective was to increase revenues or, instead, to restructure the tax system. Mr. 
Eichel, Finance Minister at that time, reported in the parliamentary debate that the general budget had a structural deficit and that 
additional revenues were needed. Based on the parliamentary debate, the law seems best categorized as driven by consolidation, yet an 
alternative motivation may have been structural. 
The law changed substantially throughout the legislative process, but no alternation in motivation is evident. In fact, most of the 
original content of the law did not survive the mediation committee. 
Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der ökologischen Steuerreform21 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
11/05/2002 (S: 1.62 bn €) 11/07/2002 11/13/2002 11/14/2002 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundesrat Bundestag 
11/29/2002 12/06/2002 12/20/2002 12/20/2002 
Publication Implementation   
12/30/2002 (S: 1.62 bn €) 01/01/2003 (S: 1.45 bn €) 
01/01/2007 (S: 0.2 bn €) 
  
The law does not qualify as important according to the 0.1% threshold. However, it consisted largely of one important tax measure 
generating 1 bn € in additional revenue, which is large enough to warrant the law’s inclusion in the narrative. 
                                                          
21 BGBl. 2002, 87, pp. 4602–4606. 
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The law’s quantitatively most important measure was the increase in tax rates on gas and fuel, generating 1.02 bn € effective 2003. 
The law also extended tax benefits for greenhouses until the end of 2004, which changed revenues by -0.03 bn € effective with the 
beginning of 2003. As usual, the effect of the extension does not show up in the implementation volume of the tax law. Tax benefits for 
manufacturing and agriculture were reduced. This raised 0.38 bn € beginning in 2003. Finally, the law reduced tax benefits for the use of 
nighttime-produced electricity, effective 2003, lowering tax revenues by 0.05 bn €. These tax benefits were fully abolished at the beginning 
of 2007, generating additional 0.2 bn € in revenues. 
The law was part of the so-called ecological tax reform, started with the Gesetz zum Einstieg in die ökologische Steuerreform and later 
continued in the Gesetz zur Fortführung der ökologischen Steuerreform. Besides creating behavioral incentives for economical 
consumption of scarce resources, the program was intended to reduce labor costs by lowering social insurance contributions and hence 
improving structural aspects of the economy. Speficially, reductions in labor cost were expected to increase employment. And, indeed, the 
first law of the program was closely related to reductions in social insurance contribution rates, financed by block grants from the 
government. However, revenues from the ecological tax reform were not explicitly earmarked. There is also evidence that later increases 
in taxes on petroleum and electricity were driven by general consolidation motives, providing evidence that other measures of the program 
were not necessarily spending driven. Indeed, the law at hand largely focused on reforming tax benefits, with no reference to any specific 
changes in social insurance contribution rates. Specifically, the statement on the introduction of the bill reported that the original program 
contained exemptions for certain companies, with the intention of giving them more time to adjust to increased energy taxes. The law at 
hand removed these exemptions. Ecological motives dominated the parliamentary debate. The law at hand reforms energy taxes oriented 
toward inducing incentives for ecological behavior and therefore is structural. 
Within the legislative process, the law did not experience any significant alternations. 
Zweites Gesetz zur Familienförderung22 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
05/29/2001 (S: -2.374 bn €) 06/01/2001 07/04/2001 07/06/2001 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
07/13/2001 08/21/2001 (S: -2.374 bn €) 01/01/2002 (S: -3.047 bn €)  
The law was primarily concerned with expanding child benefits, off set by a set of financing measures. 
Child benefits were increased effective 2002, changing revenues by -3.042 bn €. Tax-free limits and tax allowances related to children 
in § 32 Sec. 6 EStG and § 33 c EStG were changed, together affecting tax revenues by -0.795 bn € effective 2002. On the financing side, 
the general household allowance (§ 32 Sec. 7 EStG) was reduced in three steps, one each at the beginning of 2002, 2003, and 2005. The 
budgetary figures enable assigning a effect to each step. Revenues changed by 0.255 bn € in 2002, by 0.369 bn € in 2003, and by 
0.304 bn € in 2005. This measure was reformed substantially by later regulation. The Flutopfersolidaritätsgesetz moved the step in 2003 to 
2004, and the Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 2004 implemented the 2005 step in 2004. As discussed in detail in the sections covering those laws, 
the motiviations for the shift in timing was endogenous and, accordingly, the implementation effect of the measures is set to zero. There 
were further adjustments in allowances, raising revenues by 0.535 bn € in 2002. 
Parts of the law were designed to comply with demands by the constitutional court to change how educational cost are accounted for. 
The general expansion in tax benefits for children also seems related to rulings of the constitutional court, as pointed out in the 
parliamentary debate. In the statement on the introduction of the bill, it was argued that general demographic developments require 
additional efforts in family promotion. Of course, the usual social-political justifications were also given. Changes on the financing side of 
the law were in some cases justified by structural reasons related to employment and distribution policies. In any case, financing measures 
seem closely related to the expansions in family benefits and hence are assigned the same motivation as the main law. Reading the 
parliamentary debate does not change these basic interpretations. The law was driven by structural motives. 
Within the legislative process, the law was not been changed substantially. 
  
                                                          
22 BGBl. 2001, 42, pp. 2074–2080. 
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Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von Steuerverkürzungen bei der Umsatzsteuer und zur Änderung anderer Steuergesetze 
(Steuerverkürzungsbekämpfungsgesetz - StVBG)23 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
08/17/2001 (S: ? bn €) 09/25/2001 11/20/2001 11/27/2001 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
11/30/2001 12/27/2001 (S: ? bn €) 01/01/2002 (S: ? bn €)  
The law’s main objective was to reduce value-added tax fraud and, especially, missing trader intra-community fraud by introducing new 
supervisory powers and making organized value-added tax fraud a statutory crime. Also, companies knowing of missing trader intra-
community fraud were made liable for missing value-added taxes and newly founded companies were subjected to additional supervision. 
As is often the case with such changes, the revenue forecast given in the official sources is highly suspicious. Still, the Finanzbericht 
reports an annualized impact of 2.5 bn €, which, as in the Gesetz zur Förderung der Steuerehrlichkeit, is set to zero. Most measures of the 
law are implemented at the beginning of 2002 and the implementation date is chosen accordingly. 
The statement on the introduction of the bill explicitly mentioned organized value-added tax fraud as the law’s primary motivation. It 
was also mentioned that the value-added tax rate is an important revenue source and needs to be protected from fraud, which was also 
supposed to be in the interest of honest companies. In the parliamentary debate, the government followed the same line of reasoning. 
Given the emphasis on making the tax system more efficient and just, the law is categorized as structural. 
Within the legislative process, the law was altered due to suggestions by the leading parliamentary committee. These changes were 
not associated with changes in the revenue forecast or in motivation. 
Gesetz zur Finanzierung der Terrorbekämpfung24 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
10/09/2001 (SD: 2.09 bn €) 10/12/2001 11/07/2001 (SD: -0.02 bn €) 11/09/2001 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
11/30/2001 12/14/2001 (SD: 2.07 bn €) 01/01/2002 (SD: 1.525 bn €) 
01/01/2003 (SD: 0.545 bn €) 
 
The law increased the insurance tax and the tobacco tax. Additional revenue was supposed to finance expenditures related to combating 
international terrorism. The prospective revenue impact of the law amounts to around 0.07 percent of GDP, not enough to pass the 0.1 
percent of GDP threshold, but as it consisted of only a few well-defined shocks, including it seems justified. 
The general insurance tax rate was increased from 15 to 16 percent and the fire insurance tax rate from 10 to 11 percent, thereby 
generating 0.525 bn € in additional revenues on an annual basis effective at the beginning of 2002. The law increases the tobacco tax in 
two steps, the first at the beginning of 2002 and the second in 2003. Deriving a revenue forecast for each step individually is complicated 
by the fact that the Finanzbericht reported only the combined revenue impact. Based on the figures for budgetary years, I arrive at a 
revenue forecast of 1 bn € for the first step and 0.545 bn € for the second step. 
In the statement on the introduction of the bill it was clearly stated that additional funds for combating international terrorism were 
needed after 9/11. In the parliamentary debate, it was mentioned that an additional 3 billion would be spent on army, police, and 
international development aid. The increase in taxes introduced by this law were specifically designed to finance these additional 
expenditures. One problem with this interpretation is that policymakers regularly find noble reasons for tax increases, with the intention of 
deceiving the general public as to their true purpose. This was exactly the argument brought forward by the opposition in the parliamentary 
debate, during which it was asserted that tax increases were really needed to cover budget deficits. In assessing the primary motivation of 
the law, I follow the government’s official line. 
The increase in the tobacco tax was originally designed to be implemented in only one step. However, the leading parliamentary 
committee suggested increasing the tax in two steps, while leaving other parts of the law broadly unchanged. Taken together, the law 
corresponds to a tax change of 2.025 bn € in 2002 and 2003. 
  
                                                          
23 BGBl. 2001, 74, pp. 3922–3925. 
24 BGBl. 2001, 66, pp. 3436–3437. 
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Gesetz zur Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung und zur Förderung eines kapitalgedeckten Altersvorsorgevermögens 
(Altersvermögensgesetz - AVmG)25 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
11/14/2000 (S. -10.099 bn €) 11/16/2000 01/24/2001 (S: -0.46 bn €) 01/26/2001 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
02/16/2001 05/09/2001 (S: -0.143 bn €) 05/11/2001 05/11/2001 
Publication Implementation   
06/29/2001 (S: -10.702 bn €) 06/29/2001 (S: -0.076 bn €) 
01/01/2002 (S: -3.062 bn €) 
01/01/2004 (S: -2.538 bn €) 
01/01/2006 (S: -2.442 bn €) 
01/01/2008 (S: -2.548 bn €) 
  
The law was part of a large effort to reform Germany’s pension system and introduced the so-called Riester-Rente, which is a scheme 
granting direct transfers for retirement savings. 
The law’s main measure was the step-wise introduction of tax benefits for private savings for old-age provisions. Basically, the new 
regulations allowed deducting—up to a certain limit—expenses for old-age provisions from the tax base. The government also pays a 
special surcharge on specific savings for old-age provisions. The measure was implemented in four steps at the beginning of 2002, 2004, 
2006, and 2008. The reported budgetary effects in the Finanzbericht allow computing a series of tax shocks. This gives a shock of 
-2.153 bn € in 2002, -2.538 bn € in 2004, -2.442 bn € in 2006, and -2.584 bn € in 2008. 
The law also had other, rather technical measures. In some specific cases, the law allowed using savings benefited by the government 
surcharge for buying homes. The revenue effect of that measure was -0.143 bn € effective 2002. Extant regulations had allowed 
companies to deduct certain expenses for pension funds once the beneficiary passed the age of 30. This threshold was reduced to 28, in 
effect allowing for larger deduction of business expenses. The measure applies to all new cases beginning with 2001; hence, given the 
retroactive nature, the date of publication is chosen as the implementation date. My sources report an annualized revenue impact of 
-0.076 bn €. The law exempted from income taxation employer contributions to pension funds, thereby changing revenues by -0.256 bn € 
effective 2002. Beginning in 2002, employees were granted the right to demand that their employer invest part of their earnings in 
company pension schemes. This had an annualized impact of -0.199 bn € on tax revenues. The law also allowed reclassifying book 
reserve arrangements for pensions as pension funds, which was likely to affect tax revenues by -0.204 bn € after full implementation. In 
the official revenue forecast it was assumed that making retirement savings more attractive would result in a substitution away from 
conventional forms of savings, thereby generating an additional loss in taxes on capital profits. The revenue effect was given as 
-0.107 bn € after full implementation. The latter two measures are effective 2002. 
Identifying the motivation behind the law is straightforward. Policymakers were concerned about the sustainability of the public pension 
system and hence wanted to strengthen private retirement savings. This was also intended to help stabilize social insurance contribution 
rates, which otherwise would need to rise in order to finance higher pensions. The law is concerned with providing tax incentives for private 
pension schemes. It is clear that the motivation was structural. 
Within the legislative process, the law was augmented by additional tax measures due to suggestions by the leading parliamentary 
committee and the Vermittlungsausschuss. No change in motivation was evident. 
Gesetz zur Fortführung der ökologischen Steuerreform26 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
08/27/1999 (C: 10.635 bn €) 09/09/1999 11/09/1999 11/11/1999 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
11/26/1999 12/22/1999 (C: 10.635 bn €) 01/01/2000 (C: 2.659 bn €) 
01/01/2001 (C: 2.659 bn €) 
01/01/2002 (C: 2.659 bn €) 
01/01/2003 (C: 2.659 bn €) 
 
 
The law increased the petroleum tax, as well as the electricity tax, in a series of steps at the beginning of 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. The 
Finanzbericht reported a revenue effect of 2.659 bn € for the first step. As taxes are increased in equally-sized steps, this is a good proxy 
                                                          
25 BGBl. 2001, 31, pp. 1310–1343. 
26 BGBl. 1999, 56, pp. 2432–2440. 
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for the revenue impact of the following steps. Also note that the series of shocks constructed thereby is similar to the budgetary figures 
given in the Finanzbericht for the years 2000 to 2003. 
The law is part of the ecological tax reform, a centerpiece of the political program of the Social-Democratric and Green Party coalition 
government. The program started with the Gesetz zum Einstieg in die ökologische Steuerreform, which raised taxes on energy 
consumption to finance reductions in social insurance contribution rates. The program combined the intention of creating incentives for 
ecological behavior with an effort at reducing labor cost and hence stimulating employment. The present law further increased taxes on 
energy consumption, generating up to 0.52 percent of GDP in revenues. In the statement on the introduction of the bill, it was stated that 
additional revenues are to be used to finance a block grant to the government pension program, thereby financing future reductions in 
social insurance contribution rates. And, indeed, the draft of the Gesetz zur Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung und zur 
Förderung eines kapitalgedeckten Altersvorsorgevermögens (Altersvermögensgesetz - AVmG) contains a large reform of the pension 
system, leading to lower social insurance contribution rates in the long run financed partially by larger government grants. Still, the 
opposition argued that the additional revenues generated by the law at hand were much larger than the increase in government grants, 
and hence were used to finance general deficits. Additional revenues were not earmarked, nor is it clear that the additional revenues 
generated are directly linked to changes in social insurance contribution rates. In any case, the tax shocks were not directly related to 
immediate reductions in contribution rates; rather, the argument was that additional block grants avoid future increases. I thus classify the 
law as being driven by consolidation motives. 
Within the legislative process, the core of the law remained broadly unchanged. No change in the revenue impact or in motivation is 
evident. 
 Gesetz zur Familienförderung27 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
08/27/1999 (S: -2.817 bn €) 09/09/1999 11/09/1999 (S: -0.460 bn €) 11/12/1999 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/26/1999 12/15/1999 (S: -0.087 bn €) 12/16/1999 12/17/1999 
Publication Implementation   
12/28/1999 (S: -3.364 bn €) 12/28/1999 (S: -0.547 bn €) 
01/01/2000 (S: -2.817 bn €) 
  
The law was concerned with reforming tax benefits related to the cost of raising children. Basically, it raised child benefits and introduced 
allowances for child-care costs. The primary motivation was a November 10, 1998 ruling by the constitutional court. 
Direct transfer payment of child benefits was increased from 250 DEM to 270 DEM per month effective 2000. The measure was 
expected to change revenues by -1.943 bn € on an annual basis. The law introduced an allowance for child-care costs of 1,512 DEM per 
child and parent effective with 2000, thereby changing tax revenues by -0.971 bn € on an annual basis. An additional allowance for 
handicapped children changed revenues by -0.01 bn €. The introduction of allowances for child-care costs was a substitute for previous 
measures, thereby affecting tax revenues by 0.107 bn € per annum. Finally, the law changed tax allowances for children retroactive for the 
years 1983 to 1995. This produced a one-time revenue effect of -0.547 bn €. 
Identifying the motivation of this legislation is straightforward. In the statement on the introduction of the bill, it is clearly stated that the 
reform was needed to comply with demands of the constitutional court. In the parliamentary debate, the law was relatively uncontroversial. 
In addition to references to the aforementioned ruling by the constitutional court, social and family political reasons were mentioned. It was 
clear that the motivation for the law was structural. 
Within the legislative process, the law was supplemented with the retroactive tax allowances for children as discussed above. No 
alteration in motivation was evident.  
                                                          
27 BGBl. 1999, 58, pp. 2552–2560. 
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Gesetz zur Bereinigung von steuerlichen Vorschriften (Steuerbereinigungsgesetz 1999 - StBereinG 1999)28 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
08/27/1998 (S: -0.843 bn €) 09/24/1998 11/10/1998 (S: -0.35 bn €) 11/12/1998 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/26/1998  12/15/1998 (S: -0.534 bn €) 12/16/1998 12/17/1998 
Publication Implementation   
12/29/1999 (S: -1.727 bn €) 12/29/1999 (S: -1.195 bn €) 
01/01/2000 (S: -0.532 bn €) 
  
The law contained a series of rather technical changes made with the general intention of increasing the efficiency of the tax system. It fails 
to qualify as important according to the 0.1 percent of GDP threshold, yet is included in the narrative because some of its measures 
represent well-defined tax shocks of considerable importance. 
Tax exemptions on income derived from part-time activity as a coach, educator, carer, and other related occupations were expanded. 
The measure came into effect at the beginning of 2000 and was expected to change revenues by -0.378 bn €. Changes in § 4 Sec. 2 EStG 
allowed changing balance sheets retroactively, affecting revenues by -0.048 bn € on an annual basis. The measure was retroactive; hence 
the date of publication is chosen as the implementation date. Section 4 Sec. 4a EStG limits interest cost deductions in case withdrawals 
exceed profits and deposits. The law at hand changed technical aspects of the regulation, thereby lowering tax revenues by -0.305 bn €. 
The measure was retroactive. Changes in § 39a EStG allowed using tax-free amounts for more than one occupation. This induced a one-
time revenue effect of -0.153 bn € in 2000. Section 50a Sec. 7 EStG was removed. This section had allowed the tax office to require 
certain employees to take part in the system of tax deduction with limited tax liability. The removal was retrospective and changed 
revenues by -0.097 bn €. Under new regulation, 5 instead of 15 percent of dividends obtained from shares in foreign corporations are 
subject to corporate taxation. The measure was retroactive for 1999 and changed revenues by -0.767 bn €. Finally, the law implemented 
technical changes related to interest on tax liabilities, generating 0.021 bn € in revenues. The measure was retroactive. Also note that the 
law contained adjustments to the Investitionszulagengesetz 1999 that had been demanded by the European Commission. Prospective 
effects on tax revenues, however, were small and as our sources do not allow establishing precisely how revenues were affected and 
hence make it difficult to time the tax shock, the measure is omitted. 
According to the statement on the introduction of the bill, the law was concerned with reforming technical aspects of the tax code. It 
was an attempt to close tax loopholes, simplify the tax code, and comply with recent EU regulations. In the parliamentary debate, no 
specific macroeconomic shocks were mentioned. Taken together, the law had a structural motivation. 
Within the legislative process, the law was supplemented with additional tax measures. No change in the primary motivation was 
evident. 
Gesetz zur Senkung der Steuersätze und zur Reform der Unternehmensbesteuerung (Steuersenkungsgesetz - StSenkG)29 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
02/14/2000 (S: -36.833 bn €) 02/18/2000 05/16/2000 (S: -0.412 bn €) 05/18/2000 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
06/09/2000 07/04/2000 (S: -5.438 bn €) 07/06/2000 07/14/2000 
Publication Implementation   
26/10/2000 (S: -42.683 bn €) 01/01/2001 (S: -13.935 bn €) 
01/01/2002 (S: -4.627 bn €) 
01/01/2005 (S: -8.444 bn €) 
  
The law implemented one of the most extensive tax reforms in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. The law substantially 
reduced the income and corporate tax burden, financed partially by broadening the tax base. Also of considerable interest was the 
substitution of the existing corporate tax imputation system by a 50 percent income taxation rule. 
The Steuersenkungsgesetz considerably reduced the corporate tax burden. Before the tax reform, the corporate tax rate had been 40 
percent on retained profits and 30 percent on distributed profits. Under the new regulation, the corporate tax rate was uniformly set to 25 
percent effective 2001. The prospective annualized revenue impact of these changes was -8.153 bn €. The law instituted a switch from the 
existing corporate tax imputation system to a 50 percent income taxation rule. Under the tax imputation system, corporate taxes had been 
considered only a downpayment that was later credited at the individual level. The 50 percent income taxation rule specified that only 50 
                                                          
28 BGBl. 1999, 59, pp. 2601–2623. 
29 BGBl. 2000, 46, pp. 1433–1466. 
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percent of dividends and certain taxable profits from trading corporate shares were subject to income taxation at the individual level. The 
prospected revenue impact of the changes was 2.549 bn €. Timing of the measure is complicated by the fact that the transition was 
smoothed across 2001 and 2002, a process that involved some very technical details of the taxation process. Still, the 50 percent taxation 
rule was partially applicable in 2001, leading me to choose this date as the implementation date. The law introduced extensive transition 
rules for the change from the tax imputation system to the 50 percent taxation rule. The primary reason for the necessity of such transition 
rules lay in the fact that under former regulation, taxes paid by corporations on retained profits were allowed to be deducted partially at 
later stages once profits were distributed. Indeed, the corporate tax rate on retained earnings had been 40 percent, whereas it had been 30 
percent on distributed profits. Under the new system, where taxation was final, there was no place for the deduction of formerly paid taxes, 
implying that transition rules were required to protect tax credits earned by paying corporate taxes on retained earnings previously. The law 
specified rules under which corporations were allowed to reduce their corporate tax obligations. The transition period is very long-term 
oriented; hence, for practical reasons, no phase-out date is specified. The measure was implemented in 2001, leading to changes in 
revenues of -2.104 bn €. 
The capital return tax was reduced from 25 to 20 percent, inducing a revenue change of -0.059 bn €. Technical changes in the 
taxation of fiscal unities induced revenue effects of -0.054 bn € effective 2001. Beginning with 2002, profits derived by corporations from 
selling shares of domestic corporations were no longer taxed, inducing a revenue change of -2.168 bn €. In the income tax code, the 
participation threshold for the taxation of profits derived from selling shares of corporations was decreased from 10 to 1 percent, in effect 
changing revenues by 0.128 bn € effective 2002. So-called speculation gains were also subject to the newly established 50 percent 
taxation rule, changing revenues by -0.593 bn € effective 2002. The law further specified the way local business taxes were to be deducted 
from income tax obligations, leading to changes in revenues of -2.431 bn € in 2001. The tax-free amount related to the sale of sole traders 
and partnerships was increased from 60,000 to 100,000 DEM effective 2001, leading to a change in revenue of -0.256 bn €. Technical 
changes related to the taxation of partnerships induced revenue effects of 0.041 bn € effective 2001. Stricter depreciation rules generated 
8.718 bn € effective 2001. 
Of considerable importance were changes in the income tax tariff. The income tax tariff that had originally been designed to be 
implemented 2002 in the Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/2002 was introduced 2001, thereby changing revenues by -14.234 bn € in 
2001. Note that the implementation effect in the Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/2002 is set to zero; accordingly, the measure is 
treated as a permanent measure in 2001 and subsumed under the Steuersenkungsgesetz. Next, the income tax tariff was reformed in two 
steps, one in 2003, leading to revenue changes of -6.89 bn €, and one in 2005, inducing changes of -17.374 bn €. The step in 2003 was 
later endogenously shifted to 2004 by the Flutopfersolidaritätsgesetz. As the shift in timing was endogenous, it seems warranted to remove 
the tax shock and, accordingly, its implementation effect is set to zero. The step for 2005 was later partially brought forward to 2004. Again, 
the motivation behind the change in timing was endogenous. To remove the proportion of the tax shock for which timing is endogenous, 
the revenue forecast from the Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 2004 is subtracted from the implementation effect of the law at hand, leaving an 
effect of -8.444 bn €. Technical changes in the income tax code, effective 2003, induced revenue changes of 0.143 bn €. However, the 
measure was later endogenously shifted to 2004 by the Flutopfersolidaritätsgesetz. As before, the implementation effect is set to zero. 
The statement on the introduction of the bill postulated that the law will promote growth and employment by reducing the tax burden. It 
was explicitly stated that the law pushes the economy onto a different growth path. The reduction in the corporate tax rate and the top 
income tax rate was intended to improve Germany’s international attractiveness and its competitiveness. More generally, tax reductions in 
income and corporate taxes were supposed to stimulate consumption, employment, and investment. An important part of the tax reform is 
the transition from a corporate tax imputation system to a 50 percent income taxation rule. The reform was partially driven by 
considerations of tax harmonization in the European Union. Indeed, the tax imputation system was problematic because foreign investors 
were often unable to reclaim corporate taxes in their home countries. As such, the tax imputation system may have violated EU regulation. 
The statement on the introduction of the bill reported that the imputation system had been very complex and associated with high 
bureaucratic costs. It was also mentioned that the 50 percent income taxation rule is less prone to tax evasion. The parliamentary debate 
accompanying the tax legislation was extensive, but basically followed the same line of reasoning. Specifically, no macroeconomic shocks 
were mentioned in the debate. Taken together, it is evident that the Steuersenkungsgesetz was driven by structural motives. 
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Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Steuersenkungsgesetzes (Steuersenkungsergänzungsgesetz – StSenkErgG)30 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
08/18/2000 (S: -3.49 bn €) 10/12/2000 11/08/2000 11/10/2000 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/01/2000 12/23/2000 (S: -3.49 bn €) 01/01/2001 (S: -1.079 bn €) 
01/01/2005 (S: -2.411 bn €) 
 
The compromise between the government and the opposition that had been made during the legislative process of the 
Steuersenkungsgesetz stipulated two additional tax measures. The marginal top income tax rate was reduced by an additional point to 42 
percent in 2005, leading to additional revenue effects of -2.411 bn €. Sales of businesses received a reduced tax rate once in the lifetime 
of an entrepreneur, inducing revenue changes of -1.079 bn €. 
In principle, the law has the same motivation as the Steuersenkungsgesetz as it was part of that reform program. In the statement on 
the introduction of the bill, it was stated that the changes are specifically designed to promote medium-sized companies. In the 
parliamentary debate, this supplementation of the Steuersenkungsgesetz was always justified as being beneficial to mainly medium-sized 
companies. Accordingly, the law was motivated by structural objectives. 
Within the legislative process, the law was not changed substantially. Taken together, the law adds a tax shock of -3.49 bn € 
implemented at 2001 and 2005. 
Steueränderungsgesetz 199831 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
11/09/1998 (S: -1.504 bn €) 11/13/1998 12/08/1998 12/10/1998 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/18/1998 12/23/1998 (S: -1.504 bn €) 01/01/1999 (S: -1.504 bn €)  
The law was originally introduced as part of the Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/2002, but later became a separate law. Accordingly, 
the dates of the introduction of the bill, as well as of the first reading of the law, are taken from the Steuerentlastungsgesetz 
1999/2000/2002. The law’s regulations are essentially identical in form to those in the original draft of that law. Accordingly, no relevant 
changes in the prospective revenue impact of the measure occurred over the legislative history of the law. 
The German tax code allows companies to form book reserves for pensions, thereby reducing profits and the tax burden. At the 
beginning of November 1998, new guidelines on how to calculate pension liabilities accounting for the increase in life expectancy were 
published. Accordingly, book reserves were allowed to be considerably higher, leading to reduced tax liabilities over a transition period. By 
law, companies need to build up the larger book reserves over a three-year period. The annualized revenue impact was given as 
-1.504 bn € in the Finanzbericht, effective 1999 and phased-out at the end of 2001. 
The law was originally part of the Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/2002, so it receives the same motivation as that law. From the 
report of the leading parliamentary committee and the discussion in parliament, it is also clear that the law was concerned with a necessary 
technical adjustment due to increased life expectancy. Hence, the motivation behind the law was structural in nature. 
Steuerentlastungsgesetz 199932 
Draft 1st Reading Comittee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
11/09/1998 (S: -3.633 bn €) 11/13/1998 12/02/1998 12/04/1998 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/18/1998 12/23/1998 (S: -3.633 bn €) 01/01/1999 (S: -3.633 bn €)  
The law was originally introduced as part of the Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/2002, but was later introduced as a separate law. 
Accordingly, the dates of the introduction of the bill, as well as of the first reading of the law, are taken from the Steuerentlastungsgesetz 
1999/2000/2002. The law’s regulations are essentially identical in form to those in the original draft of that law. Accordingly, no relevant 
changes in the prospective revenue impact of the measure occurred over the legislative history of the law. 
The law increased child benefits from 220 DEM to 230 DEM, thereby changing revenues by -2.965 bn € effective 1999. Also, the 
starting income tax rate was reduced to 23.9 percent, effective at the beginning of 1999, thereby changing revenues by -0.667 bn €. 
                                                          
30 BGBl. 2000, 57, pp. 1812–1814. 
31 BGBl. 1998, 84, pp. 3816–3817. 
32 BGBl. 1998, 84, pp. 3779–3815. 
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Since the law was originally part of the Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/2002, it’s assigned motivation is the same as that law’s. In 
the parliamentary debate, the two measures introduced by the law at hand received relatively little attention. The increase in child benefits 
was seen as a good idea by all parties, and the only discussion related to the question of how to finance them. It seems uncontroversial 
that the expansion in child benefits was driven by family political reasons. The second measure of the law was the reduction of the starting 
income tax rate. In the parliamentary debate, this was sometimes justified as necessary in order to comply with the principle of vertical tax 
justice. The reduction in the starting tax rate was also justified by sociopolitical reasons, as it benefited mostly low-income taxpayers. In 
any case, neither measure seemed related to any specific macroeconomic shock. Timing considerations were responsible for removing 
this law from the original proposal, as the government wanted to implement these measures in 1999. Altogether, it seems uncontroversial 
to categorize the law as being driven by structural objectives. 
Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/200233 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
11/09/1998 (S: -4.408 bn €) 11/13/1998 03/02/1999 (S: -0.353 bn €) 03/04/1999 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
03/19/1999 03/31/1999 (S: -4.762 bn €) 03/31/1999 (S: 12.836 bn €) 
04/01/1999 (S: 1.294 bn €) 
01/01/2000 (S: -5.338 bn €) 
 
This law is one of the most extensive tax reforms covered in the narrative. The basic structure of the law was to change the income tax 
tariff, leading to substantial tax reductions, while financing these tax reductions by closing loopholes and eliminating tax exceptions. 
The income and corporate tax tariff was reformed in three steps, one retroactively for 1999, one in 2000, and one in 2002. The 
combined revenue effect of the first step amounted to -2.542 bn €, the second step to -6.938 bn €, and the third step to -13.825 bn €. Note 
that the third step was later shifted to 2001 in the Steuersenkungsgesetz and that the implementation effect is subsumed in the volume 
derived for that law. These measures were accompanied by a multitude of others intended to close loopholes and abolish exemptions. The 
total volume of these measures was 18.544 bn €, to be implemented mostly at various dates in 1999, as well as at the beginning of 2000. 
The majority of the measures, although extremely technical in nature, had very minor revenue impacts, and so as to focus on the more 
important issues, these minor measures are not discussed here, although they were comprehensively analyzed. Briefly, the most 
noteworthy of these minor measures is the reduction in tax allowances for savings, which induced changes in revenues of 1.549 bn € 
effective 2000. Of considerable importance also were regulations on commercial reserves, inducing a total revenue effect of 5.54 bn € 
effective 1999. Changes in the taxation of extraordinary incomes induced revenue effects of 3.3 bn € effective 1999. Changes in the value-
added tax code related to the deduction of prepaid taxes induced revenue effects of 1.008 bn € effective April 1999. A full list of measures 
not explicitly discussed is available on request. 
Identifying the motivation behind the law is straightforward. In the statement on the introduction of the bill, it was stated that the tax 
reform is part of the coalition agreement between the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party. In fact, the law was introduced in 
parliament shortly after the election of that government. The objectives stated in the statement on the introduction of the bill were to 
increase growth by strengthening investment and internal demand, reduce the tax burden on employees and families, and foster tax justice 
and tax efficiency. Indeed, the basic structure of the law was to reduce tax rates and tax brackets, while at the same time removing 
exceptions and loopholes. In the parliamentary debate, many of these objectives were mentioned, but slightly stronger emphasis was 
placed on the law’s role in promoting families and tax justice. Mr. Müller, Economics Minister at the time, stated in the Bundesrat that the 
law was also helpful in complying with requirements of the constitutional court. It seems uncontroversial to assign the law a structural 
motivation, especially since no specific macroeconomic conditions or shocks played a role in the parliamentary debate. 
The final version of the law was very different from the one originally introduced. Parts of the original proposal were moved to separate 
laws (see the Steueränderungsgesetz 1998 and the Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999). I ignore those in my quantitative measure of changes 
during the legislative process and instead focus on the report by the budget committee (Haushaltsausschuss), which explicitly listed how 
tax measures included in the final version of the law compare to the original proposal. Based on the reports of the Haushaltsausschuss 
and the Finanzausschuss, no change in the original motivation was evident. 
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Gesetz zur Neuregelung der geringfügigen Beschäftigungsverhältnisse34 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
01/19/1999 (SD: -1.079 bn €) 01/22/1999 03/01/1999 03/04/1999 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
03/19/1999 03/29/1999 (SD: -1.079 bn €) 04/01/1999 (SD: -1.079 bn €)  
The law was concerned with reforming regulation on insignificant employment. Basically, employment yielding monthly wages below 
630 DEM is no longer taxed. The law came into effect April 1, 1999 and was expected to change tax revenues by -1.079 bn €. 
The law freed insignificant employment from income taxation, while at the same time introducing a flat-rate social insurance 
contribution rate for insignificant employment of 10 percent for health insurance and 12 percent for the governmental pension scheme. This 
was expected to generate additional social insurance revenue of roughly 2.5 bn €, larger in absolute value than the actual tax increase. It is 
clear from the statement on the introduction of the bill, as well as from the parliamentary debate, that the focus of the law was to increase 
social insurance contributions. The tax decrease cannot be viewed in isolation, as the tax measure was correlated with a corresponding 
increase in social insurance contributions. The tax measure is endogenous. The best fitting category seems to be spending driven. 
Within the legislative process, the law was changed only in technical dimensions. No change in the revenue forecast or in motivation is 
evident. 
Gesetz zum Einstieg in die ökologische Steuerreform35 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
11/17/1998 (SD: 6.212 bn €) 11/20/1998 02/24/1999 03/03/1999 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
03/19/1999 03/29/1999 (SD: 6.212 bn €) 04/01/1999 (SD: 6.212 bn €)  
The law increased energy taxes with the intention of lowering social insurance contributions. 
The law increased taxes on electricity, petroleum, heating oil, and petroleum gas, thereby generating 2.301 bn €, 2.147 bn €, 0.793 bn 
€, and 0.971 bn € on annual basis, respectively. The law came into effect April 1, 1999. 
The law was part of the so-called ecological tax reform, which started with this law and continued with the Gesetz zur Fortführung der 
ökologischen Steuerreform and the Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der ökologischen Steuerreform. In addition to creating behavioral 
incentives for economical consumption of scarce resources, the program was intended to reduce labor costs by lowering social insurance 
contributions and hence improving structural aspects of the economy. Speficially, reductions in labor costs were expected to increase 
employment. Indeed, the statement on the introduction of the bill suggested that the additional revenue raised by the law would be used to 
finance a decrease in social insurance contribution rates, as well as be invested in renewable energies. The Gesetz zu Korrekturen in der 
Sozialversicherung und zur Sicherung der Arbeitnehmerrechte36 had reduced social insurance contributions rates effective April 1, 1999 
while increasing the block grant of the general government to the social insurance institutions. The total budgetary effect of that law was 
forecast to be around 7 bn €, even exceeding tax revenues generated by the law at hand. The law at hand was spending driven. 
Within the legislative process, the law underwent a series of technical changes due to suggestions by the leading parliamentary 
committee. No changes in the revenue forecast or in motivation seem evident. The law represented a tax shock of 6.212 bn € to be 
implemented in April 1999. 
Gesetz zur Senkung des Solidaritätszuschlags37 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
05/24/1997 (S: -3.784 bn €) 06/14/1997 10/07/1997 10/09/1997 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
11/07/1997 11/28/1997 (S: -3.784 bn €) 01/01/1998 (S: -3.784 bn €)  
The law was originally introduced as part of the Jahressteuergesetz 1997; however, during the legislative process, it was decided to split 
the original law into two parts. Accordingly, the dates for the draft and the first reading are taken from the Jahressteuergesetz 1997. The 
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law reduced the solidarity surcharge on income and corporate taxes from 7.5 percent to 5.5 percent, thereby lowering tax revenues by 
-3.784 bn € effective 1998. 
The law was originally part of the Jahressteuergesetz 1997, so it has the same structural motivation of that law. The reduction in the 
solidarity surcharge tracks back to the Aktionsprogramm für Investitionen und Arbeitsplätze, which can be translated as the Agenda for 
Investment and Employment. The program recognized that unemployment in Germany had been high and suggested potential policy 
approaches, including a reduction in the solidarity surcharge. In the discussion of the program, it was argued that the government sector in 
Germany is too large and that reducing it would improve structural conditions for growth. As part of the agenda to reduce governmental 
influence, the program proposed reducing the solidarity surcharge. Finally, note that growth rates in the first and second quarter in 
comparison to the previous year were around 1.8 percent. Business cycle indicators also support that economic conditions were fairly 
normal, which support deeming this law to have a structural motivation. 
The law was originally part of the Jahressteuergesetz 1997, where the original intention had been to reduce the solidarity surcharge in 
two steps as of 1997 and 1998. The measure is now implemented in one step as of 1998, but other than that, no substantial changes 
during the legislative process are evident. 
Gesetz zur Finanzierung eines zusätzlichen Bundeszuschusses zur gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung38 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
10/07/1997 (SD: 5.778 bn €) 10/10/1997 10/29/1997 10/31/1997 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/28/1997 12/10/1997 12/11/1997 12/19/1997 
Publication Implementation   
12/23/1997 (SD: 5.778 bn €) 
 
04/01/1998 (SD: 5.778 bn €)   
The Gesetz zur Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung (Rentenreformgesetz 1999 - RRG 1999)39 reduced pension contribution 
rates and introduced an additional government block grant corresponding to the part of value-added tax revenues generated by a 1 
percent value-added tax rate. The law at hand was concerned with increasing the value-added tax rate in order to finance the additional 
block grant to the government pension scheme. Effective April 1998, the value-added tax rate was increased from 15 to 16 percent, 
generating 5.778 bn € in additional revenues. 
In the law, it was clearly stated that expected additional revenues of the value-added tax increase are to be used to finance a grant to 
the pension system. At the beginning of 1999, social insurance contribution rates were reduced in accordance with the law at hand. Taken 
together, it is clear that the law was spending driven. 
Within the legislative process, the law experienced some alternations. The increase in the value-added tax rate was originally 
scheduled for January 1, 1999 but was shifted by the mediation committee to April 1, 1998. No changes in motivation were evident. 
Jahressteuergesetz (JStG) 199740 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
05/24/1996 (S: -1.398 bn €) 06/14/1996 11/05/1996 (S: -0.182 bn €) 11/07/1996 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/15/1996 12/12/1996 (S: 1.488 bn €) 12/12/1996 12/19/1996 
Publication Implementation   
12/27/1996 (S: -0.092 bn €) 12/27/1996 (S: 1.562 bn €) 
01/01/1997 (S: -2.505 bn €) 
01/01/1998 (S: -0.851 bn €) 
  
Jahressteuergesetze (annual tax laws) are often concerned with changing technical aspects of the tax code. Indeed, most of the measures 
contained in this law were very technical and associated with only minor revenue effects. However, partially due to demands of the 
constitutional court, the law also made important changes in the inheritance and wealth tax, leading to substantial revenue effects. The 
reason this law is given careful study in the narrative is that a couple of its measures are very substantial, changing revenues by more than 
4 bn €. Still, as these measures partially cancel out, no substantial net revenue effect is achieved. 
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In 1995, the constitutional court ruled that the wealth tax in its current form is unconstitutional and demanded changes. Rather than 
changing the wealth tax, the government decided to suspend it, leading to an annualized revenue impact of -4.755 bn € effective 1997. 
Reforming the inheritance tax in accordance with the demands of the constitutional court led to a revenue change of 1.074 bn € effective 
retroactively for 1996. Accordingly, the date of publication is chosen as the implementation date. The land purchase tax was increased 
effective 1997, inducing a revenue effect of 2.684 bn €. Technical changes in the land purchase tax code lead to revenue changes of 
0.179 bn € effective 1997. The law also introduces a couple of technical changes in the income tax code. Retroactively for 1996, special 
depreciations for airplanes and ships were abolished, inducing revenue changes of 0.038 bn € and special rules for loss deduction in 
relation to ships were introduced, changing revenues by 0.066 bn €. 
All other changes in the income tax code were effective 1997. The way meals on business trips are treated was changed, inducing 
changes of -0.268 bn €. Some depreciation rules were changed, inducing revenue effects of -0.089 bn €. Tax allowances for household 
employment were increased, inducing revenue effects of -0.138 bn €. The way the income tax is charged was altered effective 1997, 
inducing one-time revenue effects of -0.182 bn € in 1997. The increase in the general tax-free amount due to the Jahressteuergesetz 1996 
was shifted to 1998, inducing revenue effects of 0.851 bn € in 1997. To model implementation of the measure correctly, I model a shock of 
-0.851 bn € at the beginning of 1998 and remove the implementation effect of the aforementioned law. This ensures that the tax shock hits 
at the correct time. Technical changes in the local business tax code induced changes of -0.018 bn € in 1997. Changes in tax benefits for 
home owners induced revenue effects of 0.082 bn € in 1997. Technical changes in the general tax code induced revenue changes of 
0.383 bn € with immediate impact. Accordingly, the date of publication is chosen as the implementation date. 
Identifying the motivation behind the law is straightforward. To a large extent, the law was concerned with rulings of the constitutional 
court. At the same time, the statement on the introduction of the bill cited structural reasons, such as improving opportunities for 
production, investment, and employment. The removal of the wealth tax, which not demanded by the constitutional court, was justified by 
arguing that the wealth tax was hindering economic growth by taxing the substance of companies in bad years. Changes in the 
depreciation rules were justified as improving conditions for investment and growth of small and medium-sized companies. Specifically, no 
specific economic shock was mentioned. Also, the law was concerned with balancing tax decreases and tax increases, making a business 
cycle stimulus unlikely. It is evident that the law was structurally motivated. 
Within the legislative process, the law was changed to a substantial degree as it was augmented by a variety of new measures. Also, 
parts of the law were removed to separate legislations. No change in motivation was evident. 
Gesetz zur Fortsetzung der wirtschaftlichen Förderung in den neuen Ländern41 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
06/03/1997 (S: -2.937 bn €) 06/06/1997 06/25/1997 (S: -0.031 bn €) 06/26/1997 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
07/04/1997 08/25/1997 (S: -2.968 bn €) 01/01/1999 (S: 0 bn €)  
The law extended and reformed the investment surcharge for the New Laender. 
The law implemented an investment surcharge of 10 percent on moveable assets in manufacturing until the end of 2004, affecting 
revenues by -0.435 bn. Investment in small and medium-sized companies was encouraged by an additional surcharge of 10 percent, 
affecting revenues by -1.120 bn € until the end of 2004. The investment surcharge was 10 percent for investment in crafts enterprises and 
in retail and wholesale trade until the end of 2004, affecting revenues by -0.143 bn € and -0.082 bn €, respectively. Until the end of 2004, 
investment in buildings used in manufacturing was benefited by an investment surcharge of 10 percent, affecting revenues by -0.358 bn €. 
Corresponding investment surcharges for buildings used for crafts enterprises and for retail and wholesale trade each changed revenues 
by -0.036 bn € until the end of 2001. Modernization of old homes and flats were benefited until the end of 2004, changing revenues by 
-0.348 bn €. New homes and flats let for rent were benefited until the end of 2001, changing revenues by -0.077 bn €. Owner-occupied 
buildings were benefited until the end of 2004, changing revenues by -0.143 bn €. West Berlin was included in the investment surcharge, 
changing revenues by -0.115 bn €. Previously, East German companies with turnovers less than 1,000,000 DEM were temporarily allowed 
to pay value-added taxes on actual revenues rather than on contracted sums. The law extended this provision, thereby inducing an 
announcement effect of -0.077 bn €. All measures of the law are effective at the beginning of 1999. 
It is difficult to assess the implementation effect precisely because the law partially extended already existing measures that had been 
designed to expire in 1998. This is a frequent aspect of investment surcharges, which are usually limited to a specific time span and then 
later adjusted and prolonged. The statement on the introduction of the bill explicitly pointed out that the total volume of the investment 
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surcharge roughly corresponded to the total volume of previous benefits. Based on that argument, the law was not a true tax innovation 
and the implementation effect is hence set to zero. 
Identifying the motivation behind the law is straightforward. The statement on the introduction of the bill recognized that the capital 
stock, productivity, and economic conditions in East Germany were still lagging those of West Germany. Therefore, the law extended and 
reformed the existing investment surcharge with the intention of fostering investment. In addition to investment in capital stocks, the law 
also allowed investment in buildings, recognizing that the standard of buildings and flats in East Germany is somewhat below the Western 
German level. The motivation of the law was structural. 
Within the legislative process, the law was subject to only very modest changes. 
Jahressteuergesetz 199642 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
03/27/1995 (S: -15.354 bn €) 03/31/1995 05/31/1995 (S: -1.986 bn €) 06/02/1995 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
06/23/1995 07/07/1995 07/13/1995 07/14/1995 
Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat Publication 
08/02/1995 (S: -3.219 bn €) 09/21/1995 09/22/1995 10/20/1995 (S: -20.559 bn €) 
Implementation    
10/20/1995 (S: -0.159 bn €) 
01/01/1996 (S: -8.904 bn €) 
01/01/1997 (S: -1.981 bn €) 
01/01/1999 (S: -2.38 bn €) 
   
Important parts of this law were related to reforms of the income tax tariff, as well as to changes in the tax treatment of families and 
children. Of relevance also was extension of the surcharge for investment in East Germany. In addition, the law contained a series of 
rather technical changes with limited revenue impact. The law has a record length of 164 pages, thus only the important measures are 
discussed in full detail here. 
The income tax tariff was reformed in three steps. The general tax-free amount was adjusted in 1996, 1997, and 1999, inducing 
revenue changes of -7.15 bn €, -1.478 bn €, and -2.38 bn €, respectively. The change in 1997 was later shifted to 1998 in the 
Jahressteuergesetz 1997. The implementation shock is discussed in the section on that law and set to zero for purposes of the law at 
hand. Changes in the tax treatment of families affect revenues by -3.702 bn € effective 1996. A related increase in child benefits induced 
revenue changes of -1.961 bn € in 1997. The law further extended and slightly altered the already existing investment surcharge for 
investment in East Germany for the time period 1996 to 1998. The announcement effect of these measures was -5.437 bn € on an annual 
basis. It is clear that the largest part of the shock was due to the renewal of existing measures, and hence the implementation effect is set 
to zero. The total effect of the multitude of tax shocks not discussed here, yet analyzed in an identical matter, was 1.549 bn €, implemented 
mostly in 1996. 
Identifying the motivation behind the law is straightforward. The constitutional court required the government to reform tax treatment of 
the minimum income needed to exist. This induced changes in the general tax-free amount and the tax treatment of family and children. 
The extension of the investment surcharge for the New Laender was motivated by a continued lag in economic activity and living standards 
in East Germany compared to West Germany. The remainder of the law was concerned with changing technical aspects of the tax code, 
with the intention of making the tax system simpler and more transparent. The discussion in parliament does not change this basic 
interpretation, although the parliamentary debate strongly emphasized the size of government in general at that time, potentially explaining 
the implementation of tax reductions. In any case, no endogenous motives for the law changes were present. The motivation of the law 
was structural. 
Within the legislative process, the law was changed extensively, yet no change in motivation occurred. 
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Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Mißbrauchs und zur Bereinigung des Steuerrechts (Mißbrauchsbekämpfungs- und 
Steuerbereinigungsgesetz - StMBG)43 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
09/03/1993 (MS: 1.271 bn €) 09/07/1993 11/08/1993 (MS: -0.394 bn €) 11/11/1993 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/26/1993 12/08/1993 (MS: 0.57 bn €) 12/10/1993 12/17/1993 
Publication Implementation   
12/29/1993 (MS: 1.447 bn €) 12/29/1993 (MS: 0.182 bn €) 
01/01/1994 (MS: 1.910 bn €) 
04/01/1994 (MS: -0.716 bn €) 
07/01/1994 (MS: 0.072 bn €) 
  
The law contained a series of technical changes in the tax code, primarily concerned with simplifying the tax code and closing loopholes. 
Depreciation rules for buildings not used as accommodations were changed, affecting revenues by 0.051 bn € effective 1994. Tax 
allowances for commuting costs were increased, affecting revenues by -0.205 bn € effective 1994. Tax allowances related to the 
acquisition of buildings were reduced, thereby changing revenues by 0.317 bn € effective 1994. Under former regulation, employers had 
been allowed to grant employees tax-free equity participation as long as the value did not exceed 500 DEM. This threshold was reduced to 
300 DEM, increasing revenues by 0.077 bn € effective 1994. Technical changes in the income tax code intended to close loopholes related 
to financial innovations changed revenues by 0.205 bn € effective 1994. Further changes in the income tax code were of minor importance 
and had a total revenue effect of 0.304 bn €. 
Employee savings allowances for certain capital investment were reduced to 10 percent, affecting revenues by 0.051 bn € effective 
1994. Closing loopholes in the Foreign Tax Act affected revenues by 0.332 bn € effective 1994. The law also introduced several changes 
in the Valuation Tax Act, the inheritance tax, and the value-added tax code, resulting in total revenue effects of 0.033 bn €, 0.038 bn €, and 
0.105 bn €, respectively. The fire insurance tax rate was set to 8 percent. The prospected revenue forecast for that measure was 
0.072 bn € effective July 1, 1994. The automobile tax for diesel cars was increased, inducing revenue changes of 0.332 bn € in 1994. The 
automobile tax for trucks was changed as of April 1, 1994, inducing revenue changes of -0.716 bn €. Technical changes in the general 
fiscal code induced revenue effects of 0.179 bn € effective on the date of announcement. Further technical changes in the corporate tax 
code and other minor parts of the tax code induced revenue effects of 0.271 bn € effective around 1994. 
According to the statement on the introduction of the bill, the law was primarily concerned with simplifying the tax system and closing 
loopholes. Changes in the automobile tax code were also justified on an environmental basis. Moreover, some technical adjustments were 
needed to comply with EC regulations. However, in the parliamentary debate, the law was discussed in conjunction with the Erstes Gesetz 
zur Umsetzung des Spar-, Konsolidierungs- und Wachstumsprogramms (1. SKWPG). It was repeatedly mentioned that both laws form a 
common program and share the same background. Accordingly, consolidation motives receive stronger emphasis in the parliamentary 
debate than do the technical arguments brought forward in the statement on the introduction of the bill. In the parliamentary debate, the 
law is seen as part of the consolidation program passed in response to a recent recession. It hence seems convincing to see both laws as 
having the same motivation, namely, macroeconomic shock. 
Within the legislative process, the law experienced some changes, none of which changed its motivation. 
Erstes Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Spar-, Konsolidierungs- und Wachstumsprogramms (1. SKWPG)44 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
08/13/1993 (MS: 4.346 bn €) 09/07/1993 10/20/1993 10/22/1993 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/26/1993 12/09/1993 12/10/1993 12/17/1993 
Publication Implementation   
12/29/1993 (MS: 4.346 bn €) 01/01/1994 (MS: 4.346 bn €)   
The law increased the petroleum tax rate at the beginning of 1994, thereby generating 4.346 bn € in revenues. Along with the tax 
measures, the law introduced a series of consolidation measures on the expenditure side. 
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In the statement on the introduction of the bill, it was stated that a recent economic downturn had led to reduced revenues, inducing a 
large budget deficit. The government at that time was not willing to enage in additional borrowing and hence decided to increase taxes. In 
the parliamentary debate, it was stated that the government’s budgetary targets would be in danger without additional revenue. Taken 
together, the official government stance suggested that the law increased taxes in response to a recent recession. It seems warranted to 
assume that the law is driven by a recent macroeconomic shock. 
The part of the law related to changes in the tax code did not changed substantially during the legislative process. 
Gesetz zur Neuregelung der Zinsbesteuerung (Zinsabschlaggesetz)45 
Draft 1st Reading Cmomittee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
04/08/1992 (S: -0.118 bn €) 05/07/1992 06/03/1992 (S: 0.394 bn €) 06/05/1992 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
06/26/1992 07/08/1992 (S: 1.751 bn €) 09/24/1992 09/25/1992 
Publication Implementation   
11/12/1992 (S: 2.027 bn €) 
 
01/01/1993 (S: 1.567 bn €) 
01/01/1994 (S: 0.46 bn €) 
  
The law reformed the tax treatment of interest income, leading to substantial tax increases. Increases in the tax burden were accompanied 
by expansions in tax allowances, most notably for for savings and insurance contributions. 
The law introduced a 30 percent withholding tax on interest income. Under the new regulation, banks were directly obliged to pay a 30 
percent tax on interest income, with the possibility of later deduction against tax liabilities at the individual level. The measure was 
expected to be implemented in 1993 with expected revenue effects of 6.647 bn €. Accrued interest was included in the new regulations in 
1994, changing revenues by 0.46 bn €. The tax rate on over-the-counter transactions was set at 35 rather than 30 percent, raising 0.205 
bn € effective 1993. The law also expanded tax allowances. The general allowance for savings was increased to 6,000 DEM from 
600 DEM in 1993, changing revenues by -2.592 bn €. Technical changes in the wealth tax affected revenues by -0.043 bn €. Finally, 
allowances related to savings and insurance contributions were increased, inducing changes of -2.648 bn € in 1993. 
The primary motivation for the law was a ruling of the constitutional court demanding changes in the taxation of interest income. Given 
banking confidentiality, enforcing taxation of interest income was difficult, which was criticized as violating tax justice. The 
Zinsabschlaggesetz reacted to this ruling and introduced a withholding tax on interest income. Increases in allowances for savings and 
insurance contributions and related changes were justified in the statement on the introduction of the bill in terms of sociopolitical reasons. 
The parliamentary debate does not add insight to these basic qualifications. The debate was entirely oriented toward structural arguments, 
with no mention of specific macroeconomic shocks. The motivation of the law was structural. 
Gesetz zur Anpassung von Verbrauchsteuer- und anderen Gesetzen an das Gemeinschaftsrecht sowie zur Änderung anderer 
Gesetze (Verbrauchsteuer-Binnenmarktgesetz)46 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
10/02/1992 (S: -1.651 bn €) 10/29/1992 11/30/1992 (S: -0.836 bn €) 12/02/1992 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/18/1992 12/29/1992 (S: -2.487 bn €) 01/01/1993 (S:-0.249 bn €) 
02/01/1993 (S: 0.056 bn €) 
 
The Verbrauchsteuer-Binnenmarktgesetz reformed two blocks of the tax code. It rewrote the majority of consumption tax laws while 
introducing several technical adjustments. The most noteworthy measure of the second block was extension of the investment surcharge 
for East German states. 
The more extensive part of the law dealt with reformulating consumption tax laws while introducing slight alternations. Alcohol used for 
medicine, cosmetics, and groceries was no longer taxed effective 1993, affecting revenues by -0.205 bn €. Taxes on lubricants were 
abolished effective 1993, leading to a one-time effect of -0.008 bn € and a permanent effect of -0.153 bn €. Technical changes in the 
petroleum tax code as well as abolishment of the tax on petrol coke led to revenue effects of 0.074 bn € effective 1993. The beer tax was 
increased effective 1993, changing revenues by 0.051 bn €. Technical changes in the tobacco tax code led to revenue changes of 
-0.029 bn € effective 1993. The tax rate for so-called Steckzigaretten, which are made out of a ready-made paper tube into which tobacco 
is inserted, was increased in two steps. For a transition period between February 1993 and December 1995, the tax rate was slightly 
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increased, affecting revenues by 0.056 bn €. Afterward, the full tax rate for ordinary cigarettes was to apply, affecting revenues by 0.353 bn 
€. However, the transition regulation was regularly extended by later legislations, and thus the implementation effect of the final provisions 
is set to zero. 
The Verbrauchsteuer-Binnenmarktgesetz also contained provisions affecting other parts of the tax code. The surcharge for investment 
in East Germany was both slightly altered and extended for the most part until the end of 1996. Regrettably, the Finanzbericht does not 
make a clear distinction between the effect of the prolongation and that of the expansion. However, it is clear that the largest part of the 
effect was caused by renewing extant regulation. It seems advisable to set the implementation effect of measures related to the promotion 
of investment in East Germany to zero. The announcement effect of the measure was -2.614 bn €. Finally, special depreciations granted in 
§ 7c EStG related to tenements were renewed until the end of 1995, while those in § 7k EStG pertaining to social housing were slightly 
altered. The combined effect of the two measures is -0.013 bn €. 
The law had two core topics, the promotion of economic development in the New Laender and the reformulation of consumption tax 
laws. Assessing the motivation behind the law is straightforward. The statement on the introduction of the bill cited EU regulations as the 
primary driving factor behind the legislation addressing consumption taxes. The investment surcharge, which aims at equalizing economic 
conditions across Germany, has a structural motive. 
Within the legislative process, alternations related to the investment surcharge led to substantial changes in the prospective revenue 
impact of the law. No change in motivation occurred. 
Gesetz über Maßnahmen zur Bewältigung der finanziellen Erblasten im Zusammenhang mit der Herstellung der Einheit 
Deutschlands, zur langfristigen Sicherung des Aufbaus in den neuen Ländern, zur Neuordnung des bundesstaatlichen 
Finanzausgleichs und zur Entlastung der öffentlichen Haushalte (Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Föderalen 
Konsolidierungsprogramms - FKPG)47 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
03/04/1993 (C: 10.303 bn €) 04/22/1993 05/18/1993 (C: 7.094 bn €) 05/27/1993 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
05/28/1993 06/26/1993 (C: 17.397 bn €) 06/26/1993 (C: -1.125 bn €) 
07/01/1993 (C: 1.048 bn €) 
01/01/1994 (C: -0.026 bn €) 
01/01/1995 (C: 16.885 bn €) 
01/01/1996 (C: 0.102 bn €) 
01/01/1997 (C: 0.102 bn €) 
01/01/1998 (C: 0.102 bn €) 
01/01/1999 (C: 0.102 bn €) 
01/01/2000 (C: 0.102 bn €) 
01/01/2001 (C: 0.102 bn €) 
 
The centerpieces of this legislation were the increase in the insurance tax rate and the permanent introduction of a “solidarity” surcharge of 
7.5 percent on income and corporate taxes. The Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Föderalen Konsolidierungsprogramms made other changes 
on both the revenue and the expenditure side of the budget, but these were of limited revenue impact. 
The solidarity surcharge, which is an additional surcharge on income and corporate tax liabilities, was formerly levied in 1992 and 
1993. The Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Föderalen Konsolidierungsprogramms reintroduced a solidarity surcharge of 7.5 percent effective 
1995, associated with an annualized revenue impact of 15.339 bn €. The insurance tax was increased in two steps: by 2 percent on July 1, 
1993, and by an additional 3 percent at the beginning of 1995. The revenue effect of the first step was 0.844 bn €; the effect of the second 
step was 1.329 bn €. Changes in the wealth tax effective 1995 induced effects of 0.499 bn €. Rated films and other acts were no longer 
subject to the reduced value-added tax rate, inducing a revenue effect of 0.026 bn € in 1994. Temporarily, the general tax-free amount in 
the income tax code was set to 10,500 DEM in 1993, 11,000 DEM in 1994, and 11,500 DEM in 1995. This was associated with a series of 
tax shocks of -1.125 bn € in 1993, -0.46 bn € in 1994, and -0.358 bn € in 1995. Reducing home owner benefits induced a series of revenue 
shocks, each in the amount of 0.102 bn €, in 1994 to 2001. Other changes in the tax code were technical, with a combined revenue effect 
of 0.486 bn € implemented at various dates between 1993 and 1994. 
The statement on the introduction of the bill reported that reunification had put tremendous financial burdens on the government 
budget, making additional revenue necessary. Noting that income per capita in East Germany is 15 percent lower than in West Germany 
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and that the economic structure in East Germany is still burdened by its socialist past, the statement claimed that about 5 percent of output 
is needed annually for resolving challenges associated with reunification. Assigning a motivation to the the law is complicated because the 
law is also associated with reforming the financial equalization scheme between the federal government and the Laender and with 
constructing a federal special fund commissioned with servicing debt inherited from East Germany. However, the former is related only to 
redistribution of revenue across tiers of the federal state and not necessarily with expansions in expenditure. The latter deals with debt 
inherited from the past. As such, the Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Föderalen Konsolidierungsprogramms is not spending driven. The law is, 
instead, a reaction to the financial burdens created by reunification and was motivated by consolidation. Note that the quantitatively 
important parts of the law were implemented at the beginning of 1995. Reunification certainly was not a contemporeanous shock in 1995. 
Within the legislative process, the law changed substantially. Due to suggestions from the leading parliamentary committee, the 
solidarity surcharge was set to 7.5 percent and the general tax-free amount was increased. No change in motivation was evident. 
Gesetz zur Verbesserung der steuerlichen Bedingungen zur Sicherung des Wirtschaftsstandorts Deutschland im Europäischen 
Binnenmarkt (Standortsicherungsgesetz - StandOG)48 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
01/04/1993 (S: -3.367 bn €) 02/04/1993 05/25/1993 (S: 0.476 bn €) 05/27/1993 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
06/18/1993 07/01/1993 (S: -0.414 bn €) 07/02/1993 07/09/1993 
Publication Implementation   
09/17/1993 (S: -3.306 bn €) 09/17/1993 (S: 0.123 bn €) 
11/01/1993 (S: 0.026 bn €) 
12/21/1993 (S: 1.534 bn €) 
01/01/1994 (S: -2.308 bn €) 
01/01/1995 (S: -0.688 bn €) 
  
    
The Standortsicherungsgesetz reduced the corporate tax rate, mainly through extensive changes in depreciation rules. The law also 
renewed special depreciation rules for disadvantaged regions in Germany. 
The law reduced the corporate tax rate effective 1994, leading to revenue changes of -2.066 bn €. Starting in 1994, the top marginal 
tax rate for commercial income was reduced to 47 percent, leading to expected revenue changes of -0.716 bn €. The declining balance 
method of depreciation for commercial buildings was abolished, leading to changes in revenues of 1.534 bn € effective 1994. Although not 
effective until 1995, new special depreciations for small and medium-sized companies were enacted, leading to expected revenue changes 
of -0.46 bn €. Extending existing special depreciations for ships and airplanes led to an announcement effect of -0.015 bn €. As the 
measure was a mere extension of existing regulations, no implementation effect is assigned. 
One centerpiece of the law was related to tax allowances for investment in disadvantaged regions. Renewing and slightly adjusting 
existing measures was associated with an announcement effect of -2.158 bn €. It is clear that the size of the renewal is much larger than of 
the adjustments, making it natural to set the whole implementation effect of the measures to zero. The law implemented a tax-free amount 
for business assets in the inheritance tax code of 500,000 DEM, inducing revenue changes of -0.128 bn € effective 1994. Certain travel 
sales were now no longer subject to the reduced value-added tax rate, inducing revenue changes of 0.026 bn €. Technical changes with 
minor revenue effects accounted for a revenue effect of 0.677 bn €, effective mostly 1994. 
The statement on the introduction of the bill reported four objectives of the law. First, the law was intended to strengthen investment. 
The law was further concerned with increasing international competitiveness, improving tax conditions for medium-sized companies, and 
with providing incentives for investment in the new Laender. It also stated that the law was concerned with reducing top marginal tax rates, 
which had typically been higher in Germany than in other member states of the European Union. Reducing top marginal rates was 
supposed to strengthen entrepreneurial spirit and willingness to invest. Also, the reduction was intended to make Germany more attractive 
for foreign direct investment. It is clear that the Standortsicherungsgesetz was concerned with improving structural conditions. 
Within the legislative process, the law was changed substantially. No change in motivation was evident. 
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Gesetz zur Entlastung der Familien und zur Verbesserung der Rahmenbedingungen für Investitionen und Arbeitsplätze 
(Steueränderungsgesetz 1992 - StÄndG 1992)49 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
09/03/1991 (S: 2.678 bn €) 09/19/1991 11/07/1991 (S: -1.279 bn €) 11/08/1991 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/29/1991 02/10/1992 (S: 0.302 bn €) 02/13/1992 02/14/1992 
Publication Implementation   
02/28/1992 (S: 1.701 bn €) 02/28/1992 (S: -1.784 bn €) 
01/01/1993 (S: 3.788 bn €) 
01/01/1994 (S: -0.173 bn €) 
01/01/1995 (S: -0.02 bn €) 
01/01/1996 (S: -0.02 bn €) 
01/01/1997 (S: -0.02 bn €) 
01/01/1998 (S: -0.02 bn €) 
01/01/1999 (S: -0.02 bn €) 
  
Two noteworthy tax measures of the Steueränderungsgesetz 1992 were the expansions in tax allowances for children and in direct child 
benefits, financed by an increase in the value-added tax rate. Other tax measures were largely technical in nature and had very limited 
revenue impact. 
Quantitatively most important was the increase in the value-added tax rate from 14 to 15 percent, changing tax revenues by 
6.289 bn € effective 1993. Technical changes in the value-added tax code induced permanent revenue effects of 0.051 bn €, and one-time 
revenue effects of -0.128 bn €, both effective 1993. Expansions in tax allowances for children and in direct child benefits effective 
retroactively to 1992 induced revenue effects of -1.853 bn € and -1.582 bn €, respectively. The law reformed benefits for home owners. As 
those are paid for eight consecutive years, a series of revenue effects of -0.02 bn € from 1992 to 1999 occurred (see the discussion under 
Gesetz zur Abschaffung der Eigenheimzulage). Those measures related to real estate were accompanied by minor technical measures, 
inducing a revenue effect of 0.107 bn € effective retroactively for 1992, and by temporary measures limited for three years and 
implemented in 1992, 1993, and 1994, affecting revenues by -0.077 bn € on an annual basis. 
Changes in the local business tax code, including increases in the tax-free amount, a new tax tariff, and technical changes, induced 
revenue effects of -1.185 bn € effective 1993. Changes in the Valuation Tax Act related to the tax balance sheet induced revenue changes 
of -1.066 bn € effective 1993. Reductions in tax allowances related to cash-value life insurance induced revenue effects of 0.767 bn € 
effective retroactively for 1992. Tax allowances related to business contributions to pension funds were reduced, affecting revenues by 
0.545 bn € effective retroactively for 1992. Changes in the International Tax Relations Law affected revenues by 0.409 bn € effective 
retroactively for 1992. Further tax changes had only minor revenue effects. The total volume of these measures was -0.169 bn €. 
In the statement on the introduction of the bill, it was explicitly stated that the law’s intention had been to improve the economic 
structure in Germany. Changes in the tax treatment of families were partially motivated by requirements of the constitutional court. The 
increase in value-added taxes was implemented to improve the government’s financial situation and to finance expansions in tax benefits, 
especially those related to families. Many of the more technical changes were concerned with improving the structure of the tax system 
and making it ready for introduction of the European common market. The parliamentary debate adds nothing to this basic interpretation. 
The motivation of the law was structural. 
Within the legislative process, the law experienced substantial changes. No change in motivation was present.  
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Gesetz zur Förderung von Investitionen und Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen im Beitrittsgebiet sowie zur Änderung 
steuerrechtlicher und anderer Vorschriften (Steueränderungsgesetz 1991 - StÄndG 1991)50 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
03/08/1991 (MS: 1.379 bn €) 03/12/1991 05/11/1991 (MS: -0.375 bn €) 05/14/1991 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
06/07/1991 06/17/1991 (MS: 0.026 bn €) 06/19/1991 06/21/1991 
Publication Implementation   
06/27/1991 (MS: 1.03 bn €) 06/27/1991 (MS: -3.15 bn €) 
07/01/1991 (MS: 1.687 bn €) 
01/01/1992 (MS: -1.47 bn €) 
01/01/1993 (MS: 0.281 bn €) 
01/01/1994 (MS: 0.522 bn €) 
01/01/1995 (MS: 0.230 bn €) 
01/01/1996 (MS: -0.089 bn €) 
01/01/1997 (MS: -0.089 bn €) 
01/01/1998 (MS: -0.089 bn €) 
  
The main theme of the law was expansion of tax benefits for investment in the New Laender, partially replacing earlier tax instruments 
designed to promote growth in disadvantaged regions. In addition, the law included a collection of minor technical tax measures. 
The most important parts of the law were concerned with reforming tax allowances for disadvantaged regions. The law largely 
removed tax benefits for companies in West Berlin. This induced revenue effects of 0.066 bn € retroactively for 1991, 1.36 bn € effective 
July 1991, 1.603 bn € effective 1992, and 0.238 bn € distributed over 1993 to 1995. Moreover, benefits for taxpayers and employees in 
West Berlin were reduced in a series of five steps. The revenue effects were 0.389 bn € effective October 1991, 0.251 bn € effective 1992, 
0.307 bn € effective 1993, 0.537 bn € effective 1994, and 0.256 bn € effective 1995. The reductions in benefits for West Berlin were 
compensated by increases in tax benefits for disadvantaged regions and the investment surcharge tailored toward the needs of East 
Germany, with a total volume of -2.027 bn €, implemented retroactively for 1991. The law introduced, temporarily for 1991 to 1993, a tax-
free amount for East German taxpayers, thereby affecting revenues by -0.409 bn €. For 1991 and 1992, the local capital tax was not 
imposed in East Germany, inducing a revenue effect of -0.046 bn €. The wealth tax was not imposed in 1992 to 1994, inducing revenue 
effects of -0.102 bn €. However, both the wealth tax and the local capital tax were never actually imposed in East Germany and were 
finally abolished and hence these tax shocks are treated as permanent. 
Section 10e EStG had been concerned with special deductions for home owners, allowing deducting certain amounts for eight 
consecutive years after acquisition of a family-occupied flat or home. The law increased the upper limit for deductions and created 
additional child benefits, thereby inducing a revenue change of -0.089 bn € for each vintage accumulating over eight years. Also, but 
limited to acquisitions in 1991 to 1994, there were additional benefits for East Germany of -0.033 bn € per vintage, accumulating for 1991, 
1992, 1993, and 1994, and then being paid for eight years. The law prolonged existing special deductions for social housing, implying an 
announcement effect of -0.128 bn €. Allowances for commuting costs were expanded in two steps, one retroactively for 1991, the other at 
the beginning of 1992. Unfortunately, the available revenue forecast is combined for both steps. It seems reasonable to distribute the 
shock equally across both steps, implying a shock of -0.281 bn € per step. Also, some technical changes related to child benefits 
retroactive for 1983 to 1985 induce revenue effects of -0.055 bn €. Technical changes related to the tax treatment of families induced a 
revenue effect of -0.023 bn € effective 1992. Changes in the local business tax tariff induced revenue changes of -0.036 bn € effective 
1991. Changes in the automobile tax had a volume of 0.231 bn € effective at various dates in 1991. 
The primary focus of the law was on improving economic conditions in East Germany. Tax benefits for West Germany were 
substantially reduced, while those benefiting East Germany were expanded. In the statement on the introduction of the bill, this was 
justified by promoting economic development in East Germany toward the goal of equalizing living conditions across Germany. The 
parliamentary debate centered on challenges raised by reunification. Treating reunification in 1989 to 1991 as a macroeconomic shock, 
which seems feasible, this suggests that the law was endogenous. In addition to measures related to the promotion of economic 
development in East Germany, the law contained a series of technical adjustments to the tax code. Some of these, such as the 
adjustments in the automobile tax or the expansion in commuter tax allowances, can be traced back to the reunification shock as they 
were either direct responses or responses to measures related to reunification. Only for measures with very minor revenue effects, such as 
the changes in the tax treatment of families, is an alternative motivation feasible. Taken together, it seems convincing to view the law as an 
endogenous reaction to the reunification shock. However, an alternative structural motivation is also a possibility. 
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Gesetz zur Einführung eines befristeten Solidaritätszuschlags und zur Änderung von Verbrauchsteuer- und anderen Gesetzen 
(Solidaritätsgesetz)51 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
03/08/1991 (SD: 20.022 bn €) 03/12/1991 05/11/1991 05/14/1991 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundesrat Publication 
06/07/1991 06/17/1991 06/21/1991 06/27/1991 (SD: 20.022 bn €) 
Implementation    
07/01/1991 (SD: 18.833 bn €) 
03/01/1992 (SD: 0.525 bn €) 
   
The law increased taxes on petroleum and tobacco and introduced the solidarity surcharge, which was an additional levy on income and 
corporate taxes. 
Temporarily, between July 1991 and June 1992, a solidarity surcharge of 7.5 percent on income and corporate taxes was levied. The 
revenue effect was 10.226 bn € on an annual basis. The petroleum tax was increased as of July 1991, thereby generating 6.698 bn €. 
Note that part of the changes in the petroleum tax code consisted in the extension of extant measures. The extension effect of 0.665 bn € 
is not included in the implementation effect. Finally, the insurance tax was increased effective July 1991, inducing additional revenues of 
0.971 bn €, and the tobacco tax went up as of March 1992, increasing tax revenues by 0.46 bn €. Increases in the petroleum and tobacco 
taxes created additional value-added tax revenues of 1.002 bn €, which are distributed on the implementation date of the increase in the 
tobacco tax and the increase in the petroleum tax in accordance to the relative size of the shocks. 
It is clear that the law’s main objective was to generate additional revenue. The statement on the introduction of the bill mentions that 
additional revenues are needed to finance expenditures related to the Gulf War and to reunification, and to assist eastern European 
transition economies. However, additional revenues were not earmarked and it was pointed out in the parliamentary debate that the 
increase in revenues exceeds the costs of the Gulf War by a fair margin. Nevertheless, the parliamentary debate was dominated by 
reunification and expenditure needs created by it. As such, the law is a response to the macroeconomic shock created by reunification in 
general. More specifically, it seems related to expenditure needs created by recent political developments. Taken together, the law was 
spending driven. 
Within the legislative process, the law did not experience any substantial alternations. 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Steuerreformgesetzes 1990 sowie zur Förderung des Mietwohnungsbaus und von Arbeitsplätzen in 
Privathaushalten52 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
05/09/1989 (S: -2.498 bn €) 05/12/1989 06/14/1989 (S: -0.043 bn €) 06/16/1989 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
06/30/1989 06/30/1989 (S: -2.541 bn €) 07/01/1989 (S: -2.521 bn €) 
01/01/1990 (S: -0.02 bn €) 
 
The law’s main measure was abolishment of the so-called small capital return tax. Together with other minor measures, the law 
implemented substantial tax reductions. 
The so-called small capital return tax was a withholding tax on capital returns introduced at the beginning of 1989 and abolished 
effective July 1989, changing revenues by -1.943 bn €. Savings allowances were increased, changing revenues by -0.297 bn € effective 
July 1, 1989. Changes in the income tax code expanded special depreciation for flats let for rent, thereby affecting revenues by -0.123 bn € 
effective July 1, 1989. Technical changes related to the capital gains tax changed tax revenues by -0.02 bn € effective 1990. Employment 
in private households was benefited by the introduction of special deductions, affecting revenues by -0.115 bn € effective July 1, 1989. 
Other technical changes affected revenues by -0.026 bn € effective July 1, 1989. Finally, the law allowed for additional special 
depreciations related to buildings in West Berlin, thereby changing revenues by -0.018 bn € effective July 1, 1989. 
According to the statement on the introduction of the bill, the capital return tax was abolished because it has led to confusion in 
financial markets and to extreme administrative effort. Many of the minor changes introduced by the law, such as expansions in allowances 
for housing and in government incentives for savings, were justified with sociopolitical reasons. The parliamentary debate adds no insight. 
It is clear that the law was driven by structural reasons. 
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Gesetz über Maßnahmen zur Entlastung der öffentlichen Haushalte (Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 1989)53 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
08/12/1988 (C: 0.879 bn €) 09/30/1988 11/18/1988 (C: -0.02 bn €) 11/23/1988 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/16/1988 12/22/1988 (C: 0.859 bn €) 01/01/1989 (C: 0.854 bn €) 
01/01/1991 (C: 0.01 bn €) 
 
The total announcement effect of the Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 1989 fails to exceed the 0.1 percent threshold. However, the law contained a 
few, well-defined tax measures of considerable importance, warranting discussion in this history. Of importance was the increase in the 
insurance tax rate as well as in the automobile tax on diesel cars. 
The automobile tax on diesel cars was increased effective 1989, changing revenues by 0.276 bn €. Technical changes in the 
automobile tax code induced a revenue effect of 0.01 bn € effective 1991. The increase in the insurance tax rate increased revenues by 
0.603 bn € effective 1989. Minor changes in the capital returns tax affected revenues by -0.026 bn € effective 1989. Finally, the law 
prolonged the reduced value-added tax rate on ship travelling introduced with the Gesetz zur Stärkung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der 
Wirtschaft und zur Einschränkung von steuerlichen Vorteilen (Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1984 - StEntlG 1984). The prospective revenue 
effect was -0.005 bn € on an annual basis. As usual, the measure is included in the announcement effect, but not in the implementation 
shock. 
According to the statement on the introduction of the bill, the primary motive behind this tax legislation was to generate additional 
revenue. It states that grants to the European communities and to financially weak Laender have put financial burdens on the general 
budget, requiring compensation. It is, however, not clear that the revenue was earmarked for specific expenditure programs. The law 
appears to be chiefly related to distributing revenues across tiers of government, not necessarily to contemporaneous expansions in 
spending. It is also reported that the law was part of an ongoing effort to reduce budget deficits. For many of the tax measures included in 
the bill, structural motives were reported. Technical changes in the automobile tax code were justified by necessary modernizations and by 
the need to reduce administrative costs. The increase in the automobile tax on diesel cars was justified partially by tax justice, as previous 
increases in the petroleum tax fell disproportionally on other sorts of fuel. It was also noted that moving to indirect taxes may be beneficial 
for the economy, as direct taxes may discourage economic activity. The parliamentary debate does not add any fundamentally different 
insight. Given the emphasis on raising revenues, the law is classified as motivated by consolidation. However, an alternative structural 
motivation may be feasible. 
During discussion in parliament, the law was altered only in very minor ways. 
Gesetz zur Änderung von Verbrauchsteuergesetzen (Verbrauchsteueränderungsgesetz 1988 - VerbrStÄndG 1988)54 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
08/12/1988 (C: 4.218 bn €) 09/30/1988 11/21/1988 (C: -0.146 bn €) 11/23/1988 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/16/1988 12/22/1988 (C: 4.072 bn €) 01/01/1989 (C: 3.339 bn €) 
05/01/1989 (C: 0.256 bn €) 
01/01/1990 (C: 0.008 bn €) 
01/01/1991 (C: 0.47 bn €) 
 
The Verbrauchsteueränderungsgesetz 1988 implemented substantial increases in the petroleum and tobacco tax, with the primary 
intention of generating additional revenue. 
The petroleum tax on gasoline and fuel oil was increased in two steps. In a first step, effective 1989, 3.339 bn € in additional revenues 
were created. In the second step, effective 1991, 0.47 bn € in additional revenues were created. Some technical changes in the petroleum 
tax code created 0.008 bn € effective 1990. Additionally, the tobacco tax was increased, generating 0.256 bn € effective May 1, 1989. 
The Verbrauchsteueränderungsgesetz 1988 was closely related to the previously discussed Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 1989. The laws 
were often discussed together in parliament, indicating that they did indeed share a common motivation. In the statement on the 
introduction of the bill, it is again stated that the government needs to compensate for grants to the European communities, to the Laender, 
and to the federal labor market authority. Again, no specific expenditure programs mentioned, nor are additional revenues earmarked. The 
motive of the law was one of consolidation. 
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Based on suggestions from the leading parliamentary committee, the tax increase in the petroleum tax was less severe than originally 
planned. No change in motivation is evident. 
Steuerreformgesetz 199055 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
03/23/1988 (S: -11.156 bn €) 04/21/1988 06/21/1988 (S: -0.266 bn €) 06/23/1988 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
07/08/1988 08/02/1988 (S: -11.422 bn €) 08/02/1988 (S: 0.133 bn €) 
01/01/1989 (S: 3.244 bn €) 
01/01/1990 (S: -14.799 bn €) 
 
The Steuerreformgesetz 1990 is one of the more extensive tax reforms in this history. However, most of its tax measures had only very 
minor revenue effects. To keep focused on the more important parts of the reform, negligible measures are discussed only in the 
aggregate. The analysis of these smaller measures, however, was conducted in a manner identical to that for the measures dicussed in 
more detail. Most noteworthy was the reform in the income tax tariff, leading to substantial tax reductions. Of interest also were reductions 
in the corporate tax rate. 
The most important part of the law was the change in the income tax tariff effective 1990, which changed revenues by -16.31 bn €. 
The law also increased allowances for families effective 1990, thereby generating -1.107 bn €. Allowances for expenses of a provident 
nature were expanded effective 1990, leading to changes in revenues of -0.307 bn € and one-time effects of -0.153 bn €. The corporate 
tax rate was reduced, thereby generating -1.278 bn €. Compensations of employers for professional expenses were now taxed to a larger 
degree, changing revenues by 0.102 bn € effective 1990. The measure was also associated with a one-time revenue effect of size 
0.256 bn €. Tax benefits for employment on Sundays, at night, or on bank holidays were reduced, thereby generating revenues of 
0.130 bn € effective 1990. Effective 1989, allowances for provisions for jubilee benefits were removed, thereby generating revenues of 
0.307 bn €. Effective 1990, a general tax deduction for work-related expenses of 2000 DEM was introduced, thereby changing revenues by 
0.614 bn €. Only 50 percent of contributions to building savings contracts were allowed to be deductible effective 1990, thereby changing 
revenues by 0.128 bn €. The general allowance for special expenses was reduced effective 1990, thereby generating revenues of 
0.179 bn €. The old age tax-free amount was removed, generating 0.215 bn € effective 1990. Additional wage components were included 
in the progression clause, changing revenues by 0.256 bn € effective 1990. The capital return tax was reformed effective 1989, inducing 
revenue changes of 2.199 bn €. The most noteworthy of these reforms was the introduction of a 10 percent withholding tax. The 
investment surcharge was removed, generating 0.818 bn € effective 1990. Tax debts were now subject to interest payment, changing 
revenues by 0.46 bn € effective 1989. Government incentives for savings were reduced, changing revenues by 0.307 bn € in 1990. Tax 
measures not discussed here were often technical and associated with only minor revenue impacts. Their total volume was 2.015 bn €, 
mostly effective 1989 and 1990. 
The Steuerreformgesetz 1990 was the core part of an attempt to reform and modernize the German tax system, with the general 
intention being to reduce tax rates financed by, at least partially, broadening the tax base. Based on the statement on the introduction of 
the bill, there is little doubt that the law was driven by structural considerations. According to this source, the law’s measures were 
designed to lead to a more efficient tax system, to improve tax justice, to promote families, and to achieve sustainable long-term growth. It 
was also stated that the law increased international competitiveness. It was explicitly stated in the statement on the introduction of the bill 
that the law will improve conditions for sustainable growth, making its structural emphasis clear. The parliamentary debate was along 
similar lines. Dr. Stoltenberg from the CDU/CSU pointed out that the law followed the principal logic of expanding the tax base, while 
reducing tax rates. Not only is such a course of action often advised by leading economists, it is also the principle of tax reform in many 
countries. Mr. Stoltenberg further claimed ideological motivations for a reduction in marginal tax rates; as such a reduction should increase 
the benefits of work and effort. Dr. Dregger from the CDU/CSU government claimed that the objectives of the tax reform were to improve 
tax justice and the efficiency of the tax system, to improve structural conditions for growth, to reduce bureaucratic costs, and to increase 
international competiveness. Neither the statement on the introduction of the bill, nor the discussion in parliament, justified the reform on 
the basis of specific macroeconomic shocks. The law was motivated by structural considerations. 
Given the size of the tax reform at hand, it is not surprising that the law changed during the legislative process. However, most 
changes had only minor revenue impacts and none were related to alterations in motivation. The Steuerreformgesetz implemented a shock 
of 3.24 bn € in 1989 and of -14.8 bn € in 1990.  
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Gesetz zur Änderung des Einkommensteuergesetzes (Steuersenkungs-Erweiterungsgesetz 1988 - StSenkErwG 1988)56 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
04/03/1987 (MS: -2.677 bn €) 05/20/1987 06/24/1987 06/26/1987 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
07/10/1987 07/22/1987 (MS: -2.677 bn €) 01/01/1988 (MS: -2.677 bn €)  
The law introduced tax reductions, supplementing those already implemented at the beginning of 1988 due to the Steuersenkungsgesetz 
1986/1988. One important motive was to comply with a February 22, 1987 international agreement among six industrial nations. 
The general tax-free amount was increased with the beginning of 1988, thereby changing tax revenues by -0.734 bn € on an annual 
basis. In addition to measures that had already been designed to be implemented in 1988, the law further changed the income tax tariff, 
thereby inducing revenue changes of -1.534 bn €. The law increased training tax allowances, changing revenues by -0.153 bn €. Special 
depreciations for small and medium-sized companies were expanded, changing revenues by -0.256 bn € on an annual basis effective 
1988. 
In the parliamentary debate, Mr. Stoltenberg, Federal Minister of Finance, reported that an important motive of the law was to 
strengthen internal demand. It was stated that the DEM had appreciated strongly, thereby depressing external demand. The tax stimulus 
program was partially designed to offset these macroeconomic shocks. It is explicitly stated that economic growth was slowing down, 
providing incentive for a stimulus package. Mr. Stoltenberg also justified the law as an exercise in international cooperation. Germany at 
that time had a large trade surplus, and strengthening internal demand was expected to lead to more balanced trade. The statement on the 
introduction of the bill reported that the law had been designed to improve disposable income, employment, and investment. Based on the 
parliamentary debate, it also seems that the government was reacting to current macroeconomic conditions. The tax law was endogenous 
and reacted to a recent macroeconomic shock. 
Within the legislative process, the law experienced no substantial alternation. 
Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Abschreibungsbedingungen für Wirtschaftsgebäude und für moderne Heizungs- und 
Warmwasseranlagen57 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
08/16/1985 (S: -1.48 bn €) 10/25/1985 11/26/1985 (S: -0.091 bn €) 12/05/1985 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/19/1985 12/24/1985 (S: -1.571 bn €) 12/24/1985 (S: -1.571 bn €)   
The law was concerned with reforming depreciation rules, primarily those related to buildings. 
First and foremost, the law expanded depreciation allowances. The depreciation period for commercial buildings was set to 25 rather 
than 50 years. The measure came into effect retroactively for 1985, implying that the date of publication should be chosen as the 
implementation date. Deciding on an appropriate revenue effect is complicated because the annualized revenue impact within the first 12 
months after full implementation in this case does not account for accumulation effects over the years. The pragmatic solution is to take an 
average over the budgetary effects given for 1985 to 1990. This produces an effect of -1.429 bn €. The law authorized the government to 
allow special depreciations for heating systems, with a prospective average effect of -0.091 bn € in 1985 to 1991. In calculating the 
revenue effect, the same logic as above is applied. The law further expanded tax benefits for Berlin and the area adjacent to the German 
Democratic Republic. The investment surcharge on certain assets and buildings is increased by 5 percent retroactive to 1985. Also, 
special depreciations for certain assets in the area adjacent to the German Democratic Republic were increased retroactively to 1985. Both 
measures had a combined effect of 0.051 bn €. 
Based on the statement on the introduction of the bill, it is not entirely clear whether structural or countercyclical reasons were the 
primary motive behind these changes. It was stated that increased depreciation allowances give companies increased flexibility and hence 
are beneficial in overcoming structural problems. At the same time, it was stated that one motive of the law was to increase employment in 
the construction sector given current economic conditions. Still, there are indications that this motive was sectoral and not economywide. 
First, in the third quarter of 1985, the economy was growing at 2.5% on an annual level, while the corresponding rate was 4% in the 
second quarter. There were hence no indications of a recession or unfavorable macroeconomic conditions. Also, the parliamentary debate 
focused on structural arguments. The motivation of the law was structural. 
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Gesetz zur leistungsfördernden Steuersenkung und zur Entlastung der Familie (Steuersenkungsgesetz 1986/1988 - StSenkG 
1986/1988)58 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
12/28/1984 (S: -9.899 bn €) 03/01/1985 05/15/1985 (S: -0.02 bn €) 05/24/1985 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
06/14/1985 06/28/1985 (S: -9.919 bn €) 01/01/1986 (S: -5.573 bn €) 
01/01/1988 (S: -4.346 bn €) 
 
The law reformed the income tax tariff as well as the tax treatment of families, leading to large tax reductions. 
At the beginning of 1986, the general tax-free amount was increased, changing revenues by -1.074 bn €. The income tax tariff was 
altered in two steps, the first in 1986 and the second in1988. The first step changed revenues by -1.841 bn € and the second step by 
-4.346 bn €. These changes were accompanied by changes in the tax treatment of families starting in 1986. Of special importance was the 
increase in the tax-free amount for children, corresponding to -2.454 bn €. Further measures, such as changes in general household 
allowances and training tax allowances, affected revenues by -0.205 bn € in 1986. 
In the statement on the introduction of the bill it was stated that the reform of the income tax tariff was designed to offset increased 
taxation as a consequence of growing income. Thus, the law was at least partially designed to offset cold progression. It was also stated 
that the tax burden of the low–income population will be reduced. The reform of the tax treatment of families was justified on sociopolitical 
grounds. There was also some indication that part of the reason behind these changes related to the tax treatment of families had to do 
with complying with certain requirements of the constitutional court. The parliamentary debate added no substantial information. The 
motivation of the law was structural. 
Within the legislative process, the law experienced only very modest alternations. No change in motivation is evident. 
Gesetz zur Stärkung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der Wirtschaft und zur Einschränkung von steuerlichen Vorteilen 
(Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1984 - StEntlG 1984)59 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
07/22/1983 (S: -1.782 bn €) 09/07/1983 11/25/1983 (S: - 0.01 bn €) 12/08/1983 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/16/1983 12/28/1983 (S: -1.792 bn €) 12/28/1983 (S: -0.895 bn €) 
01/01/1984 (S: -0.897 bn €) 
04/01/1984 (S: -0.051 bn €) 
 
The law implemented a multidude of technical changes and created new tax incentives, leading to substantial tax reductions. 
In § 117 a BewG, details related to computation of the tax assessment basis of the wealth tax were changed, altering revenues by 
-0.593 bn € effective 1984. The wealth tax rate was reduced from 0.7 percent to 0.6 percent, changing revenues by -0.153 bn € effective 
1984. Under the German Valuation Law, if a corporation holds more than 25 percent of another corporation, those shares do not qualify as 
business assets. The law reduced that threshold to 10 percent, leading to a change in tax revenues of -0.107 bn € effective 1984. The law 
also introduced changes in income-related taxes. Small and medium-sized enterprises were allowed to deduct special depreciations for 
moveable assets, changing revenues by -0.511 bn € retroactively. The law also introduced special depreciations for research and 
development, retroactively and limited until the end of 1989. The revenue effect was -0.153 bn €. Special depreciations for vessels and 
airplanes were extended until the end of 1989. Following the usual practice, this tax shock of -0.051 bn € is included in the announcement 
effect of the law, but excluded from the implementation tax shock series. Technical changes in the income tax code induced revenue 
effects of -0.005 bn € effective 1984. 
The German tax code allows firms to transfer losses over time. The law doubled the amount for loss carry back to 10 million DEM, 
thereby changing revenues by -0.102 bn € effective 1984. § 16 sec. 4 EStG allowed for a tax-free amount in case of sale of business. This 
amount was increased to 120,000 DEM from 60,000 DEM, changing revenues by -0.02 bn € effective with 1984. Technical changes in the 
corporate income tax code changed tax revenues by -0.013 bn € effective 1984. There was also a large one-time effect of -0.128 bn €. 
From 1984 to 1989, passenger ship services were subject to a reduced VAT tax rate, changing revenues by -0.005 bn €. The measure 
was originally designed to be temporary, but it was in effect for the rest of the time horizon considered in this history. Finally, tax benefits in 
the autotmobile tax code for disabled persons were reduced, changing revenues by 0.051 bn € effective April 1, 1984. 
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The law’s title suggests that it was concerned with strengthening growth. The statement on the introduction of the bill reported that the 
law was intended to increase growth and to decrease unemployment, both by improving the structure of the tax system and by fostering 
investment and innovation. However, while considerable emphasis was given to improving long-term conditions, no specific 
macroeconomic shock was mentioned. Indeed, the economy was growing at around 2 percent annually at the time the law was written, 
which seems about normal. Also, in the parliamentary debate, it is acknowledged that the economy was recovering at the time the law was 
written. The focus of the law is not countercyclical; rather, it is concerned with improving structural conditions. 
Within the legislative process, the law was changed only in insubstantial ways. No change in motivation is evident. 
Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Umsatzsteuergesetzes60 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
04/30/1984 (S: -0.98 bn €) 05/03/1984 06/20/1984 (S: -0.457 bn €) 06/27/1984 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
06/29/1984 06/30/1984 (S: -1.437 bn €) 07/01/1984 (S: -1.437 bn €) 
01/01/1989 (S: -0.98 bn €) 
 
The purpose of the law was to provide an income transfer to farmers implemented via the value-added tax. 
The value-added tax code contains special regulations for farmers and agricultural businesses. Famers are not required to engage in 
bookkeeping, implying that value-added taxation can be based on average rates. Specifically, the tax code allows for average rates for 
input tax deductions. The law changed the average tax rate for agricultural businesses and granted the right to reduce value-added tax 
liabilities by 5 percent of the tax base between July 1984 and December 1988 and by 3 percent between January 1989 and December 
1991. Over the whole lifetime of the measure, the Finanzbericht reports an effect of -9.408 bn €, while for the first phase, the total revenue 
effect is given as -6.468 bn €. On an annual basis, this allows specifying an annualized revenue effect of -0.980 bn € on the second phase, 
to be phased out at the end of 1991, and one of -1.437 bn € on the first phase, to be phased out at the end of 1988. 
Based on the parliamentary debate and the statement on the introduction of the bill, it is clear that the law was related to technical 
changes in the EU common agricultural policy. Using a complex system, the EU common agricultural policy fixed prices. By technical 
adjustments due to a decision of the Council of the European Union, the monetary compensatory amount for Germany was decreased. In 
essence, this led to reduced prices for German agricultural goods. The law’s intention was to compensate farmers for their loss in income. 
It is clear that policymakers were acting on agricultural and social policy motives. Note that other than in the Gesetz über einen Ausgleich 
für Folgen der Aufwertung der Deutschen Mark auf dem Gebiet der Landwirtschaft (Aufwertungsausgleichgsgesetz - AufwAG), the law 
was not a reaction to a recent exchange rate alteration, but to a technical adjustment in the EU common agricultural policy. Hence, the 
motivation behind the law was structural. 
Due to suggestions of the Finanzausschuss, the income transfer to farmers was increased in the period between July 1984 and 
December 1988, while it remained essentially unchanged for the remaining period. Originally, the regulations for the second phase were 
designed for the whole period between 1984 and 1991. Our annualized effect of -0.98 bn € seems a good proxy for the original revenue 
effect of the law. 
Gesetz zur Wiederbelebung der Wirtschaft und Beschäftigung und zur Entlastung des Bundeshaushalts (Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 
1983)61 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
11/04/1982 (MS: 2.81 bn €) 
11/04/1982 (SD: 0.639 bn €) 
11/10/1982 12/09/1982 (SD: -0.153 bn €) 12/15/1982 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
12/17/1982 12/23/1982 (MS: 2.81 bn €) 
12/23/1982 (SD: 0.486 bn €) 
12/23/1982 (MS: -0.383 bn €) 
01/01/1983 (MS: -0.312 bn €) 
01/01/1983 (SD: 0.486 bn €) 
07/01/1983 (MS: 4.09 bn €) 
01/01/1984 (MS: -0.279 bn €) 
01/01/1985 (MS: -0.307 bn €) 
 
The law’s title suggests it was designed to promote employment and economic activity, while in effect it implemented substantial tax 
increases, mostly via an increase in the value-added tax rate. 
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The general value-added tax rate was increased from 13 to 14 percent and the reduced value-added tax rate from 6.5 to 7 percent 
effective July 1, 1983. The prospected revenue effect was 4.09 bn € on an annual basis. A reform of the tax treatment of child-care 
expenses affected revenues by -0.271 bn € effective 1983. A related retroactive measure generated a one-time revenue effect of 
-0.077 bn €. Changes in § 21 a EStG allowed an increased interest deduction for family homes and owner-occupied flats from 1983 to 
1986. The annualized impact was given as -0.307 bn €. The deduction was paid for three consecutive years, implying a series of revenue 
shocks in 1983, 1984, and 1985 (see the Gesetz zur Abschaffung der Eigenheimzulage for a justification). Tax allowances for private 
pensions were reduced, generating 0.460 bn € effective 1983. 
Temporarily, the law allowed for book reserves in case of acquisition of endangered companies. The measure changed tax revenues 
by -0.307 bn €, was implemented retroactively, and was expected to phase out at the end of 1986. Previously, certain interest payments 
had been subject to the local business tax. Under new regulations, 50 percent of such interest was taxed in 1984 and only 40 percent 
beginning with 1983. Unfortunately, the revenue forecast provided in the official sources does not allow distinguishing between the revenue 
effects of these steps. Based on the effects on budgetary years, a good estimate seems to be -0.706 bn € for the first step and -0.176 bn € 
for the second step. Part of the law is the Investitionshilfegesetz, concerned with generating revenues for public housing schemes. In 
principle, the measure implements a surcharge on income and corporate taxes for the years 1983 and 1984, generating 0.486 bn € on an 
annual basis. 
The temporary surcharge on income and corporate taxes in 1983 and 1984 was spending driven, as revenues were intented to 
finance public housing schemes. The rest of the law was justified in the statement on the introduction of the bill as related to recent 
economic deterioration. Specifically, it was stated that surprisingly gloomy business cycle prospects required adjustments in budgetary 
planning. Reductions in tax revenues and increased unemployment put a financial burden on the budget, requiring additional revenues. 
And, indeed, the economy was in a recession at the time the law was passed. Accordingly, the law was driven by a recent macroeconomic 
shock. 
The law was slightly altered due to suggestions from the leading parliamentary committee; however, no change in motivation was 
evident. Taken together, the law implemented an endogenous shock of 3.295 bn € at various dates between 1982 and 1985. 
Zweites Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Haushaltsstruktur (2. Haushaltsstrukturgesetz - 2.HStruktG)62 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
09/04/1981 (S: 0.119 bn €) 10/01/1981 11/03/1981 (S: -0.029 bn €) 11/12/1981 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/27/1981 12/08/1981 (S: -0.568 bn €) 12/10/1981 12/18/1981 
Publication Implementation   
12/29/1981 (S: -0.477 bn €) 12/29/1981 (S: -1.682 bn €) 
01/01/1982 (S: 1.971 bn €) 
01/01/1983 (S: -0.156 bn €) 
01/01/1984 (S: -0.156 bn €) 
01/01/1985 (S: 0.151 bn €) 
01/01/1986 (S: -0.156 bn €) 
01/01/1987 (S: -0.156 bn €) 
01/01/1988 (S: -0.156 bn €) 
01/01/1989 (S: -0.156 bn €) 
  
The law implemented a diversity of tax measures, most of which had limited revenue impact. One emphasis of the tax act was on removing 
tax exemptions, and yet noteworthy provisions of the law involved subsidies on housing and expansions in depreciation allowances. 
The law extensively reformed the income tax code, with a net revenue effect of -0.517 bn €. Retroactively, the declining balance 
depreciation was expanded, changing revenues by -1.526 bn €. Also, again retroactively, depreciation allowances for single and two-family 
homes, as well as owner-occupied flats, were extended, changing revenues by -0.156 bn €. As benefits are paid for eight consecutive 
years, a revenue effect in the amount of -0.156 bn € resulted at each step (see the discussion under the Gesetz zur Abschaffung der 
Eigenheimzulage for more details). Given the retroactive nature of these shocks, the date of publication is chosen as the implementation 
date. Technical changes related to housing induced revenue changes of 0.087 bn € effective 1982. The law reduced tax allowances for 
training and education costs, thereby generating 0.102 bn € in 1982. Certain unemployment benefits had not previously been taxable; 
however, under the new regulation, they were considered as part of income when computing the tax rate. This was important because of 
                                                          
62 BGBl. 1981, 58, pp. 1523–1559. 
52 
 
the progressivity of the tax tariff and generated 0.205 bn € in revenues. The law removed household allowances for singles older than 49 
years, generating 0.263 bn € in 1982. The Haushaltsstrukturgesetz changed technical details related to pension reserves, generating 
0.562 bn € effective 1982. Further technical changes in the income tax code affected revenues by 0.332 bn € effective 1982. 
In addition to amending the income tax code, the law also touched on a diversity of other tax types. Privileges granted the self-
employed in regard to the value-added tax were removed effective 1982, generating 0.169 bn €. Sales by the land-registry were included 
in the value-added tax base, generating 0.031 bn € in 1982. Starting in 1982, agricultural businesses were allowed to deduct larger input 
taxes, in effect reducing their tax burden by 0.128 bn € in 1982. Removing further exemptions in the value-added tax code generated 
0.307 bn €, effective 1985. For 1982 to 1985 only, the law implemented an investment surcharge for investment in the iron steel industry, 
which affected revenues by -0.107 bn € on an annual basis. The law reduced tax incentives for savings, which generated 0.542 bn € 
effective 1982. The law also closed loopholes in the local business tax, thereby generating 0.005 bn € effective 1982. The tax code at that 
time had allowed creating book reserves for investment in developing countries, which in essence had reduced taxable profits. The 
Haushaltsstrukturgesetz abolished these tax benefits effective 1982, thereby changing revenues by 0.164 bn €. The law also reduced tax 
benefits for West Berlin, thereby changing revenues by 0.053 bn € in 1982. Some further technical changes affected revenues by 
0.112 bn € in 1982. 
At the time of writing the law, budget consolidation was the dominant political topic and, accordingly, the statement on the introduction 
of the bill, as well as the parliamentary debate, put considerable emphasis on consolidation. In the aftermath of the oil crises, the economy 
needed structural adjustments, and reductions in the budget deficit were expected to promote investment and growth. While growth at that 
time was relatively low, the statement on the introduction of the bill suggested that low growth rates at that time were structural in nature. 
Indeed, this is the general theme of a great deal of tax legislation implemented at that time (see the discussion under the Gesetz zur 
Änderung von Verbrauchsteuergesetzen, under the Gesetz über steuerliche und sonstige Maßnahmen für Arbeitsplätze, Wachstum und 
Stabilität, or under the Mineralöl- und Branntweinsteuer-Änderungsgesetz 1981). The Haushaltsstrukturgesetz abolished tax exemptions 
and special allowances, reflecting the general consolidation motive. Yet given substantial increases in depreciation allowances, and in 
allowances for housing, the law actually had a negative impact on tax revenues. In the parliamentary debate, considerable emphasis was 
given to the housing aspect, with sociopolitical reasons used in its justification. Increases in depreciation allowances were also expected to 
increase investment, and hence improve conditions for growth. Taken together, I see a slight dominance of structural considerations. The 
law was motivated by structural considerations. 
Within the legislative process, the law experienced some modest alternations. No change in motivation was prevalent. 
Gesetz zur Änderung von Verbrauchsteuergesetzen (Verbrauchsteueränderungsgesetz 1982 - VStÄndG 1982)63 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
09/04/1981 (C: 1.679 bn €) 09/16/1981 11/04/1981 11/12/1981 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
11/27/1981 12/08/1981 12/10/1981 12/11/1981 
Bundestag Publication Implementation  
12/18/1981  12/30/1981 (C: 1.679 bn €) 01/01/1982 (C: 0.007 bn €) 
04/01/1982 (C: 0.394 bn €) 
06/01/1982 (C: 1.278 bn €) 
 
The law increased taxes on tobacco, sparkling wine, and spirits. 
The tobacco tax was increased effective June 1982, generating 1.278 bn €. Increases in the tax rates on sparkling wine and spirits 
generated 0.394 bn € effective April 1982. Finally, the law introduced some technical adjustments in the petroleum tax code, changing 
revenues by 0.007 bn € at the beginning of 1982. 
The statement on the introduction of the bill reported that the law was motivated by budget consolidation and structural adjustments in 
the composition of tax revenues. Specifically, one of the law’s purposes was to increase the importance of indirect taxes vis-à-vis direct 
taxes. Increasing the tobacco tax was also justified by health political reasons; however, this argument seems secondary. In the 
parliamentary debate, Mr. Matthoefer, Federal Minister of Finance at that time, opened by describing the economic background of the law. 
Substantial oil price increases in the 1970s had put considerable stress on the current account, and had induced structural adjustment 
processes in the economy, according to Mr. Matthoefer. The law’s intention was to aid economic adjustment by consolidating budgetary 
positions and, as such, the law was part of a general consolidation program. In the parliamentary debate, it was explicitly stated that 
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budget consolidation would improve confidence and hence investment. Changing the composition of tax revenues by favoring indirect 
taxes over direct taxes was expected to preserve marginal returns of labor and capital, and hence to be beneficial for economic activity, 
according to Mr. Matthoefer. The only difficulty in assessing the motivation of the law arises because the law mixed consolidation and 
structural motives. Still, the main motivation of the law seems to have been consolidation. 
Within the legislative process, the law was not altered substantially. 
Gesetz über steuerliche und sonstige Maßnahmen für Arbeitsplätze, Wachstum und Stabilität (Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz - 
BeschäftFG)64 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
03/01/1982 (S: 0.409 bn €) 03/04/1982 03/25/1982 03/26/1982 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
04/30/1982 05/12/1982 (S: - 2.454 bn €) 05/27/1982 05/28/1982 
Publication Implementation   
06/08/1982 (S: - 2.045 bn €) 06/08/1982 (S: - 2.045 bn €)   
The law implemented a temporary investment surcharge of 10 percent on certain investment categories, in most cases restricted to 1982. 
The investment surcharge was granted only if the investment in 1982 was larger than that made in the three previous years. The measure 
was expected to change revenues by -2.045 bn € in 1982. Given the law’s retroactive nature, the date of publication is chosen as the 
implementation date. 
Dr. Graf Lambdsdorff from the coalition government started the parliamentary debate by outlining economic projections for 1982. 
According to these projections, the government expected modest economic growth and a slight recovery of employment. However, he 
continued by arguing that economic growth in general had been too weak to substantially reduce unemployment. Especially, international 
and national economic adjustment processes following the oil price increases in the 1970s had put considerable stress on economic 
growth. He pointed out that the necessary structural adjustment would require time and long-term effort. Dr. Graf Lambdsdorff stated 
explicitly that the temporary investment surcharge was expected to jump-start growth of the economy, as well as help make the necessary 
structural adjustments. Although the investment surcharge was designed to be only temporary, Dr Graf Lambdsdorff reported that the 
measure would be accompanied by additional structural measures at later points. The statement on the introduction of the bill followed a 
similar line of reasoning. It was explicitly stated that structural adjustment was needed and that the law had been designed to induce 
sustainable structural change. The motivation of the law was structural. 
Within the legislative process, the law changed substantially. The government originally intended to increase the value-added tax rate 
to offset the budgetary effects of the investment surcharge, but this plan was rejected by the mediation committee. 
Mineralöl- und Branntweinsteuer-Änderungsgesetz 1981 - MinöBranntwStÄndG 1981 -65 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
12/19/1980 (C: 2.021 bn €) 01/23/1981 02/16/1981 (C: -0.051 bn €) 02/19/1981 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundesrat Bundestag 
02/20/1981 03/06/1981 03/13/1981 03/18/1981 
Publication Implementation   
03/25/1981 (C: 1.969 bn €) 04/01/1981 (C: 1.765 bn €) 
12/27/1981 (C: 0.153 bn €) 
01/01/1982 (C: 0.051 bn €) 
  
The law increased the petroleum tax and taxes on spirits. 
The petroleum tax was increased, which generated 1.348 bn € on an annual basis effective April 1982. Technical changes in the 
petroleum tax code had additional effects of 0.051 bn € and were implemented at the beginning of 1982. The remaining part of the law was 
concerned with changing taxation of spirits. First, the tax rate was increased, leading to 0.307 bn € in revenues effective April 1982. The 
law also broadend the tax base of the tax on spirits by introducing taxes on Isopropylalcohols. This generated 0.11 bn € in additional 
revenues. Last, the law changes the payment period, which generated a one-time revenue effect of 0.153 bn € in December 1982. 
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The Finanzbericht categorizes the law as motivated by budget consolidation. The statement on the introduction of the bill reported 
three objectives of the tax act: the law was designed to reduce public borrowing, to improve the structure of tax revenues by aiding 
changes in its composition, and to reduce energy dependence and oil imports by increasing the cost of energy consumption. Mr. Matthöfer, 
Federal Minister of Finance, stated in the parliamentary debate that the law was part of a general effort to moving from direct to indirect 
taxation, and pointed out that this agenda had been supported across parties. More importantly, past increases in oil prices had put 
considerable burdens on the current account. Increasing the cost of petroleum consumption would then reduce oil imports, and aid the 
economy in structural adjustments following escalating oil prices. Political uncertainties in the Arab region, and dependency on oil imports 
from that region, also determined to a considerable extent the first reading in parliament. However, it was also repeatedly stated that 
additional revenue was needed for budgetary reasons, recognizing that the current budgetary situation was not sustainable. Budget 
consolidation was a general theme at that time, with many hoping that consolidation itself would benefit economic growth. Taken together, 
it is evident that the law was motivated by both consolidation and structural concerns. Given the assignment in the Finanzbericht, I see a 
slight dominance of consolidation motives, specifically because budget consolidation was expected to have beneficial structural effects. 
The motivation of this act was budget consolidation; however, a structural motivation is not completely out of question. 
Within the legislative process, the law was augmented in technical dimensions, none of them quantitatively substantial. 
Gesetz zur Steuerentlastung und Familienförderung (Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1981)66 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
02/21/1980 (S: -8.334 bn €) 03/07/1980 05/14/1980  05/22/1980 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
06/13/1980 07/03/1980 (S: 1.278 bn €) 07/04/1980 07/04/1980 
Publication Implementation   
08/21/1980 (S: -7.056 bn €) 08/21/1980 (S: -1.79 bn €) 
01/01/1981 (S: -3.272 bn €) 
01/01/1982 (S: -1.994 bn €) 
  
The law introduced a series of tax reductions, mainly by extending child benefits and reforming the income tax tariff. The main intention of 
the law was to offset bracket creep. 
The law’s quantitatively most important measure was adjustment of the income tax tariff. Specifically, the tax-free amount and income 
brackets were expanded. This lowered revenues by 3.119 bn € effective 1981. Of considerable importance also was the increase in the 
maximum deduction for special expenses, as well as the advance deduction for insurance contributions. The measure was expected to 
change revenues by -1.841 bn € effective 1982. Two measures of the law were retroactive for 1980. First, the tax-free Christmas 
allowance was increased. This lowered tax revenues by 0.716 bn €. Also, allowances for child-care expenses were extended, lowering tax 
revenues by -1.074 bn €. Some other, rather technical measures changed revenues by -0.153 bn € both at the beginning of 1981 and in 
1982. 
In the Finanzbericht, it was reported that the law had been designed to assist families and to lower taxes. Based on the statement on 
the introduction of the law, the law was implemented for sociopolitical reasons and to offset bracket creep. Precisely these two motivations 
were mentioned in the parliamentary debate. It is hence clear that the law was not a reaction to a contemporaneous macroeconomic 
shock. The motivation of the law was structural. 
Within the legislative process, the law was altered substantially. No change in motivation was evident. 
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Gesetz zur Änderung des Einkommensteuergesetzes, des Gewerbesteuergesetzes, des Umsatzsteuergesetzes und anderer 
Gesetze (Steueränderungsgesetz 1979 - StÄndG 1979)67 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
09/01/1978 (CC: -4.433 bn €) 09/20/1978 10/18/1978  10/19/1978 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss 
10/27/1978 11/09/1978 (CC: -0.636 bn €) 11/10/1978 11/17/1978 (CC: -0.636 bn €) 
Bundestag Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
11/17/1978 11/24/1978 12/02/1978 (CC: -5.068 bn €) 01/01/1979 (CC: -5.686 bn €) 
07/01/1979 (CC: 3.298 bn €) 
01/01/1980 (CC: -2.599 bn €) 
01/01/1981 (CC: -0.082 bn €) 
The law was a stimulus package in response to global economic imbalance financed partially by an increase in the value-added tax rate. 
First, the law reformed the income tax tariff effective with 1979, thereby changing revenues by -5.42 bn €. Of some importance also 
were increases in advance deductions for health insurance, pension contributions, and other insurance. This changed revenues by 
-0.92 bn € effective 1980. Other changes in the income tax system were of less importance, affecting tax revenues by -0.266 bn € in 1979 
and -0.256 bn € in 1980. The law also introduced substantial changes in the local business tax. At that time, the local business tax included 
a municipal payroll tax, a profit tax, and a trade capital tax. The law abolished the municipal payroll tax effective 1980, thereby lowering tax 
revenues by -1.125 bn €. Tax allowances and exemptions for the profit tax were increased at the beginning of 1980, thereby affecting 
revenues by -0.298 bn €. Similar changes for the trade capital tax affected revenues by -0.082 bn € effective 1981. To finance some of the 
tax reductions, the value-added tax rate was increased from 12 to 13 percent effective July 1979. This measure raised 3.298 bn € on an 
annual basis. 
The Finanzbericht classified the law as a countercyclical policy. The statement on the introduction of the bill pointed out that the law 
was designed to cope with a recent global recession and that it is part of an international cooperation aimed at providing a demand 
stimulus. Specifically, global policymakers believed that global demand was insufficient, and hence implemented a coordinated stimulus. 
This tax act was Germany’s contribution. The parliamentary debate also revolved around countercyclical arguments. It was mentioned that 
the law was part of an international cooperation effort to overcome recent imbalances, to which end the federal government had agreed to 
implement stimulus measures. Hence, the motivation of the law was clearly countercyclical. 
Within the legislative process, the law was altered substantially. No change in motivation occurred. 
Gesetz zur Steuerentlastung und Investitionsförderung68 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
09/13/1977 (CC: -4.671 bn €) 09/15/1977 10/05/1977  10/06/1977 
Bundesrat Vermittlungsausschuss Bundestag Bundesrat 
10/14/1977 10/24/1977 (CC: -1.841 bn €) 10/27/1977 11/04/1977 
Publication Implementation   
11/08/1977 (CC: -6.512 bn €) 11/08/1977 (CC: -2.831 bn €) 
01/01/1978 (CC: -3.681 bn €) 
  
The Gesetz zur Steuerentlastung und Investitionsförderung implemented a large business cycle stimulus. 
The law increased the tax-free Christmas allowance from 51 € to 205 €, effective 1977, and changed revenues by -1.074 bn €. The 
tax-free income was increased from 1,534 € to 1,687 € effective 1977, which changed revenues by -1.074 bn € on an annualized basis. 
The law introduced a general tax allowance of 261 €, which affected revenues by -2.608 bn € effective 1978. Finally, the law reformed 
depreciation rules. Declining depreciation for buildings was reintroduced retroactively to September 1977. The measure changed revenues 
by -0.371 bn €. The law also allowed for increased rates in declining balance depreciation, changing revenues by -1.386 bn € retroactively 
to September 1977. 
The Finanzbericht classified the law as driven by countercyclical reasons. In the statement on the introduction of the bill, it was 
explicitly stated that the economy had been doing worse than expected and that the law was intended to stimulate growth and 
employment. Mr. Westphal, SPD, gave the opening speech in the parliamentary debate, in which he stated very clearly that the law was 
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intended to increase consumer spending, economic activity, and employment. The tax law was a classical Keynesian stimulus and its 
motivation was countercyclical. 
Within the legislative process, the law was changed in important ways in the Vermittlungsausschuss, but it is clear that these changes 
were not driven by alterations in motivation. 
Gesetz über steuerliche Vergünstigungen bei der Herstellung oder Anschaffung bestimmter Wohngebäude69 
Draft 1st Reading Committee 2nd & 3rd Reading 
03/03/1977 (S: -1.329 bn €) 04/21/1977 05/17/1977 05/26/1977 
Bundesrat Publication Implementation  
06/24/1977 07/14/1977 (S: -1.329 bn €) 07/14/1977 (S: -0.435 bn €) 
01/01/1978 (S: -0.128 bn €) 
01/01/1979 (S: -0.128 bn €) 
01/01/1980 (S: -0.128 bn €) 
01/01/1981 (S: -0.128 bn €) 
01/01/1982 (S: -0.128 bn €) 
01/01/1983 (S: -0.128 bn €) 
01/01/1984 (S: -0.128 bn €) 
 
The law does not formally qualify as important according to the 0.1 percent criterion; however, it had two clearly defined measures of 
considerable importance. Also, the annualized revenue impact of the law reported in the Finanzbericht underestimates its impact, as part 
of the tax measures cumulate over time. The tax act was concerned with tax benefits related to family homes. 
Under the new regulation, transactions involving one- and two-family houses, as well as owner-occupied flats, were exempted from 
the land purchase tax retroactive to 1977, thereby changing tax revenues by -0.307 bn € on an annual level. The tax law further expanded 
income tax deductions for the same class of real estate in case of acquisitions. For a total of eight consecutive years, the home owner was 
allowed to set off 5 percent of the acquisition costs against tax liabilities. Analysis of this law is very similar to that conducted for the law 
that abolished home owner benefits (see Gesetz zur Abschaffung der Eigenheimzulage). The total impact on tax liabilities accumulates 
over time, with a series of tax shocks of -0.128 bn € on July 14, 1977 as well as at the beginning of the years 1978 to 1984. 
The statement on the introduction of the bill mentioned several policy objectives. Measures of the law were driven by concern over 
urban development, housing policies, and government incentives to save. In the parliamentary debate, mainly social political reasons were 
stated. It was also often argued that the exemption of acquisitions of owner-occupied homes from the land purchase tax increased labor 
mobility. The law had mainly social policy and structural reasons. It is hence classified as motivated by structural concerns. 
The law experienced some technical adjustment within the legislative process, but according to my sources, none of these 
adjustments changed the prospective revenue impact. 
Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Haushaltsstruktur (Haushaltsstrukturgesetz - HStrukG)70 
Publication Implementation   
12/20/1975 (C: 1.468 bn €) 01/01/1976 (C: 0.944 bn €) 
01/01/1977 (C: 0.105 bn €) 
01/01/1978 (C: 0.105 bn €) 
01/01/1979 (C: 0.105 bn €) 
01/01/1980 (C: 0.105 bn €) 
01/01/1981 (C: 0.105 bn €) 
 
  
The law reduced government incentives to save effective 1976, thereby raising 0.588 bn €. After the appreciation of the DEM in 1969, 
technical aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy led to reduced DEM prices for agricultural goods. As compensation, the 
Aufwertungsausgleichgesetz vom 23. Dezember 1969 had introduced tax benefits for the agricultural sector paid via the value-added tax 
system, which, under the new regulation, were reduced uniformly at the beginning of 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980, and finally 
abolished at the beginning of 1981. The Finanzbericht reported a change in tax revenues of 0.105 bn € for the first step. Given that the tax 
measure was phased out uniformly, the estimate for the initial step seems a good proxy for later revenue effects. The law also reduced tax 
benefits for public banks, inducing a revenue change of 0.251 bn € effective 1976. The measure was intended to be in effect for 1976 and 
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1977; however, the Körperschaftssteuerreformgesetz vom 31. August 197671 permanently reduced these tax benefits. Hence, the measure 
is treated as permanent. 
According to the Finanzbericht, the law was driven by budgetary reasons. There are no indications that additional revenues were used 
to finance specific expenditure programs. The motive of the law was consolidation. 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Tabaksteuergesetzes und des Gesetzes über das Branntweinmonopol72 
Publication Implementation   
07/08/1976 (C: 0.818 bn €) 01/01/1977 (C: 0.818 bn €)   
The law increased taxes on tobacco and spirits effective 1977. The prospected revenue effects were 0.614 bn € and 0.205 bn €, 
respectively. 
The Finanzbericht reported that the motive behind the the law was consolidation. 
Gesetz zur Förderung von Investitionen und Beschäftigung73 
Publication Implementation   
12/24/1974 (CC: -3.477 bn €) 
12/28/1974 (CC: -0.118 bn €) 
12/31/1974 (CC: -0.031 bn €) 
12/24/1974 (CC: -3.477 bn €) 
12/28/1974 (CC: -0.118 bn €) 
01/01/1975 (CC: -0.031 bn €) 
  
At the time of writing the law, the economy had been moving into a recession and the law implemented a temporary investment surcharge 
as a business cycle stimulus. Based on the discussion of the law in the Finanzbericht, it is clear that two other laws—the Gesetz zur 
Änderung des Investitionszulagengesetzes vom 30.12.197474 and the Gesetz über Investitionszuschüsse für Mietwohnungen, 
Genossenschaftswohnungen und Wohnheime im sozialen Wohnungsbau vom 27.12.197475—were closely related. Thus, the two tax 
measures introduced by these laws are subsumed under the discussion here. 
The Gesetz zur Förderung von Investitionen und Beschäftigung introduced a temporary investment subsidy between November 30 
and June 30, 1975. Given the retroactive nature of the change, the date of publication is chosen as the implementation date. The measure 
was expected to change revenues by -3.477 bn € on an annual basis. The Gesetz über Investitionszuschüsse für Mietwohnungen, 
Genossenschaftswohnungen und Wohnheime im sozialen Wohnungsbau vom 27.12.1974 extended the investment subsidy to nonprofit 
public housing organizations, changing revenues by -0.118 bn €. The timing of the tax shock is as before. Finally, the Gesetz zur Änderung 
des Investitionszulagengesetzes vom 30.12.1974 introduced additional investment allowances for investment in energy consumption 
reductions. The tax measure was applicable for all investment conducted since 1975 and was expected to change revenues by 
-0.031 bn €. In contrast to the other measures, this measure was intended to be permanent. 
The Finanzbericht reported that the law was countercyclically motivated. It was explicitly stated that Germany had moved into a 
recession in 1974, requiring countercyclical policies. 
Gesetz zur Reform der Einkommensteuer, des Familienlastenausgleichs und der Sparförderung (Einkommensteuerreformgesetz 
- EStRG)76 
Publication Implementation   
08/10/1974 (S: -8.024 bn €) 01/01/1975 (S: -6.879 bn €) 
01/01/1977 (S: -1.145 bn €) 
  
The law’s most notable provisions reformed the income tax tariff and the system of child benefits. 
The reform of the income tax tariff affected revenues by -2.505 bn € effective 1975. The Zweites Steueränderungsgesetz 1967 had 
introduced a 3 percent surcharge on income and corporate taxes. Effective 1975, the 3 percent surcharge on income taxes was removed, 
changing revenues by -1.007 bn €. The 3 percent surcharge on corporate taxes was abolished effective 1977, affecting revenues by 
-0.931 bn €. The wealth tax rate for legal entities was increased from 0.7 percent to 1 percent starting at the beginning of 1975, generating 
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revenues of 0.476 bn €. The Einkommensteuerreformgesetz also substantially reformed the system of child benefits. Child benefits of 50 
DEM for the first, 70 DEM for the second, and 120 DEM for each further child were now directly paid to eligible parents per month. This 
replaced former tax allowances and direct payments, making it clear that the child benefit is systematically related to the income tax tariff 
as the child benefit was partially designed to exclude from taxation the minimum income needed to sustain a child. The net effect on 
revenues was -2.548 bn € effective 1975. The law also reduced government incentives for savings, generating 1.038 bn € effective 1975. 
In addition, the Einkommensteuerreformgesetz implemented 28 other tax measures associated with very modest revenue effects. In total, 
these other measures changed tax revenues by -2.331 bn € effective 1975 and by -0.215 bn € effective 1977. Quantitatively important 
were changes related to the general allowance for tax allowable expenses and to income tax allowances for special expenses. 
The Finanzbericht reported that the main motivation of the law was to improve tax justice and to lower taxes on small and middle-sized 
incomes. It was also reported that the law had abolished “unwarranted” subventions and had improved the efficiency of the tax system. 
The motivation of the law was structural. 
Steueränderungsgesetz 197377 
Publication Implementation   
06/28/1973 (CC: 7.795 bn €) 
06/28/1973 (S: -0.115 bn €) 
06/28/1973 (CC: 7.411 bn €) 
01/01/1974 (CC: 0.383 bn €) 
06/28/1973 (S: -0.038 bn €) 
06/29/1973 (S: -0.077 bn €) 
 
  
The Steueränderungsgesetz 1973 implemented substantial tax increases to cool down the economy and combined those with less 
important structural adjustments to the tax code. 
According to the Finanzbericht, most of the tax measures were driven by countercyclical reasons. The law implemented a temporary 
tax of 11 percent on investment, which was expected to generate 4.857 bn € on an annual basis. Originally, the measure was designed to 
be in effect between May 9, 1973 and April 30, 1975 and, given its retroactive nature, the date of publication is chosen as the 
implementation date. By later regulation in the Neunte Verordnung zur Durchführung des UStG vom 20. Dezember 1973,78 the measure 
was phased out at the end of November 1973. Additionally, the law levied a temporary surcharge on income and corporate taxes for the 
years 1973 and 1974, raising revenues of 2.454 bn €. Further countercyclical measures were related to depreciations for buildings, 
investment surcharges, and the tax treatment of interest payments. The combined effect was 0.483 bn €. 
Technical adjustments in the tax code, related to the payment period for the value-added tax and to the tax treatment of work on public 
holidays, affected revenues by -0.115 bn €. According to the Finanzbericht, these measures were driven by structural motives. 
Dritte Verordnung über steuerliche Konjunkturmaßnahmen79 
Publication Implementation   
06/09/1973 (CC: 0.358 bn €) 06/09/1973 (CC: 0.358 bn €)   
At this point in the country’s history, the federal government was allowed to implement business cycle programs via simple decrees. This 
decree was one such countercyclical measure, making the motivation of the decree clear. 
The decree temporarily abolished the declining balance depreciation between May 8, 1973 and May 1, 1974. Following the usual 
practice, the date of publication is chosen as the implementation date. The measure raised revenues by 0.307 bn € on an annual basis. 
For the same time span, the law also reduced tax allowances for investment in buildings, thereby generating revenus of 0.051 bn €. By 
later regulation in the Verordnung zur Änderung der Dritten Verordnung über steuerliche Konjunkturmaßnahmen vom 4. Februar 1974,80 
both measures were phased out at the end of November 1973 and at the end of December 1973, respectively. 
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Gesetz zur Reform des Grundsteuerrechts81 
Publication Implementation   
08/11/1973 (C: 0.409 bn €) 01/01/1974 (C: 0.409 bn €)   
The law increased the tax assessment base of the land tax effective 1974 and thereby generated 0.409 bn € in revenue. 
According to the Finanzbericht, the intention of the law was to generate additional revenue. The motivation of the law was 
consolidation. 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Mineralölsteuergesetzes 1964 und des Gesetzes über das Branntweinmonopol82 
Publication Implementation   
06/28/1973 (C: 1.483 bn €) 07/01/1973 (C: 1.023 bn €) 
12/27/1973 (C: 0.256 bn €) 
  
The law increased the petroleum tax effective July 1973, generating revenues of 1.023 bn € on an annual basis. The law further adjusted 
payment periods for the petroleum tax and the duty on spirts. Under former regulation, the petroleum tax had to be paid at latest three 
months after accrual. The Gesetz zur Änderung des Mineralölsteuergesetzes 1964 und des Gesetzes über das Branntweinmonopol 
mandated that taxes accrued in November must be paid by December 27 of that year. The measure generated one-time revenues of 
0.256 bn €, to be offset by an equal-sized shock in the next period. Similarly, the time allowed for payment of the petroleum tax was 
shortened in a series of steps from five to three months beginning with July 1973. This corresponded to a shock of 0.205 bn €. 
Unfortunately, the available sources on the measure’s revenue impact do not allow accounting for the step-wise nature of the measure. 
Therefore, the implementation effect of the measure is set to zero. 
The Finanzbericht reported that all tax measures were enacted for budgetary reasons. The motivation of the law was consolidation. 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes über das Branntweinmonopol83 
Publication Implementation   
12/28/1971 (C: 0.297 bn €) 01/01/1972 (C: 0.297 bn €)   
The law increased taxes on spirits, changing revenues by 0.297 bn € effective 1972. 
According to the Finanzbericht, the motivation of the law was consolidation. 
Gesetz über die weitere Finanzierung von Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Verkehrsverhältnisse der Gemeinden und des 
Bundesfernstraßenbaus84 
Publication Implementation   
02/29/1972 (SD: 0.716 bn €) 
02/29/1972 (S: 0.123 bn €) 
03/01/1972 (SD: 0.716 bn €) 
04/01/1972 (S: 0.123 bn €) 
  
The law increased the petroleum tax effective March 1972, generating 0.716 bn €. The automobile tax was increased effective April 1972, 
generating 0.123 bn € in revenues. 
According to the Finanzbericht, revenues generated by the increase in the petroleum tax were earmarked for traffic policies, making 
this measure spending driven. The increase in the automobile tax was justified as a way of increasing rail usage. Accordingly, this measure 
was motivated by structural concerns. 
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Elftes Gesetz zur Änderung des Tabaksteuergesetzes85 
Publication Implementation   
03/04/1972 (C: 0.818 bn €) 09/01/1972 (C: 0.818 bn €)   
The law raised the tobacco tax effective September 1972, generating 0.818 bn € in revenues. 
According to the Finanzbericht, the law was driven by budgetary reasons. The Finanzbericht gave no evidence that the additional 
revenues were used to finance specific expenditures. Therefore, the motivation of the law was consolidation. 
Gesetz zur Wahrung der steuerlichen Gleichmäßigkeit bei Auslandsbeziehungen und zur Verbesserung der steuerlichen 
Wettbewerbslage bei Auslandsinvestitionen86 
Publication Implementation   
09/12/1972 (S: 0.263 bn €) 09/12/1972 (S: 0.263 bn €)   
The law introduced a couple of measures aimed at hindering tax evasion and raised revenues of 0.263 bn €. Most parts of the law were 
retroactive to 1972; hence, I choose the date of publication as the implementation date. 
According to the Finanzbericht, the main motivation of the law was structural. 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes über die Besteuerung des Straßengüterverkehrs87 
Publication Implementation   
12/31/1970 (S: 0.24 bn €)  01/01/1971 (S: 0 bn €)   
The law renewed the transportation tax introduced in the Gesetz über die Besteuerung des Straßengüterverkehrs. Following my usual 
practice, the extension counts as an announcement, not as an implementation shock. 
The original motivation for the transportation tax was structural. Based on the Finanzbericht, there is no reason to change this. 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Mineralölsteuergesetzes 1964 und zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur Änderung des 
Mineralölsteuergesetzes 196488 
Publication Implementation   
04/30/1971 (SD: 0.552 bn €) 05/01/1971 (SD: 0 bn €) 
 
  
The law combined an extension of the general fuel tax with a reduction in the tax rate on heavy fuel oil in two steps in 1972 and 1973. 
Unfortuntately, the Finanzbericht provided only a combined forecast for both measures, making it impossible to assess the revenue impact 
of each measure separately. However, taxes on heavy fuel oil accounted for only a minor fraction of total fuel tax revenues and the 
extension was clearly the important part of the law. Accordingly, the implementation effect is set to zero. The announment effect of the two 
measures was 0.552 bn €. 
According to the Finanzbericht, the law was spending driven. Revenues generated by the law’s measures were intended to finance 
subventions of the coal industry. Also, the government wanted to install a strategic oil reserve and to assist German companies in 
developing foreign oil fields. 
Gesetz zur Änderung des zweiten Gesetzes zur Förderung der Vermögensbildung der Arbeitnehmer89 
Publication Implementation   
06/30/1970 (S: -0.547 bn €) 06/30/1970 (S: -0.077 bn €) 
01/01/1971 (S: -0.470 bn €) 
  
The law implemented important measures related to government incentives to save. First, it increased the maximum amount of the 
employee savings allowance from 312 to 624 DEM effective 1970. Further measures of the law were implemented in 1971, such as the 
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substitution of tax deductions by a direct payment, the introduction of income limits for eligibility, and specific tax allowances for small 
companies. Regrettably, the Finanzbericht provided only a combined revenue impact for all measures. However, revenue forecasts for 
budgetary years allow a reasonable distinction of the revenue impacts, giving a shock of -0.077 bn € in June 1970 and of -0.435 bn € in 
1971. Additionally, the law implemented expansions in government incentives to save of -0.036 bn € effective 1971. 
According to the Finanzbericht, the main intention of the law was to promote asset formation by people with low or medium income. As 
the law was concerned with social equity and sociopolitic motives, the motivation of the law is designated as structural. 
Gesetz über einen Ausgleich für Folgen der Aufwertung der Deutschen Mark auf dem Gebiet der Landwirtschaft 
(Aufwertungsausgleichgsgesetz - AufwAG)90 
Publication Implementation   
12/31/1969 (MS: -0.399 bn €) 01/01/1970 (MS: -0.399 bn €)   
According to the Finanzbericht, the motivation behind this law was to compensate agricultural business for the exchange rate appreciation 
that occurred on October 27, 1969. 
The EU’s common agricultural policy had fixed prices for agricultural goods. Exchange rate appreciations hence implied that prices in 
national currency would decrease, leaving farmers worse off. To compensate for the exchange rate appreciation, the law allowed 
agricultural businesses to deduct higher input value-added taxes, changing revenues by -0.399 bn € effective 1970. It is clear that the law 
was a reaction to a contemporeanous macroeconomic shock. 
Gesetz über die Erhebung eines rückzahlbaren Konjunkturzuschlags zur Einkommen- und Körperschaftsteuer91 
Publication Implementation   
07/25/1970 (CC: 2.659 bn €) 08/01/1970 (CC: 2.659 bn €)   
The law implemented an additional surcharge on the income tax and the corporate tax between August 1, 1970 and June 30, 1971, 
generating revenues of 2.659 bn €. 
According to the Finanzbericht, the law was an attempt at counteracting an economic upswing and hence was motivated by 
countercyclical reasons. 
Gesetz über die Gewährung von Investitionszulagen und zur Änderung steuerrechtlicher und prämienrechtlicher Vorschriften 
(Steueränderungsgesetz 1969)92 
Publication Implementation   
08/21/1969 (S: -0.7 bn €) 08/21/1969 (S: -0.427 bn €) 
01/01/1970 (S: -0.056 bn €) 
  
The law implemented a variety of often minor tax changes. 
The law introduced subsidies for investment in disadvantaged regions, with the intention of reducing regional inequality. These 
measures changed revenues by -0.138 bn € and were retroactive to 1969; accordingly, the date of publication is chosen as the 
implementation date. Also, the law introduced investment subsidies for research and development expenditures, changing revenues by 
-0.056 bn € effective 1970. Investment surcharges related to the coal industry were renewed, changing revenues by -0.077 bn € for 1970 
and 1971. The law also renewed investment surcharges for West Berlin, inducing an announcement effect of -0.01 bn €. Associated 
expansions in investment surcharges for West Berlin had an additional effect of -0.005 bn €. 
The law granted tax exemptions for a newly founded association of stone coal companies, with the intention of mitigating the effects of 
the structural change in the Ruhr region. The total revenue effect was -0.031 bn €. Changes related to international taxation affected 
revenues by -0.031 bn € retroactive to 1969. Additional changes in the income tax code, related to special depreciations, donations, and 
international trade, were associated with an announcement effect of -0.138 bn € and an implementation effect of -0.008 bn €. Of interest 
also were expansions in government incentives for savings, affecting revenues by -0.215 bn €. 
                                                          
90 BGBl. 1969, 17, pp. 2381–2382. 
91 BGBl. 1972, 17, pp. 261–264. 
92 BGBl. 1969, 79, pp. 1211–1231. 
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The Finanzbericht classified the law’s provisions as related to sociopolitics and structural policies. The motivation of the law was 
structural. 
Gesetz über die Besteuerung des Straßengüterverkehrs93 
Publication Implementation   
31/12/1968 (S: 0.194 bn €) 01/01/1969 (S: 0.194 bn €)   
The law implemented a transportation tax on trucks. Although the total impact of the law did not exceed 0.1 percent of GDP, it is covered 
here because it consisted of mainly one measure having a significant impact on revenues. The law was expected to raise 0.194 bn € 
effective 1969. Originially, the measure was to expire at the end of 1970. However, the Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes über die 
Besteuerung des Straßengüterverkehrs extended it by two years up to the end of 1972. 
The Finanzbericht reported that the main intention of the law was to increase rail usage. Hence the law was structurally motivated. 
Gesetz über Maßnahmen zur außenwirtschaftlichen Absicherung gemäß § 4 des Gesetzes zur Förderung der Stabilität und des 
Wachstums der Wirtschaft (AbsichG)94 
Publication Implementation   
11/30/1968 (MS: 0.307 bn €) 11/30/1968 (MS: 0.307 bn €)   
The law attempted to reduce the current account surplus by implementing a sales tax on exports, while warranting a negative tax on 
imports. The measure was expected to change revenues by 0.307 bn €, effective retroactively. Given the retroactive nature of the law, the 
publication date is chosen as the implementation date. The measure was originally designed to expire at the end of 1970. However, it was 
actually abolished by decree effective October 10, 1968.95 
The Finanzbericht reported that the law was designed to achieve “external equilibrium.” At the time, Germany was running an account 
surplus, giving rise to fear of “international disequilibria” and price increases. It is evident that the law was related to contemporaneous 
macroeconomic conditions and hence is classified as being driven by a recent macroeconomic shock. 
Gesetz zur Verwirklichung der mehrjährigen Finanzplanung des Bundes, I. Teil Zweites Steueränderungsgesetz 196796 
Publication Implementation   
12/23/1967 (C: 0.353 bn €) 
12/23/1967 (S: 0.261 bn €) 
01/01/1968 (C: 0.353 bn €) 
01/01/1968 (S: 0.261 bn €) 
  
The law implemented a supplementary tax to income and corporate taxes. The measure was expected to raise 0.353 bn € effective 1968. 
Additionally, the law reduced tax benefits for financial businesses, generating 0.261 bn € effective 1968. 
The Finanzbericht classified the supplementary tax as being concerned with budget consolidation. The abolishment of tax benefits for 
financial businesses, on the contrary, was concerned with the efficiency of the tax system. The latter measure hence was motivated by 
structural concerns. 
Gesetz zur Sicherung des Haushaltsausgleichs (Haushaltsicherungsgesetz)97 
Publication Implementation   
12/24/1965 (C: 0.169 bn €) 01/01/1966 (C: 0.169 bn €)    
The law increased duties on spirits and the sparkling wine tax, both effective at the beginning of 1966. The measures were expected to 
raise 0.133 and 0.036 bn €, respectively. 
The Finanzbericht classified the law as concerned with budget consolidation. 
  
                                                          
93 BGBl. 1968, 99, pp. 1461–1465. 
94 BGBl. 1968, 86, pp. 1255–1262. 
95 BGBl. 1969, 108, p. 1864 and BGBl. 1969, 115, p. 2045. 
96 BGBl. 1967, 74, pp. 1254–1258. 
97 BGBl. 1965, 72, pp. 2065–2072. 
63 
 
Zweites Gesetz zur Überleitung der Haushaltswirtschaft des Bundes in eine mehrjährige Finanzplanung (Steueränderungsgesetz 
1966)98 
Publication Implementation   
12/29/1966 (C: 0.504 bn €) 
12/29/1966 (SD: 0.337 bn €) 
 
01/01/1967 (C: 0.48 bn €) 
01/01/1967 (SD: 0.337 bn €) 
04/01/1967 (C: 0.024 bn €) 
  
The law implemented a variety of tax measures. First and foremost, it raised the petroleum tax, changing revenues by 0.337 bn € effective 
1967. The law abolished value-added tax exemptions related to petroleum consumption, generating 0.245 bn € effective beginning in 
1967. Supersession of value-added tax exemptions related to housing development raised 0.038 bn € effective 1967. Also of some 
importance was the reduction in allowances for commuting expenses, raising 0.148 bn € at the beginning of 1967. The law also reformed 
government incentives for savers, changing revenues by 0.048 bn € effective 1967. Finally, the law implemented some technical changes 
related to duties on spirits, changing revenues by 0.024 bn € effective April 1967. 
The Finanzbericht classified the law as concerned with budget consolidation. However, revenues due to the increase in the petroleum 
tax were explicitly earmarked for road construction and related expenditures, making this measure spending driven. 
Siebentes Gesetz zur Änderung des Tabaksteuergesetzes (Zweites Steueränderungsgesetz 1966)99 
Publication Implementation   
12/31/1966 (C: 0.301 bn €) 03/01/1966 (C: 0.301 bn €)   
The law increased tobacco taxes, effective March 1967. The budgetary figure for 1967 is given as 490 million DEM, which, annualized and 
transformed to Euro, corresponds to a change in revenues of 0.301 bn €. 
The Finanzbericht classified the law as concerned with budget consolidation. 
Gesetz zur Änderung von Verbrauchsteuergesetzen, des Gesetzes über das Branntweinmonopol und des Zollgesetzes 
(Steueränderungsgesetz 1967)100 
Publication Implementation   
04/01/1967 (C: 0.46 bn €) ?   
The law adjusted payment periods for consumption taxes and thereby generated one-time revenues of 0.46 bn €. However, appropriately 
timing the tax shock is complicated by the fact that the law allowed for transition rules, effectively phasing in the new regulations by 
shortening the payment periods step by step. Unfortunately, the revenue forecasts do not allow recovering a series of revenue effects and, 
accordingly, the implementation effect of the measure is set to zero. 
The Finanzbericht classified the law as concerned with budget consolidation. 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Umsatzsteuergesetzes 1967 (Mehrwertsteuer)101 
Publication Implementation   
10/21/1967 (CC: -0.358 bn €) 
10/21/1967 (C: 1.125 bn €) 
01/01/1968 (CC: -0.358 bn €) 
07/01/1968 (C: 1.125 bn €) 
  
The law increased the value-added tax rate from 10 percent to 11 percent effective July 1, 1968. This measure was expected to raise 
revenues by 0.562 bn € in the budgetary year 1968, and hence 1.125 bn € on an annualized basis. Germany switched from a gross 
turnover tax to a net turnover tax at the beginning of 1968. During the transition period, companies had been allowed to subtract prepaid 
tax on existing stocks. The law expanded existing allowances for the transition period in 1968. 
The Finanzbericht classified the increase in the value-added tax rate as concerned with budget consolidation. The expansion in 
allowances for the transition period was classified as driven by countercyclical reasons. 
                                                          
98 BGBl. 1966, 56, pp. 702–708. 
99 BGBl. 1966, 57, pp. 747–749. 
100 BGBl. 1967, 18, pp. 385–387. 
101 BGBl. 1967, 60, pp. 991–992. 
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Gesetz zur Änderung des Einkommensteuergesetzes, des Spar-Prämiengesetzes und anderer Gesetze (Steueränderungsgesetz 
1964)102 
Publication Implementation   
11/21/1964 (S: -1.651 bn €) 11/22/1964 (S: -0.069 bn €) 
01/01/1965 (S: -1.582 bn €) 
  
The law had a substantial impact on tax revenues and contained a series of quantitatively important tax measures. First and foremost, the 
income tax tariff was adjusted effective 1965, changing revenues by -0.726 bn €. Of considerable importance also was introduction of a 
tax-free amount for employees, changing revenues by -0.419 bn € effective 1965. Also of note were changes in the standard deduction for 
expenses in the income tax code and changes in depreciation rules for low-value assets. Both measures were effective 1965, changing tax 
revenues by -0.215 bn € and -0.128 bn €, respectively. The law introduced a series of special depreciation that benefited expenditures for 
research and development, ocean-going vessels, airplanes, and investment in old buildings. Combined, the measures were expected to 
change revenues by -0.069 bn € on an annualized level. These measures were retroactive; hence, the date of publication is chosen as the 
implementation date. To some degree, these allowances were only temporary, but seeing as they were repeatedly extended by later 
regulation, it is justifiable to treat them as permanent. Other measures had quantitatively limited importance, but are coded identical to 
those discussed above. In total, these lesser measures changed revenues by 0.095 bn € effective 1965. 
The Finanzbericht classified the law as structural. 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Einkommensteuergesetzes, des Körperschaftsteuergesetzes, des Gewerbesteuergesetzes, des 
Bewertungsgesetzes, des Steuersäumnisgesetzes, der Reichsabgabenordnung und anderer Gesetze (Steueränderungsgesetz 
1965)103 
Publication Implementation   
05/21/1965 (S: 0.218 bn €) 05/21/1965 (S: -0.199 bn €) 
07/01/1965 (S: -0.017 bn €) 
01/01/1966 (S: -0.001 bn €) 
  
The law’s quantitatively most important measures were concerned with tax allowances for pensions. These measures were expected to 
change tax revenues by -0.199 bn € effective 1966. The law further introduced tax allowances for sales of business, changing revenues by 
-0.01 bn € effective at the beginning of 1965. As usual, the date of publication is chosen as the implementation date. Changes in § 11 
KStG increased tax exemptions for companies experiencing a change in legal status. The measure was expected to change revenues by 
-0.05 bn € effective retroactive to the beginning of 1965. The law increased tax-exemption-free limits for holiday premiums. The measure 
was expected to change revenues by -0.002 bn € retroactive to the beginning of 1965. Finally, the law abolished the Süßstoffsteuer, which 
was a tax on artificial sweetener. The measure changed tax revenues by -0.001 bn € effective July 1965. 
The Finanzbericht classified the law as structural. 
Zweites Gesetz zur Förderung der Vermögensbildung der Arbeitnehmer (Zweites Vermögensbildungsgesetz - 2. VermBG)104 
Publication Implementation   
07/08/1965 (S: -0.169 bn €) 07/08/1965 (S: -0.169 bn €)   
This legislation expanded tax allowances for savings of employees. Employers had been allowed to make contributions to workers’ asset 
formation funds on their employees’ behalf. By the new regulation, these contributions were fully exempted from income taxation. 
Employers were also granted a tax credit of 30 percent of their contributions, up to a limit of 800 DEM a year. The law came into effect 
retroactively to April 1965; correspondingly, the date of publication is chosen as the implementation date. 
The Finanzbericht classified the law as driven by sociopolitical objectives. Specifically, the law was intended to increase savings by 
wage earners and employees. Correspondingly, the law was motivated by structural concerns.  
                                                          
102 BGBl. 1964, 57, pp. 885–916. 
103 BGBl. 1965, 20, pp. 377–385. 
104 BGBl. 1965, 29, pp. 585–588. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Important Tax Legislation and its Revenue Impact 
No. Title Publication Motivation Impact 
1 Gesetz zur Beschleunigung des Wirtschaftswachstums 
(Wachstumsbeschleunigungsgesetz) 
Dec-09 CC -0.35 
2 Gesetz zur Umsetzung steuerrechtlicher Regelungen des Maßnahmenpakets 
“Beschäftigungssicherung durch Wachstumsstärkung”  
Dec-08 CC -0.19 
3 Gesetz zur Förderung von Familien und haushaltsnahen Dienstleistungen 
(Familienleistungsgesetz - FamLeistG) 
Dec-08 S -0.10 
4 Gesetz zur Sicherung von Beschäftigung und Stabilität in Deutschland Mar-09 CC -0.32 
5 Gesetz zur Fortführung der Gesetzeslage 2006 bei der Entfernungspauschale Dec-08 S -0.11 
6 Gesetz zur verbesserten steuerlichen Berücksichtigung von 
Vorsorgeaufwendungen (Bürgerentlastungsgesetz Krankenversicherung) 
Jul-09 S/CC -0.53 
7 Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz 2008 Aug-07 S -0.36 
8 Gesetz zur steuerlichen Förderung von Wachstum und Beschäftigung May-06 S -0.24 
9 Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 2006 (HBeglG 2006) Jun-06 C/SD 1.04 
10 Steueränderungsgesetz 2007 Jul-06 C 0.19 
11 Gesetz zur Abschaffung der Eigenheimzulage Dec-05 C 0.26 
12 Gesetz zur Beschränkung der Verlustverrechnung im Zusammenhang mit 
Steuerstundungsmodellen 
Dec-05 C 0.09 
13 Gesetz zur Förderung der Steuerehrlichkeit Dec-03 S 0.00 
14 Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 2004 (HBeglG 2004) Dec-03 C/CC -0.06 
15 Gesetz zur Neuordnung der einkommensteuerrechtlichen Behandlung von 
Altersvorsorgeaufwendungen und Altersbezügen (Alterseinkünftegesetz – 
AltEinkG) 
Jul-04 S -0.22 
16 Gesetz zur Änderung des Tabaksteuergesetzes und anderer 
Verbrauchsteuergesetze 
Dec-03 C 0.11 
17 Gesetz zur Änderung steuerrechtlicher Vorschriften und zur Errichtung eines 
Fonds “Aufbauhilfe” (Flutopfersolidaritätsgesetz) 
Sep-02 SD 0.33 
18 Zweites Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt Dec-02 S -0.07 
19 Gesetz zum Abbau von Steuervergünstigungen und Ausnahmeregelungen 
(Steuervergünstigungsabbaugesetz - StVergAbG) 
May-03 C 0.18 
20 Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der ökologischen Steuerreform Dec-02 S 0.08 
21 Zweites Gesetz zur Familienförderung Aug-01 S -0.11 
22 Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von Steuerverkürzungen bei der Umsatzsteuer und zur 
Änderung anderer Steuergesetze (Steuerverkürzungsbekämpfungsgesetz - 
StVBG) 
Dec-01 S 0.00 
23 Gesetz zur Finanzierung der Terrorbekämpfung Dec-01 SD 0.10 
24 Gesetz zur Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung und zur Förderung 
eines kapitalgedeckten Altersvorsorgevermögens (Altersvermögensgesetz - 
AVmG) 
Jun-01 S -0.51 
25 Gesetz zur Fortführung der ökologischen Steuerreform Dec-99 C 0.52 
26 Gesetz zur Familienförderung Dec-99 S -0.17 
27 Gesetz zur Bereinigung von steuerlichen Vorschriften (Steuerbereinigungsgesetz 
1999 - StBereinG 1999) 
Dec-99 S -0.08 
28 Gesetz zur Senkung der Steuersätze und zur Reform der 
Unternehmensbesteuerung (Steuersenkungsgesetz - StSenkG) 
Oct-00 S -2.08 
29 Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Steuersenkungsgesetzes 
(Steuersenkungsergänzungsgesetz – StSenkErgG) 
Dec-00 S -0.17 
30 Steueränderungsgesetz 1998 Dec-98 S -0.08 
31 Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999 Dec-98 S -0.18 
32 Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/2002 Mar-99 S -0.24 
33 Gesetz zur Neuregelung der geringfügigen Beschäftigungsverhältnisse Mar-99 SD -0.05 
34 Gesetz zum Einstieg in die ökologische Steuerreform Mar-99 SD 0.31 
35 Gesetz zur Senkung des Solidaritätszuschlags Nov-97 S -0.19 
36 Gesetz zur Finanzierung eines zusätzlichen Bundeszuschusses zur gesetzlichen 
Rentenversicherung 
Dec-97 SD 0.30 
37 Jahressteuergesetz (JStG) 1997 Dec-96 S 0.00 
38 Gesetz zur Fortsetzung der wirtschaftlichen Förderung in den neuen Ländern Aug-97 S -0.15 
39 Jahressteuergesetz 1996 Oct-95 S -1.10 
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No. Title Publication Motivation Impact 
40 Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Mißbrauchs und zur Bereinigung des Steuerrechts 
(Mißbrauchsbekämpfungs- und Steuerbereinigungsgesetz - StMBG) 
Dec-93 MS 0.08 
41 Erstes Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Spar-, Konsolidierungs- und 
Wachstumsprogramms (1. SKWPG) 
Dec-93 MS 0.25 
42 Gesetz zur Neuregelung der Zinsbesteuerung (Zinsabschlaggesetz) Nov-92 S 0.12 
43 Gesetz zur Anpassung von Verbrauchsteuer- und anderen Gesetzen an das 
Gemeinschaftsrecht sowie zur Änderung anderer Gesetze (Verbrauchsteuer-
Binnenmarktgesetz) 
Dec-92 S -0.15 
44 Gesetz über Maßnahmen zur Bewältigung der finanziellen Erblasten im 
Zusammenhang mit der Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands, zur langfristigen 
Sicherung des Aufbaus in den neuen Ländern, zur Neuordnung des 
bundesstaatlichen Finanzausgleichs und zur Entlastung der öffentlichen 
Haushalte (Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Föderalen Konsolidierungsprogramms - 
FKPG) 
Jun-93 C 1.02 
45 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der steuerlichen Bedingungen zur Sicherung des 
Wirtschaftsstandorts Deutschland im Europäischen Binnenmarkt 
(Standortsicherungsgesetz - StandOG) 
Sep-93 S -0.19 
46 Gesetz zur Entlastung der Familien und zur Verbesserung der 
Rahmenbedingungen für Investitionen und Arbeitsplätze 
(Steueränderungsgesetz 1992 - StÄndG 1992) 
Feb-92 S 0.10 
47 Gesetz zur Förderung von Investitionen und Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen im 
Beitrittsgebiet sowie zur Änderung steuerrechtlicher und anderer Vorschriften 
(Steueränderungsgesetz 2001 - StÄndG 2001) 
Jun-91 MS 0.07 
48 Gesetz zur Einführung eines befristeten Solidaritätszuschlags und zur Änderung 
von Verbrauchsteuer- und anderen Gesetzen (Solidaritätsgesetz) 
Jun-91 SD 1.30 
49 Gesetz zur Änderung des Steuerreformgesetzes 1990 sowie zur Förderung des 
Mietwohnungsbaus und von Arbeitsplätzen in Privathaushalten 
Jun-89 S -0.21 
50 Gesetz über Maßnahmen zur Entlastung der öffentlichen Haushalte 
(Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 1989) 
Dec-88 C 0.07 
51 Gesetz zur Änderung von Verbrauchsteuergesetzen 
(Verbrauchsteueränderungsgesetz 1988 - VerbrStÄndG 1988) 
Dec-88 C 0.35 
52 Steuerreformgesetz 1990 Aug-88 S -1.01 
53 Gesetz zur Änderung des Einkommensteuergesetzes (Steuersenkungs-
Erweiterungsgesetz 1988 - StSenkErwG 1988) 
Jul-87 MS -0.25 
54 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Abschreibungsbedingungen für 
Wirtschaftsgebäude und für moderne Heizungs- und Warmwasseranlagen 
Dec-85 S -0.15 
55 Gesetz zur leistungsfördernden Steuersenkung und zur Entlastung der Familie 
(Steuersenkungsgesetz 1986/1988 - StSenkG 1986/1988) 
Jun-85 S -1.00 
56 Gesetz zur Stärkung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der Wirtschaft und zur 
Einschränkung von steuerlichen Vorteilen (Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1984 - 
StEntlG 1984) 
Dec-83 S -0.19 
57 Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Umsatzsteuergesetzes Jun-84 S -0.15 
58 Gesetz zur Wiederbelebung der Wirtschaft und Beschäftigung und zur 
Entlastung des Bundeshaushalts (Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 1983) 
Dec-82 MS/SD 0.37 
59 Zweites Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Haushaltsstruktur (2. 
Haushaltsstrukturgesetz - 2.HStruktG) 
Dec-81 S 0.06 
60 Gesetz zur Änderung von Verbrauchsteuergesetzen 
(Verbrauchsteueränderungsgesetz 1982 - VStÄndG 1982) 
Dec-81 C 0.20 
61 Gesetz über steuerliche und sonstige Maßnahmen für Arbeitsplätze, Wachstum 
und Stabilität (Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz - BeschäftFG)  
Jun-82 S -0.24 
62 Mineralöl- und Branntweinsteuer-Änderungsgesetz 1981 - MinöBranntwStÄndG 
1981 - 
Mar-81 C 0.24 
63 Gesetz zur Steuerentlastung und Familienförderung (Steuerentlastungsgesetz 
1981) 
Aug-80 S -0.89 
64 Gesetz zur Änderung des Einkommensteuergesetzes, des 
Gewerbesteuergesetzes, des Umsatzsteuergesetzes und anderer Gesetze 
(Steueränderungsgesetz 1979 - StÄndG 1979) 
Dec-78 CC -0.72 
65 Gesetz zur Steuerentlastung und Investitionsförderung Nov-77 CC -1.00 
66 Gesetz über steuerliche Vergünstigungen bei der Herstellung oder Anschaffung 
bestimmter Wohngebäude 
 
Jul-77 S -0.21 
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No. Title Publication Motivation Impact 
67 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Haushaltsstruktur (Haushaltsstrukturgesetz - 
HStrukG)  
Dec-75 C 0.25 
68 Gesetz zur Änderung des Tabaksteuergesetzes und des Gesetzes über das 
Branntweinmonopol 
Jul-76 C 0.14 
69 Gesetz zur Förderung von Investitionen und Beschäftigung Dec-74 CC -0.67 
70 Gesetz zur Reform der Einkommensteuer, des Familienlastenausgleichs und der 
Sparförderung (Einkommensteuerreformgesetz - EStRG) 
Aug-74 S -1.50 
71 Steueränderungsgesetz 1973 Jun-73 S/CC 1.57 
72 Dritte Verordnung über steuerliche Konjunkturmaßnahmen Jun-73 CC 0.07 
73 Gesetz zur Reform des Grundsteuerrechts Aug-73 C 0.08 
74 Gesetz zur Änderung des Mineralölsteuergesetzes 1964 und des Gesetzes über 
das Branntweinmonopol 
Jun-73 C 0.30 
75 Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes über das Branntweinmonopol Dec-71 C 0.07 
76 Gesetz über die weitere Finanzierung von Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der 
Verkehrsverhältnisse der Gemeinden und des Bundesfernstraßenbaus 
(Verkehrsfinanzgesetz 1971) 
Feb-72 S/SD 0.17 
77 Elftes Gesetz zur Änderung des Tabaksteuergesetzes Mar-72 C 0.22 
78 Gesetz zur Wahrung der steuerlichen Gleichmäßigkeit bei Auslandsbeziehungen 
und zur Verbesserung der steuerlichen Wettbewerbslage bei 
Auslandsinvestitionen 
Sep-72 S 0.06 
79 Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes über die Besteuerung des 
Straßengüterverkehrs 
Dec-70 S 0.06 
80 Gesetz zur Änderung des Mineralölsteuergesetzes 1964 und zur Änderung des 
Gesetzes zur Änderung des Mineralölsteuergesetzes 1964 
Apr-71 SD 0.14 
81 Gesetz zur Änderung des zweiten Gesetzes zur Förderung der 
Vermögensbildung der Arbeitnehmer 
Jun-70 S -0.02 
82 Gesetz über einen Ausgleich für Folgen der Aufwertung der Deutschen Mark auf 
dem Gebiet der Landwirtschaft (Aufwertungsausgleichgsgesetz - AufwAG) 
Dec-69 MS -0.25 
83 Gesetz über die Erhebung eines rückzahlbaren Konjunkturzuschlags zur 
Einkommen- und Körperschaftsteuer 
Jul-70 CC 0.72 
84 Gesetz über die Gewährung von Investitionszulagen und zur Änderung 
steuerrechtlicher und prämienrechtlicher Vorschriften (Steueränderungsgesetz 
1969) 
Aug-69 S -0.21 
85 Gesetz über die Besteuerung des Straßengüterverkehrs Dec-68 S 0.06 
86 Gesetz über Maßnahmen zur außenwirtschaftlichen Absicherung gemäß § 4 des 
Gesetzes zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft 
(AbsichG) 
Nov-68 MS 0.10 
87 Gesetz zur Verwirklichung der mehrjährigen Finanzplanung des Bundes I. Teil 
Zweites Steueränderungsgesetz 1967 
Dec-67 S/C 0.23 
88 Gesetz zur Sicherung des Haushaltsausgleichs (Haushaltsicherungsgesetz) Dec-65 C 0.07 
89 Zweites Gesetz zur Überleitung der Haushaltswirtschaft des Bundes in eine 
mehrjährige Finanzplanung (Steueränderungsgesetz 1966) 
Dec-66 C/SD 0.32 
90 Siebentes Gesetz zur Änderung des Tabaksteuergesetzes (Zweites 
Steueränderungsgesetz 1966) 
Dec-66 C 0.12 
91 Gesetz zur Änderung von Verbrauchsteuergesetzen, des Gesetzes über das 
Branntweinmonopol und des Zollgesetzes (Steueränderungsgesetz 1967) 
Apr-67 C 0.18 
92 Gesetz zur Änderung des Umsatzsteuergesetzes 1967 (Mehrwertsteuer) Oct-67 C/CC 0.28 
93 Steueränderungsgesetz 1964 Nov-64 S -0.69 
94 Gesetz zur Änderung des Einkommensteuergesetzes, des 
Körperschaftsteuergesetzes, des Gewerbesteuergesetzes, des 
Bewertungsgesetzes, des Steuersäumnisgesetzes, der Reichsabgabenordnung 
und anderer Gesetze (Steueränderungsgesetz 1965) 
May-65 S -0.09 
95 Zweites Gesetz zur Förderung der Vermögensbildung der Arbeitnehmer (Zweites 
Vermögensbildungsgesetz - 2. VermBG) 
Jul-65 S -0.07 
Notes: Impact is the announcement effect of the tax law in percent of GDP. Abbreviations: CC: countercyclical, MS: macroeconomic shock, 
SD: spending driven, S: structural, C: consolidation. 
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Abstract
In this paper, I estimate a structural panel vector autoregression to study the consequences
of changes in U.S. state government fiscal policies for short-term local economic activity. My
main result is that the state-level spending multiplier is relatively small and the tax multiplier
relatively large. After four years, the government spending multiplier is 0.6 and the tax multiplier
2.6. This conclusion is robust across different model specifications. I also find that both state
spending and state revenue shocks increase out-of-state output.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, research on the consequences for economic activity of changes in government fiscal
policy has intensified, partially because of questions raised during the course of the 2007 financial
crisis and by the ongoing economic crisis in the Eurozone.1 Empirical estimates on the size of
fiscal multipliers are relevant in evaluating economic policies and they also provide stylized facts
for theoretical macroeconomic models. In this paper, using annual data on 48 contiguous U.S.
states, I estimate a structural panel vector autoregression and identify fiscal policy shocks based on
the approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The main result of my study is that tax multipliers
associated with state-level taxation are large. In my preferred specification, the government spending
multiplier is below unity, and the tax multiplier larger than 2.
I find fiscal multipliers associated with subnational governments interesting from both a theoretical
and a practical policy-making perspective. First, state fiscal policymakers are interested in how
local fiscal policy decisions affect economic activity in their home region. Second, fiscal policies of
countries or regions in a monetary union potentially can be used to stabilize region-specific shocks
that monetary policy cannot. Third, estimates on multipliers associated with regional government
are informative as to the role fiscal shocks play in explaining regional business cycles.
In this paper, I provide stylized facts on the size of fiscal multipliers in a monetary union that
may be informative for builders of structural models. Fiscal multipliers in monetary unions can be
expected to be different from their traditional counterpart because the monetary policy reaction to
regional fiscal disturbances differs, and because states or countries in a monetary union typically
have relatively more open economies. Under the usual situation, monetary policy offsets fiscal policy
shocks and hence lessens the effects these shocks have on aggregate economic activity. In several
cases it has been demonstrated that fiscal multipliers can be large when monetary policy does not
react appropriately (Christiano et al., 2011, Davig and Leeper, 2011). On the other hand, a regional
fiscal policy shock may lead to higher regional inflation and hence to real exchange rate appreciation.
This effect should dampen the size of the multiplier in a currency union comprised of open economies
such as that of the United States (Illing and Watzka, 2013).
My paper supplements the literature on fiscal multipliers associated with national fiscal policies,
as well as that on multipliers on subnational spending. Traditionally, fiscal multipliers have been
estimated using single-country time series methods. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford
and Uhlig (2009) estimate structural vector autoregressive models to study the effects of spending
and revenue shocks on aggregate economic activity. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Ramey (2011b),
1Ramey (2011a), Parker (2011), and Illing and Watzka (2013) provide recent reviews on fiscal multipliers.
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and Romer and Romer (2010) use quasi-natural experiments to identify exogenous variation in
government spending and revenues, respectively. Extensions to state-dependent fiscal multipliers
can be found in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), and extensions to panels of countries in
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011), Ilzetzki et al. (2013), and Ravn et al. (2012). The size of the
estimated effects differs across studies, but the general take-away point is that fiscal policy can have
an effect on economic activity.
My research is also related to the literature that estimates multipliers on subnational government
spending.2 Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) use regional variation in military procurement spending
to estimate relatively large spending multipliers exceeding unity, and provide a theoretical framework
to interpret their results. Clemens and Miran (2012) use state budget institutions as a source for
exogenous variation in spending and find a multiplier of below 1. Shoag (2013) uses shocks to state
pension returns as a source of exogenous variation and concludes that the spending multiplier is
larger than 1. Finally, Canova and Pappa (2007) use U.S.-state-level data to study the consequences
of fiscal disturbances on price differentials within a monetary union.
Much of the work on subnational spending uses creative sources of exogenous variations in fiscal
variables, but the estimated models of macro dynamics are typically simple, and sometimes static,
single-equation time series models. This paper makes a useful contribution to the field in that I
use a multivariate time series approach and believe the estimated macroeconometric model is more
appropriate for describing the economies dynamic adjustment to the identified fiscal shocks. Also,
in some papers on subnational spending, the local population does not need to pay for the stimulus,
which is problematic in light of the usual finding that fiscal shocks are associated with detrimental
wealth and labor supply effects that matter for the size of the multiplier (Baxter and King, 1993).
I believe, and argue below, that my conclusions are contaminated by this effect to a lesser degree.
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, tax multipliers associated with state revenue decisions have
not yet been studied.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 characterizes state’s fiscal policies, Section 3 discusses
the empirical strategy, Section 4 contains the results, and Section 5 concludes. The Appendix
describes the data used in the study.
2 State fiscal policies
U.S. state governments are economically relevant size-wise and have considerable discretion when
it comes to their expenditures and revenues. Figure 1 shows the size of state governments for the
2Ramey (2011a) reviews the literature and provides additional references.
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period 1964 to 2006.3 In 2006, the average real per capita total state expenditures across states was
$5,645, and the average real per capita total state expenditures in percent of gross state product
(GSP) was 12.8 percent. Hence, state governments are economically significant. Differences across
the states reflect differences in their economic conditions and discretionary fiscal policies.
Figure 1: Total state expenditures
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Notes: This figure shows real per capita total state expenditures, and total state expenditures as percent of GSP for
the period 1964 to 2006. Each line corresponds to one of the 48 contiguous states.
Figure 2 shows the composition of total state expenditures over time. A large fraction of state
total expenditures is comprised of intergovernmental spending to local governments. Capital outlays
include state spending on new infrastructure (buildings, roads, etc.) as well as on equipment.
Current operations include, for example, money spent on wages or supplies. The Other expenditures
category consists largely of insurance benefits, but also includes assistance and subsidies and interest
on state debt. In my estimation, I use capital outlays plus current operations less public welfare
spending. Public welfare spending, a considerable fraction of which consists of medical assistance
to the needy, is automatically related to a states output and omitting it makes the identification
assumptions presented in Section 3 more feasible.
Figure 3 shows size and composition of state revenues. For my estimation, I use total state
taxes from own sources. States have considerable discretion in setting tax regulations. State taxes
are usually chiefly made up of sales and other indirect taxes, but individual and corporate income
taxation are also important.
3Detailed data definitions, as well as data sources, can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Composition of total state expenditures
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Notes: This figure shows size and composition of state total per capita expenditures for the period 1964 to 2006. Data
are aggregated across the 48 contiguous states.
Figure 3: Composition of total state revenues
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Notes: This figure shows size and composition of state total per capita revenues for the period 1964 to 2006. Data
are aggregated across the 48 contiguous states.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Model Specification
My empirical approach is an adaptation of the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) structural vector
autoregression (SVAR) approach applied to a panel of 48 contiguous U.S. states. First, I estimate
the following reduced-form model
yit = A0vt +A1yi,t−1 + ...+Apyi,t−p + uit, t = 1, ..., T, i = 1, ..., N (1)
where yit, t = −p+ 1, ..., T is a K × 1 vector of endogenous variables for i = 1, ..., N regions, vt is a
S×1 vector of intercepts and deterministic trend terms, A0,...,Ap are coefficient matrices, and uit is a
vector of innovations with uit ∼ IID(0,Σu). In the baseline case, the vector of endogenous variables
contains log real per capita gross state product, log real per capita government expenditures, and
log real per capita government revenues. As exogenous variables, I include an intercept and a linear
trend. The data are of annual frequency over the period 1964 to 2006. For the lag length p, either 1
or 2 are plausible, but information criteria suggest 2 as more appropriate and I thus use a lag length
of 2 for the baseline case. I estimate the model in levels using least squares and then construct an
empirical sample of parameter estimates using a residual-based bootstrap. All statistics reported
are based on percentiles of their empirical distribution.4
As a measure for state government expenditures, I use current operations plus capital outlays less
public welfare spending. Taxes are state tax revenues from own sources. My output measure is the
gross state product. Unfortunately, state fiscal years do not align with the calendar year. Hence,
GSP data do not match the fiscal data. I solve this problem by first temporally disaggregating the
annual GSP data to quarterly frequency. Next, I aggregate the quarterly data across the fiscal year
of the corresponding state. The temporal disaggregation is potentially problematic and I thus show
the results using the original GSP series. The Appendix contains extensive data descriptions.
The reduced-form model is transformed into a structural model using the Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) identification scheme. The starting point is the following structural model, which relates
reduced-form innovations uit to structural innovations ǫit.


1 0 −a1
0 1 −b1
−c1 −c2 1




utt
u
g
t
u
y
t

 =


1 a2 0
b2 1 0
0 0 1




ǫtt
ǫ
g
t
ǫ
y
t

 (2)
4All analysis are conducted in R (R Core Team, 2013).
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Here, superscripts t, g, and y are used to denote the tax, spending, and output innovation, respec-
tively. The parameters are identified via the following procedure (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002):
1. Choose values for the elasticity of spending to output a1 and of the tax elasticity b1. I discuss
the choice for these parameters in Section 3.2.
2. Construct utt − a1u
y
t and u
g
t − b1u
y
t , and use them as instruments to estimate c1 and c2 in a
regression of uyt on u
t
t and u
g
t .
3. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) set a2 = 0 and estimate b2 by regressing u
g
t on ǫ
t
t, and, as a
robustness test, set b2 = 0 and estimate a2. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) show that the
relative ordering of taxes and spending is not important, and this also holds at the state level.
In the following, I assume that taxes come first.
After identification, I compute the structural response functions. The size of the structural inno-
vations themselves are interpretable only in the context of the fiscal response they generate. There
are two standard transformations of the structural response functions. The first, which I call impact
normalization, is computed as
f
y
×
yt
fo
for t=1,...,Max (3)
where yt is the response of the output variable at step t, f0 is the response of the fiscal variable
at time 0, f over y is the share of the fiscal variable in output, and Max is the maximum number
of periods over which the response functions are computed. After this normalization, the response
functions can be interpreted as a dollar change in output at time t following a 1 dollar change in
the fiscal variable at time 0. Because it takes into account the response of the fiscal variable over
the whole horizon, I prefer the present value multiplier from Mountford and Uhlig (2009), which I
compute as
f
y
×
∑t
i=1(1 + r)
−iyt∑t
i=1(1 + r)
−ift
for t=1,...,Max (4)
where all variables are defined as above and r is the average long-term interest rate over the sample.
Most other empirical VAR studies use quarterly data. The relative merits of using annual or
quarterly data are well understood (Beetsma et al., 2008, Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2011). Some
identification assumptions become stronger in the annual context, and quarterly data may be better
suited for tracking the dynamic effects of macroeconomic shocks. However, fiscal shocks in annual
data are more likely to represent actual fiscal policy action. Moreover, Beetsma and Giuliodori
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(2011) argue that anticipation effects are less likely to affect the results in studies using annual data.
A central identification assumption in this paper and other research is that government spending
is predetermined with regard to output on an annual basis. Beetsma et al. (2009) and Born and
Mu¨ller (2012) provide empirical evidence in support of this assumption.
I also provide the results of several robustness exercises and extensions. Changes in the variable
choices, and in the basic model specification, are discussed in appropriate places in the text.
3.2 Choosing Revenue and Spending Elasticities
My choice of the spending elasticity is strongly influenced by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). I
implement the standard assumption that the spending elasticity is 0. For the revenue elasticity, I
again rely on Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who, in turn, follow Giorno et al. (1995). The overall
elasticity of tax revenues to output is written as
∑
i
ηi
Ti
T
(5)
where the summation is over the different tax types (sales and other indirect taxes, personal income
taxes, and corporate income taxes), ηi is the elasticity of tax revenues to output for tax type i, Ti is
tax revenue of tax type i, and T is total tax revenue. The standard assumption on the elasticity of
sales and other indirect taxes is 1, but this seems implausibly large to me and I thus use the value
of 0.8. The reason behind this decision is that the tax base for sales taxes is consumption, which is
less volatile than output. Under a flat tax, the elasticity should be less than 1. Other indirect state
taxes, such as property taxes or automobile taxes, also likely move less than one-to-one with output.
This value of 0.8 is supported by Bruce et al. (2006), who estimate an elasticity of sales taxes of
around 0.8. Following Giorno et al. (1995), the elasticity of personal income taxes is estimated as
ηPIT = H(FD + 1) (6)
where H is the elasticity of employment to output, F is the elasticity of earnings to employment,
and D is the elasticity of taxes to earnings. I set D at 2.9, which is the mean value reported in
Giorno et al. (1995). I estimate F and H as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). F is the coefficient on
lag 0 from a regression of the log change in wages on one lead and lag 0 to 1 of the log change in
employment. H is the coefficient on lag 0 from a regression of the log change in employment on one
lead and lag 0 to 1 of the log change in output.
The elasticity of corporate income taxes is estimated as
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Table 1: Tax revenue elasticities
Tax category Share in total taxes Elasticity
Sales & other 0.66 0.8
Personal income 0.28 1.63
Corporate income 0.06 1.62
Overall 1.00 1.08
Notes: This table shows tax revenue elasticities and shares of tax types in total tax revenues.
ηCIT = ηCIT,BCIT ∗ ηBCIT ,Y (7)
where ηCIT,BCIT is the elasticity of the corporate income tax to the tax base and ηBCIT ,Y is the
elasticity of the corporate income tax base to output. Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), I set
ηCIT,BCIT = 1 and choose ηBCIT ,Y as the coefficient on lag 0 from a regression of the log change in
corporate profits on one lead and lag 0 to 1 of the log change in output. I estimate the elasticities
on the panel of U.S. states using the maximum number of observations available for each regression.
Data are again of an annual frequency. Table 1 shows the results.
My values for the tax elasticities are supported by findings in the literature. Bruce et al. (2006)
estimates tax revenue elasticities for sales and income taxes that are comparable to mine. The
selected income tax elasticity is comparable to estimates derived from the TAXSIM model (Feenberg
and Coutts, 1993).
4 Results
4.1 Main Results
Table 2 contains the main results from the SVAR. The spending multiplier is 0.4 on impact and
then rises to 0.6 over four years. The tax multiplier is 2.04 on impact and 2.62 after four years.
Hence, the tax multiplier is relatively large, and the spending multiplier relatively small.
Taken together, the stylized facts on fiscal multipliers derived in this paper support macroeconomic
models in which state fiscal policies have an impact on economic activity. This result suggests the
possibility of using regional fiscal policy to stabilize regional output variation. However, the tax
multiplier is larger than the spending multiplier. Carlino and Inman (2013) study the consequences
for state employment of local fiscal policies and also find that state revenues have a stronger impact
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Table 2: Main results
0 1 2 3 4
Spending 0.39* 0.46* 0.50* 0.54* 0.57*
Taxes -2.02** -2.19** -2.34** -2.46** -2.57**
Notes: This table shows present value multipliers for spending and taxes 0,...,4 years after the fiscal shock. The
table shows the median of the empirical distribution generated by 1,000 replications of a residual-based bootstrap. **
significant at 95 percent, significant at 68 percent.
then state expenditures
My estimate for the state-level spending multiplier is comparable to other estimates derived at
the state or country level.5 In one specification, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find a peak effect of
0.9 for the spending multiplier. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) and Shoag (2013) conclude that
the spending multiplier is larger than 1. Clemens and Miran (2012) find a multiplier of less than 1.
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) estimate a peak spending multiplier of 1.5 in a panel of EU countries.
Overall, my estimate for the state-level spending multiplier is at the lower end of the spectrum
of estimates found in the literature. In particular, despite the fact that monetary policy cannot
counteract the region-specific fiscal shocks identified in this paper, spending multipliers are not larger
than country-based estimates that are stabilized by monetary policy. One potential explanation is
that because state economies are relatively open to each other, part of the local stimulus spills
over to neighbor states. Indeed, Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013) argue
that spending multipliers are smaller in more open economies. Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) and
Carlino and Inman (2013) find that local fiscal shocks spill over to other regions. Beetsma et al.
(2008) estimate a panel VAR for the EU and conclude that expansionary fiscal shocks lead to a
deterioration of the trade balance, as do Ravn et al. (2012) using a panel structural VAR estimated
on data from four industrialized countries.
I estimate a tax multiplier of larger than 2 in absolute value. This is larger than the 1.3 estimated
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), but more in line with the larger estimates found in literature
employing narrative tax shocks. Romer and Romer (2010) construct a historical account of U.S.
tax changes and use exogenous tax changes to estimate a tax multiplier of around 3. Cloyne (2013)
and Hayo and Uhl (2014) also find large tax multipliers for the United Kingdom and Germany,
respectively. Mertens and Ravn (2014) show that the disagreement between SVAR-based and nar-
5The definition of the multiplier differs across studies, which should be kept in mind when comparing estimates
across studies.
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rative estimates of tax multipliers disappears as soon as one assumes the right tax elasticity. Given
this background, it is interesting to note that my state-level-based estimates confirm the larger tax
multipliers estimated in the literature using narrative tax shocks.
4.2 Sensitivity of Fiscal Multipliers to Spending and Revenue Elasticities
The Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach to estimating fiscal multipliers makes at least three
important assumptions in regard to (1) the spending elasticity, (2) the revenue elasticity, and (3) the
temporal ordering of expenditures and taxes. To investigate the importance of these assumptions, I
estimate the model represented by Equations 1 and 2 for both options on the ordering of expenditures
and taxes over a grid of values for the spending and revenue elasticity. The relative ordering of
expenditures and taxes does not appear to matter much. A grid search over plausible values of the
spending and revenue elasticities suggests that for spending multipliers, the spending elasticity is
the main parameter of interest, and for the revenue multiplier, it is the revenue elasticity. Other
assumptions are of second-order importance. Figure 4 shows spending multipliers for different
values of the spending elasticity conditional on a revenue elasticity of 1.1, and revenue multipliers
for different values of the tax elasticity conditional on a spending elasticity of 0. The figure would
look very similar for different cross-elasticity assumptions. The spending multiplier is decreasing in
the assumed spending elasticity, and so is the revenue multiplier. Mertens and Ravn (2014) also
find that the tax multiplier in absolute value is increasing in the tax revenue elasticity.
My main result is that for plausible values of the spending elasticity, spending multipliers are
relatively small, and for plausible values of the tax revenue elasticity, tax multipliers are relatively
large. Craig and Hoang (2011) estimate a panel VAR using data from 50 U.S. states to study the
impact of innovations in GSP on fiscal variables. One of their findings is that both government cur-
rent and capital spending, as well as state government tax revenues, are procyclical. Sørensen et al.
(2001) conclude that state spending is moderately, and state revenues strongly, procyclical. Large
government spending multipliers would occur only in the presence of anticyclical state expenditures,
but such is in contravention of the available evidence. Hence, spending multipliers at the state level
are likely small. In addition, for plausible values of the overall tax elasticity of state revenues - say,
around 1 - tax multipliers are large.
It is also noteworthy that the confidence intervals conditional on chosen spending and revenue
elasticities are of an order of magnitude smaller than variations in multipliers that result from
choosing different spending and revenue elasticities. This makes the usual practice of conditioning
on fixed, but estimated, elasticities somewhat questionable. Respecting the uncertainty associated
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of fiscal multipliers to chosen elasticites
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Notes: This figure shows fiscal multipliers for different values of spending and revenue elasticities. A 68 percent
confidence interval based on 100 residual-based bootstrap replications is reported for each elasticity.
with the estimated elasticities would induce larger confidence intervals.
4.3 Standard Variations in the Model Specification
My results are robust to standard variations in the model specification (see Table 3). As discussed
above, there are two standard definitions of fiscal multipliers in SVAR models. For the baseline case,
I chose a present-value multiplier. Table 3 shows the multiplier under impact normalization; the
results are generally very similar to the baseline case. Table 3 also shows the results when allowing
for state-specific intercepts and linear trends, but the variation does not appear to matter. Based
on information criteria, I chose a lag length of 2; Table 3 shows the results for a lag length of 1.
Spending multipliers are somewhat larger, but tax multipliers are similar. In the baseline case, I
use the Denton-Cholette method to arrive at an estimate for GSP in line with a states fiscal year.
Results are similar when using the Chow-Lin method instead. See the Appendix for an explanation
of these methods.
In the baseline case, I estimated the model in levels, which is a common approach in the liter-
ature. The VAR-in-level specification is able to capture potential long-run relationships between
the variables implicitly, and is hence my preferred model. Table 3 shows the results of a VAR-in-
difference model. The spending multiplier is somewhat larger. Finally, the use of estimated GSP
data is potentially problematic. I thus use original GSP data, where the GSP data are for the year
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Table 3: Variations in the model specification
Spending Taxes
0 2 4 0 2 4
Impact normal. 0.39* 0.59* 0.65* -2.02** -2.38** -2.64**
Fixed effects 0.38* 0.69* 0.55 -2.18** -2.72** -3.05**
1 Lag 1.10** 1.14** 1.18** -2.22** -2.41** -2.61**
Alt. interpolation 0.33* 0.46* 0.51* -1.86** -2.26** -2.53**
First differences 0.76** 1.23** 1.30** -2.12** -2.34** -2.34**
Unadj. data 0.62** 0.70** 0.76* -4.75** -6.85** -7.71**
Notes: This table shows present value multipliers for spending and taxes 0, 2, and 4 years after the fiscal shock for
various alterations of the basic model specification. The table shows the median of the empirical distribution generated
by 1,000 replications of a residual based bootstrap. ** significant at 95 percent, * significant at 68 percent.
in which the states fiscal year ends. The results for the spending multiplier are robust, but the tax
multipliers are much larger. This is not surprising, as Figure 4 makes clear that the tax multiplier
is increasing in the tax elasticity. If GSP data that do not match the states fiscal year are used, the
assumed tax elasticity is inappropriately large as an innovation in the GSP variable does not affect
the portion of the tax revenue variable that matches last years GSP. Under reduced tax elasticities,
smaller tax multipliers would result. Thus, it is important to align national account data with the
states fiscal year, an admittedly nontrivial problem that also likely introduces some noise.
In summary, the spending multiplier varies between slightly below unity and slightly above unity
across specifications, but the tax multiplier is always larger than 2 in absolute terms. Figure 5
summarizes the results.
4.4 Conditioning on Omitted Variables
In my analysis, I make several implicit orthogonality assumptions. For example, I assume that
regions are independent at the annual horizon and I omit federal fiscal policies from the empirical
model. To the extent that out-of-state variables or federal fiscal policies matter for state fiscal policy
outcomes, the identified structural shocks may partially reflect variables other than discretionary
state fiscal policies.
A SVAR analysis that explicitly takes spatial interactions or federal fiscal policies into account is
beyond the scope of the present paper, but I find the following variation in the model specification
indicative. Specifically, I estimate the model
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yit = A0vt +A1yi,t−1 + ...+Apyi,t−p +Bxit + uit, t = 1, ..., T, i = 1, ..., N (8)
where everything is as in Equation 1 except for the presence of a vector of exogenous variables xit.
The general idea is that after conditioning on the elements in xit, the reduced-form innovations
uit only contain innovations in yit that are not explained by the elements in xit. I condition on
three different sets of vectors. First, in my baseline regression, I make the implicit assumption that
regions are independent. I hence include as exogenous variables a weighted average of out-of-state
expenditures, revenues, and output. The weights are based on the inverse distance between states,
so that closer states are given relatively more weight. The reduced-form residuals uit, based on which
the structural shocks are recovered, should then contain only innovations unrelated to out-of-state
variables. Also, the estimated multipliers could partially represent federal fiscal policies. I hence
condition on federal fiscal policy variables, and on federal grants in a third specification. Table 4
contains the results.
Table 4: Conditioning on omitted variables
Spending Taxes
0 2 4 0 2 4
Out of state 0.52** 0.74** 0.81** -2.05** -2.48** -2.85**
Fed. fiscal policy 0.38* 0.50* 0.56* -2.01** -2.31** -2.51**
Fed. grants 0.35* 0.42* 0.44* -2.02** -2.37** -2.64**
Notes: This table shows present value multipliers for spending and taxes 0, 2, and 4 years after the fiscal shock for
various alterations of the basic model specification. The table shows the median of the empirical distribution generated
by 1,000 replications of a residual-based bootstrap. ** significant at 95 percent, * significant at 68 percent.
In this new model, spending and tax multipliers are relatively similar to the baseline case. In
some of the literature that estimates multipliers associated with subnational spending an assumption
is made that the local population does not need to pay for the stimulus. To the extent that the
strategy in this section is successful, my results hold when using spending and revenue innovations
not contaminated by federal fiscal policies or federal grants. Figure 5 summarizes the results.
4.5 Output Spillovers
To study the consequences for out-of-state income of state fiscal policy changes, I supplement the
model in Equation 1 with a fourth endogenous variable, namely, the distance-weighted out-of-state
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Figure 5: Robustness
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Notes: This figure shows a 68 percent confidence interval for spending and revenue multipliers after four years for
different model specifications. Solid vertical lines indicate median values.
GSP. The structural model in Equation 2 is then slightly adjusted by ordering the distance-weighted
out-of-state GSP variable last. More specifically, after the usual steps, I construct instruments that
allow regressing the reduced-form innovation in out-of-state output on the innovations in the other
equations. Table 5 contains the results.
Table 5: Output spillovers
0 1 2 3 4
Spending 0.06 0.20* 0.30* 0.37* 0.43**
Taxes -0.16* 0.16 0.31* 0.38* 0.41*
Notes: This table shows present value multipliers for spending and taxes 0,...,4 years after the fiscal shock. The
table shows the median of the empirical distribution generated by 1,000 replications of a residual-based bootstrap. **
significant at 95 percent, * significant at 68 percent.
Interestingly, it appears that both spending and tax revenue shocks increase out-of-state economic
activity, which sheds some light on the transmission mechanism of state fiscal shocks. It could be that
increases in state expenditures increase demand for goods and services produced in other states and,
hence, spill over positively to other states. This should correspond to a deterioration in the trade
balance between states and might explain why state-level spending multipliers are relatively small.
Note that Beetsma et al. (2008) conclude that expansionary fiscal shocks lead to a deterioration of
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the trade balance.
State tax shocks also increase out-of-state output. It could be argued that state tax rates influence
the location decisions of firms and workers, as well as decisions about where to shop, and that this
mechanism produces the positive response of out-of-state output to the tax shock. Such a channel
might explain the relatively large effects of tax changes on local output.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I estimate a structural vector autoregression on a panel of U.S. states so as to study
the consequences for regional economic activity of changes in state fiscal policies. In my preferred
specification, the government spending multiplier is 0.4 on impact and 0.6 after four years. The tax
multiplier is -2 on impact and -2.6 after four years. The tax multiplier estimations are highly robust
across specifications, whereas in a VAR-in-difference specification, the spending multiplier can be
as large as 1.3 after four years. I also find that both regional spending and regional revenue shocks
increase out-of-state income.
My results have implications for both policy making and economic theory. Both state spending and
revenue decisions appear to affect local output, which means that macroeconomic models in which
fiscal shocks have no, or only small, effects on output are misleading. My state-level multipliers,
however, are comparable to estimates derived at the country level, despite the fact that regional
fiscal policy shocks should have a different transmission mechanism. In particular, monetary policy
cannot stabilize output in response to a regional fiscal policy shock, but the estimated spending
multipliers are relatively small nevertheless. This could be explained by positive demand leakages
to other states and, indeed, I find that local fiscal policy shocks increase out-of-state output.
My results also indicate that state fiscal policies have the potential to stabilize regional output
fluctuations that monetary policy cannot stabilize. It is interesting that my estimates for the tax
multiplier are closer to the national estimates derived by Romer and Romer (2010) using narrative
methods than they are to those derived in conventional SVAR studies (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002).
Admittedly, my treatment of regional interactions is simple and it would be interesting to model
regional interdependencies more explicitly in a structural vector autoregression with spatial interac-
tions. Moreover, much more disaggregated data than those used in this paper are available for U.S.
states and studying the consequences of changes in components of spending or tax revenues would
be of interest.
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Appendix: Data
If not stated otherwise, all data are of annual frequency and available for 1963 to 2006. All quarterly
data are seasonally adjusted from the source.
Deflator For price adjustment, I use the national GDP deflator, base year is 2009. Source is the
BEA Table 1.1.4. Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product. For some series I need an annual price
deflator in line with the states fiscal year. I construct it by aggregating quarterly national real and
nominal GDP over the states fiscal year, and then I compute the implicit price deflator.
Distance I obtain the distance between contiguous U.S. states from Yu (2007). I use normalized
inverse distances as spatial weights in the computation of measures for out-of-state fiscal policies
and out-of-state GSP.
Federal government Quarterly data are from BEA Table 3.2. Federal Government Current Re-
ceipts and Expenditures and transformed to real per capita values. I then aggregate in line with a
states fiscal year. My definition of spending is current expenditures plus gross government invest-
ment, and my definition of tax revenue is current tax receipts.
Fiscal data for the states fiscal years are from the U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State
Government Finances and Census of Governments. When appropriate, values are transformed to
real per capita values using a deflator and a population estimate in line with the states fiscal year.
Gross domestic product Quarterly national GDP is from BEA Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Prod-
uct, and transformed to real per capita values.
Gross state product is from BEA regional data, Gross Domestic Product by State. Years 1963 to
1996 are based on the SIC; 1997 onward are based on the NAICS all-industry total. Transformed
to real per capita values. The state fiscal years do not align with the calendar year, and hence
fiscal data do not match the national account data. I first temporally disaggregate annual GSP to
quarterly values, and then aggregate to a hypothetical annual observation that matches the states
fiscal year. In a very limited number of cases, a states fiscal year ends in May or August. I treat
these cases symmetrically to states with fiscal years ending in June or September, respectively. For
the construction of quarterly GSP series, I use the R package tempdissag (Sax and Steiner, 2013).
First, I follow Denton (1971) and Cholette (1984) and use the Denton proportional method with
state quarterly personal income as the indicator variable. This method is recommended in Chen
and Andrews (2008). My explanation follows Marini and Di Fonzo (2012). Let s be the number
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of subannual periods, N the number of annual periods, y0 = (y01, ..., y0N ) a Nx1 vector of annual
observations, and y = (y1, ..., ysN ) a sNx1 vector of unknown quarterly values. Let p denote a sNx1
vector of the indicator variable. The Denton-Cholette method solves
miny
sN∑
t=2
(
yt
pt
−
yt−1
pt−1
)2
s.t.
4T∑
t=4(T−1)+1
yt = y0T for T = 1, ..., N
Intuitively, the ratio of interpolated quarterly values to the indicator series should be as constant as
possible, while satisfying the aggregation constraint.
As a robustness exercise, I use a regression-based method following Chow and Lin (1971) with
national GDP and state personal income as indicator variables. My explanation follows Sax and
Steiner (2013). The Chow and Lin (1971) method consists in estimating a linear regression of the
annual observations on the annualized indicator series, and assumes that the same linear relation
also holds at the quarterly frequency. The aggregation constraint is respected by distributing the
remaining residual across quarterly values, allowing for autocorrelation of the quarterly residuals.
Gross operating surplus State gross operating surplus is from BEA regional data, Gross Operating
Surplus by State. 1963 to 1996 based on the SIC, 1997 onward based on the NAICS all-industry
total. Transformed to real per capita values.
Personal income State quarterly personal income is from BEA Table SQ1. Quarterly Personal
Income, and transformed to real per capita values.
Population Annual state populations are from BEA Table SA1-3. Personal Income Summary.
Quarterly state population values are obtained by assigning the annual values to the second period,
and interpolating linearly between observations. Quarterly populations for the United States are
from BEA Table 7.1. Selected per Capita Product and Income Series in Current and Chained
Dollars. State population in line with the states fiscal year is obtained by averaging across quarters
of the fiscal year.
Long-term interest rate Data on U.S. long-term interest rates are from OECD.Stat, Dataset: Key
Short-Term Economic Indicators. The average value in 1964 to 2006 is 7.24 percent.
Wages and salaries are from BEA Table SA04. State Income and Employment Summary. Values
are transformed to real per capita values.
Wage and salary employment is from BEA Table SA04 State income and employment summary,
and observations are available from 1969 onwards. Values are transformed to per capita values.
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Figure A.1: Dataplots
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Notes: This figure shows level and growth rate series for real per capita GSP, government spending, and
government tax revenue for the 48 contiguous U.S. states. The sample period is 1964 to 2006.
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1 Introduction 
The 2007 financial crisis and the associated economic slump, together with the ongoing economic 
crisis in the euro area, have generated renewed interest in the consequences for economic activity of 
changes in government fiscal policy. In Germany, private final consumption expenditure accounts for 
around 60 per cent of GDP, which suggests that consumption responses are highly relevant in 
analysing the macroeconomic consequences of tax changes. Not only are consumption responses to 
tax changes a prominent feature of the public debate over the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus, they 
are also at the core of the transmission of fiscal policy shocks in most macroeconomic models.1 Thus, 
understanding consumption responses to tax changes in Germany is important for both economic 
policy and academic research. In this paper, we study the effects on consumption of a recently 
enacted payroll tax change using a representative survey conducted on our behalf by GfK in the first 
quarter of 2013. 
At the beginning of 2013, contribution rates to the statutory pension insurance were decreased 
from 19.6 per cent to 18.9 per cent. We interpret this tax change as an exogenous shock and study 
the link between taxation and consumption by directly asking a representative sample of 
respondents how they spent the extra money. In using a representative survey analysis to study self-
reported consumption responses to legislated tax changes, we follow Sahm et al. (2012) and Shapiro 
and Slemrod (1995, 2003, 2009), who use survey methodology to investigate the impacts of various 
US tax changes on consumption. Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) examine the effects of a change in tax 
withholding enacted 1992 and find that almost 43 per cent of households report that they spent the 
temporary increase in income. Given that the tax measure induced only a change in the timing of 
taxation, this is a remarkably high number. Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) find that 22 per cent of 
respondents report to have (mostly) consumed the additional income generated by the 2001 tax 
rebates, and Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) put that number at 20 per cent for the 2008 tax rebates. 
Coronado et al. (2005) investigate self-reported consumption responses to the child credit rebate 
and the change in withholding taxes enacted in 2003 and conclude that around 21–24 per cent of 
households spent the additional income. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2012) use the 2010 Italian survey of 
household income and wealth to study how much of a (hypothetical) unexpected transitory income 
change respondents would consume and find that, on average, consumers would have spent 48 per 
cent of the additional funds. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to conduct a comparable survey for Germany. 
When asking respondents about whether they plan to save or spend the additional household 
income, 55 per cent stated that they intend to increase spending. In comparison to other 
microeconometric estimates, this is at the upper end of the distribution of estimates. Thus, our 
survey analysis suggests that German tax changes likely affect economic activity. Using a back-of-the-
envelope calculation to transform our qualitative estimate into a quantitative one, we find a marginal 
propensity to consume of around 0.53, which is compatible with a relatively strong impact of 
taxation on consumption. This microeconomic-based finding is compatible with recent 
macroeconomic evidence from Hayo and Uhl (2013). Using narratively identified German tax shocks 
                                                            
1 This is well documented in the case of the United States (see, e.g., Broda and Parker, 2008). In Germany, 
much of the business cycle stimulus after the 2007 financial crisis was implemented in the Gesetz zur Sicherung 
von Beschäftigung und Stabilität in Deutschland. The draft bill contains a justification for the business cycle 
stimulus: the government argues that tax reductions strengthen domestic demand. The bill was introduced in 
parliament by finance minister Peer Steinbrück, who stressed that the business cycle stimulus would lead to a 
substantial financial relief for taxpayers and hence strengthen aggregate demand. 
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to study the consequences of tax changes for GDP and consumption in a vector-autoregressive 
model, they find that a unit increase in taxes reduces consumption by 1.8. 
Although the use of survey methods in economic research is increasing (Blinder and Krueger, 
2004; Shapiro and Slemrod, 2009; Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2012; Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2013; Hayo 
and Neumeier, 2013; among others), they are still used relatively seldom. In particular, directly 
asking respondents about their response to economic policy is a nonstandard approach in 
economics. One general concern with using survey methods in economics is measurement error. 
However, in our view, assuming that survey responses accurately measure economic concepts is no 
more or less troublesome than the untestable identification assumptions typically present in 
econometric approaches. More precisely, empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal policy is often 
based on analysis of aggregate economic time series and to deduce causal effects from such an 
analysis it is necessary to presuppose identification assumptions (Sims, 2010). By analysing self-
reported consumption responses to a recent payroll tax change using a representative survey of the 
German population, we circumvent these identifying assumptions. Thus, this study can be seen as a 
useful and novel contribution to the macroeconomic literature on how tax changes affect 
consumption and economic activity in Germany (Perotti, 2004; Baum and Koester, 2011; Hayo and 
Uhl, 2013). 
An advantage of our survey data is that they allow analysing correlations of consumption 
responses with other economic and socio-demographic variables. Due to this, our analysis makes at 
least three important contributions to the literature. First, assuming forward-looking consumers, 
standard macroeconomic theory predicts that temporary and permanent tax changes have different 
impacts. Whether this is true in practice is of interest because many stimulus measures are of a 
temporary nature.2 Although we cannot differentiate between the effects of temporary and 
permanent tax changes using only this one exogenous tax change, we can test an important 
implication of the permanent income model: consumers expecting the tax change to be temporary 
should be less inclined to increase consumption in response to the rate cut. We find that 
respondents expecting the tax reduction to be only temporary react similarly to those expecting a 
permanent reduction, which we interpret as evidence against the permanent income hypothesis. 
Second, the macroeconomic environment in which the 2013 payroll tax change took place is 
special in the sense that interest rates are at a historic low. This situation has led to lively public 
debate about whether low interest rates are a strong deterrent to savings.3 We find that respondents 
who perceive the attractiveness of saving to be low have a higher propensity to spend, which 
reinforces these concerns. Third, we find that households with higher income are more likely to 
spend the additional income resulting from the tax reduction, which runs counter to conventional 
wisdom and is of practical relevance because many stimulus measures are based on the idea that 
low-income households spend a particularly large fraction of their income.4 
                                                            
2 The 2008 tax rebate studied in Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) is one example. In Germany, a one-time €100 
child benefit payment was implemented as part of the business cycle stimulus in 2009. 
3 Two newspaper articles on this topic are Niedrige Zinsen: Deutsche sparen zu wenig für ihre Altersvorsorge 
(Low interest rates: Germans do not save enough for their retirement) from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
online on 20 August 2013 and Die Deutschen sparen nicht mehr (Germans no longer save) from Handelsblatt 
online on 22 November 2013. 
4 For the United States, this is established in Shapiro and Slemrod (2009). For Germany, this idea is present 
in the official government justification of business cycle stimulus measures accompanying the Gesetz zur 
Sicherung von Beschäftigung und Stabilität in Deutschland. 
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Section 2 briefly discusses the survey design. Section 3 shows descriptive statistics of consumption 
responses to tax changes and compares the survey findings to available estimates from the 
literature. Section 4 analyses determinants of consumption responses to the 2013 payroll tax change. 
Section 5 concludes. The Appendix lists the survey questions. 
2 Survey Design 
At the beginning of 2013, contribution rates to the statutory pension insurance system in Germany 
were reduced from 19.6 per cent to 18.9 per cent, thereby lessening the overall tax burden of 
employees and employers. This payroll tax reduction is the real-world framework for our 
representative survey on consumption responses to tax changes. 
Extant survey analyses of consumption responses to tax changes (Sahm et al., 2012; Shapiro and 
Slemrod, 1995, 2003, 2009) mainly study exceptionally large tax changes. On the one hand, large tax 
changes could enhance identification of the effects in the sense that respondents may have spent 
some time thinking about how they will respond. On the other hand, the tax change we study is of a 
more realistic size: a narrative of German tax legislation shows that its magnitude is similar to the 
vast majority of tax changes (Uhl, 2013). We find it important to study tax changes of more normal 
size because estimating average tax responses based on exceptional circumstances may bias the 
results. Moreover, doing so makes our findings directly relevant for the evaluation of ‘normal’ tax 
changes, which occur much more frequently. 
The survey was conducted as part of an omnibus survey between 15 February 2013 and 1 March 
2013 and administered by GfK. GfK is one of the largest private research companies in Germany 
working in the fields of market research and public opinion. The original sample consists of 2,042 
representatively selected persons from the general German population aged 14 or above. The survey 
was conducted via face-to-face interviews using pen-pads. The interviewers followed specific 
instructions described in the survey instrument. The GfK uses quota sampling, which makes the 
sample distributions comparable to the population distribution in terms of the following six 
dimensions: sex, age, household size, city size, occupation of head of household, and state of 
residence. Generally, sample and population distributions are similar, as shown in the survey 
documentation (Hayo et al., 2014). Sample weights representing the inverse probability of being 
included in the sample could be used to compensate for over- or underrepresentation of an 
individual. Reported statistical results are based on unweighted observations. Reflecting the 
similarity between sample and actual distribution, no notable changes occur when using weighted 
observations. We report heteroscedasticity-robust, consistent standard errors. 
Statutory pension insurance in Germany is a pay-as-you-go system, where current contributions 
are used to pay for current pensions. The pension insurance contribution rate is split between 
employers and employees and financed by a proportionate tax on monthly income up to €4,900 in 
East Germany and €5,800 in West Germany. Future pension entitlements depend on the insured’s 
income, but not on the contribution rate. The rate change studied here had to be implemented 
because the statutory pension insurance is not allowed to accumulate a substantial surplus. It is 
therefore exogenous with respect to the consumption response.5 
                                                            
5 At the beginning of the survey, we briefly describe the tax change and then explicitly ask about the 
respondent’s reaction to the rate change. Even if the respondent reacted to the rate change prior to its actual 
implementation, our survey item—to be presented in the next section—would likely capture its effect. We 
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In principle, the macroeconomic environment prevalent at the time of implementing the rate 
change, as well as other tax changes occurring at the same time, could influence the way our 
respondents answer the survey.6 However, the German population has been relatively little affected 
by the ongoing crisis in the euro area; indeed, labour market conditions have been robust. Moreover, 
as we ask about self-reported responses to a real-world rate change, we do not face the 
identification problem of finding exogenous variation in taxation that plagues the standard empirical 
literature.  
The payroll tax change that forms the basis of our analysis affects only a subsample of the general 
German population. All employees pay into the statutory pension insurance system. Also, some 
employers, freelancers, and the insignificantly employed contribute to the government pension 
insurance system, some voluntarily and some compulsorily. We collected the information necessary 
to assess whether a respondent is contributing to the statutory pension insurance. The 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal Employment Agency) directly pays pension insurance 
contributions for the unemployed. Public servants and those not part of the labour force—including 
pensioners and the inactive working-age population—are not subject to payroll taxation. Filtering 
was employed to ensure that only respondents who are subject to payroll taxation were surveyed. 
Specifically, this includes all employees and those employers, freelancers, and insignificantly 
employed who stated that they contribute to the statutory pension insurance system. 
Specific survey items are discussed as appropriate throughout the analysis. The Appendix contains 
a list of all survey items used in this paper. However, the survey is part of a large project involving a 
diverse set of contemporaneous fiscal policy issues,7 and so to preserve space, full documentation, 
including the survey instrument as well as extensive descriptive statistics, can be found in a 
companion paper (Hayo et al., 2014).  
3 Consumption Responses to Tax Changes in our Survey and in the Literature 
In the survey, we first briefly described the payroll tax change and explained its consequences for the 
household budget. Following Sahm et al. (2012) and Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 2003, 2009), we 
then measured consumption responses to the recent tax change by asking: 
Thinking about your household’s financial situation, will you use the additional budget mostly to 
increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt?8 
The item does not give a quantitative estimate of the fraction of the additional budget that is 
spent—the marginal propensity to consume (MPC)—but instead measures qualitatively whether 
respondents will mostly spend or mostly save the additional funds. This is in contrast to Jappelli and 
Pistaferri (2012), who directly ask respondents to state the fraction of the additional budget that is 
spent. We opted for the qualitative approach because we think it is more robust with respect to 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
have no information about individuals’ awareness of the rate change and its effect on responses, but judging 
from the relatively low level of factual economic knowledge that we find in our sample, it seems unlikely that 
very many respondents anticipated this change.  
6 For instance, independently from the change in social security tax, the income-tax-free amount was 
increased from €7,834 to €8,130. 
7 Hayo and Neumeier (2013) study public preferences as to the composition of government expenditures 
and for public debt. 
8 This is an English translation of the German original. The German original of the survey instrument is 
included in the survey documentation (Hayo et al., 2014). 
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measurement error in the respondents’ replies. The qualitative question requires less processing 
capacity and hence may be answered more accurately; the drawback, of course, is that such an 
approach does not allow quantitatively estimating the size of the consumption response. Table 1 
shows the self-reported response to the payroll tax change. 
Table 1: Consumption responses to the 2013 payroll tax change 
 Proportion Standard error Confidence interval (95%) Frequency 
Mostly spend 0.55 0.02 [0.52, 0.58] 565 
Mostly repay debt 0.18 0.01 [0.16, 0.20] 183 
Mostly save 0.27 0.01 [0.24, 0.30] 277 
Notes: See Item 1 in Appendix A. Based on 1,025 observations. 
Table 1 shows that 55 per cent of interviewed persons stated that they use the additional income 
resulting from the tax reduction to increase spending, which suggests that taxation can notably affect 
consumption. Given the qualitative nature of the question, it is not possible to derive a quantitative 
estimate of the consumption response—the marginal propensity to consume (MPC)—without 
additional assumptions. To transform the qualitative numbers into a quantitative estimate we follow 
Shapiro and Slemrod (2009). The method is based on assuming that respondents choose to answer 
‘mostly spend’ if their MPC is at least 50 per cent, and that respondents’ MPC within answer 
categories is uniformly distributed. In our sample, 55 per cent of respondents answer ‘mostly spend’ 
and, accordingly, are assumed to have a MPC between 50 and 100 per cent (75 per cent on average), 
and 45 per cent are assumed to have a MPC between 0 and 50 per cent (25 per cent on average). The 
weighted average produces our estimate for the overall MPC of 0.53. 
Comparing this estimated MPC for Germany with those derived in other studies, most of which 
focus on the United States, we find that it is at the upper end of the spectrum. Shapiro and Slemrod 
(1995) study the consequences for consumption of a reduction in withholding taxes and report that 
around 40 per cent of respondents increased spending. Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) analyse the 2001 
income tax rebate and estimate the marginal rate of consumption to be as low as 0.22. Results for 
the 2008 tax change (Shapiro and Slemrod, 2009) are comparable to the latter estimate. Based on 
the timing of the 2001 income tax rebate, Johnson et al. (2006) estimate that households spent 
between 20 and 40 per cent of the tax rebate within the first three months after implementation of 
the tax change. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2012) estimate an average marginal propensity to consume of 
0.48 for transitory changes in income. Hence, in comparison to estimates from other microeconomic 
studies, our estimate for the marginal propensity to consume is at the upper end of the distribution. 
See Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) for an extensive list of MPC estimates. 
4 Characterising Savers and Consumers 
4.1 Variables and Economic Hypotheses 
Next, we investigate correlates of consumption responses by running a logistic regression with the 
dependent variable taking the value 1 when the respondent answered ‘mostly spend’ and 0 when 
the respondent answered ‘mostly repaying debt’ or ‘mostly saving’. Combining the latter two 
categories seems justified because in economic theory the two behaviours are generally equivalent. 
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Moreover, this is the approach taken in much of the extant literature (Shapiro and Slemrod, 2003), 
thus improving comparability of our work with that of others. 9 This section introduces theoretical 
hypotheses and operationalisation of the variables, which are summarised in Table 2. Coefficients or 
marginal effects in the logit regression are estimated conditional on all other covariates included in 
the logit regression. For some policy applications, however, unconditional covariances are also 
relevant. Thus, in addition to the multivariate regression approach, we compute cross-tabulations. To 
economise on space we do not provide the tables when discussing the results, but instead refer to 
interesting descriptive statistics and the Fisher exact test for independence across categories of a 
covariate. 
Permanent income theory predicts that temporary tax changes have a smaller impact on 
consumption than do permanent tax changes (Friedman, 1957). This hypothesis is of practical 
interest because many business cycle stimulus measures are temporary. We cannot formally test this 
hypothesis using only a single tax change, but we can investigate one implication of the permanent 
income model: respondents perceiving the current rate change to be temporary should be less 
inclined to increase spending. Specifically, we use two items from the survey (Items 2 and 3 in the 
Appendix) to assess whether the respondent regards the outward shift of the budget constraint 
caused by the tax change to be temporary or permanent. First, we ask the respondents whether they 
expect future tax rate increases as a consequence of the current cut and, second, we ask if they think 
the current cut might lower pension payments in the future. In the regressions, we introduce a 
dummy variable taking on the value 1 in case either question is answered affirmatively, and 0 
otherwise. 
In dynamic models with intertemporally optimising consumers, the expected return on savings 
governs the intertemporal allocation of funds and is relevant for computing lifetime income. Some 
versions of the permanent income model predict that the consumption response to transitory 
changes in income is smaller in a low interest rate environment (Hall, 1978). In more general models 
of intertemporal optimization, the effect of interest rates on the consumption response to changes in 
income is ambiguous and may depend on specification of the utility function. In practice, the effects 
of interest rates on consumption and saving decisions are of interest because of widespread fears 
that current low interest rates are a major deterrent to saving. We measure the perceived 
attractiveness of saving in a historical perspective by asking respondents to state their perceptions of 
the current return on savings on a five-point scale ranging from ‘much less than 10 years ago’ to 
‘much more than 10 years ago’ (Item 6 in Appendix A). This allows investigating the question of 
whether subjective perceptions of interest rate variations are relevant for households’ consumption 
responses. In our regression, we include a dummy variable taking the value 1 in the event 
respondents perceive saving to be ‘much less attractive’ or ‘less attractive’. 
  
                                                            
9 A multinominal logistic regression based on all three categories of our item (‘spend‘, ‘save’, and ‘repay 
debt’) yields very similar conclusions for the spend category, but is not informative with respect to differences 
between ‘save’ and ‘repay debt’, which further supports our approach of combining these two categories.  
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Table 2: Variables and economic hypotheses 
Concept Hypothesis Measurement 
Temporary vs. 
permanent tax 
shocks 
The permanent income model predicts that 
temporary tax changes have a smaller impact than 
permanent tax changes. 
We measure whether the respondent 
perceives shift of the budget constraint as 
permanent or temporary by including a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
respondent either expects a future rate 
increase or a future pension reduction. 
Returns on 
savings 
The permanent income model predicts that tax 
changes have a smaller impact on consumption when 
interest rates are low. More generally, the effect of 
interest rates on the consumption response to tax 
changes is ambiguous. The relation between interest 
rates and consumption and saving behaviour is 
relevant in policy debates because of wide-spread 
fears that current low interest rates negatively affect 
savings. 
Respondents state their assessment of 
saving’s profitability (much less than 10 years 
ago to much more than 10 years ago) on a 
five-point scale. For the regression, we include 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a 
respondent perceives saving returns to be less 
or much less than 10 years ago. 
Expectation on 
future economic 
situation 
Intertemporally optimising economic agents 
expecting a worsening of their economic situation 
have a greater incentive to increase saving today, 
because the marginal utility of future income has 
increased. The ‘animal spirits’ hypothesis claims that 
more optimistic respondents are more free-
spending. 
Respondents state their expectation about 
their future economic situation (‘much worse 
than today’ to ‘much better than today’). For 
the regression, we include a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if a respondent expects 
his or her future economic situation to be 
worse or much worse than today. 
Discount factors The consumer’s Euler equation relates consumption 
decisions to a measure of time preferences ɴ. In the 
behavioural economic literature, a great deal of 
emphasis is put on an additional parameter capturing 
short-run impatience. 
Discount factors as well as the additional 
discount factors for short-run impatience are 
derived in behavioural experiments (Items 11 
and 12 in the Appendix). 
Risk propensity More risk-loving people may have different 
consumption and saving behaviour, e.g., because of 
precautionary saving.  
An indicator for risk propensity is derived in a 
behavioural experiment (Item 10 in the 
Appendix). 
Ricardian 
consumers  
Over the last years, Germany’s debt strongly 
increased and respondents taking the intertemporal 
budget constraint of the government into account 
should have decreased spending and increased 
saving, respectively.  
Respondents are asked whether they have 
adjusted their spending behaviour in response 
to the recent hike in public debt. We then 
include a dummy variable capturing ‘Ricardian 
consumers’. 
Economic 
knowledge 
Dynamic optimisation requires agents to know the 
value of the real interest rates. Ricardian equivalence 
is based on a rational agent who takes the 
government’s dynamic budget constraint into 
account. Blinder and Krueger (2004) show that 
economic knowledge affects individuals’ opinions on 
economic policy.  
Dummy variables indicating if respondents are 
able to choose, from a list of four, the correct 
previous year’s budget deficit as well as the 
current rates of inflation and interest. Dummy 
variable indicating higher education as a proxy 
for information processing capability (at least 
university-entry diploma). 
Income Household income is added to test the Keynesian 
assumption that low-income households have a 
higher propensity to spend.  
Respondents state their monetary net 
household income on an 11-point scale, which 
we collapse into three categories: low, 
medium, and high household income.  
Socioeconomic 
controls 
Various other variables control for potential 
influences outside the canonical model.  
Dummy variables taking on the value 1 if the 
respondent is from East Germany, female, in a 
relationship, respectively. Number of children 
and age of respondent are also included.  
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We also investigate whether a respondent’s expectations about future income are relevant for 
consumption responses. Intertemporally optimising economic agents expecting a worsening of their 
economic situation have a greater incentive to increase saving today because the marginal utility of 
future income has increased. Building on Keynes’s (1936) ‘animal spirits’ idea, behavioural economics 
argues that waves of optimism and pessimism influence economic behaviour and, specifically, that 
optimistic consumers are more free-spending (Akerlof and Shiller, 2010; De Grauwe, 2012). To 
investigate the importance of income expectations to individual consumption decisions, we asked 
respondents to state their expected future economic situation on a five-point scale, ranging from 
‘much worse than today’ to ‘much better than today’. We include a dummy that takes the value 1 if a 
respondent expects his or her future economic situation to be worse or much worse than today. 
Intertemporal preferences play an important role in intertemporal utility optimisation. Typical 
consumer Euler equations contain the agent’s discount factor ɴ. We derive a measure for ɴ in a 
behavioural ‘experiment’10 (Item 12 in the Appendix). Specifically, the respondents could choose 
between a fixed payment of €1,000 in six months, or a higher payment in 12 months. The higher the 
payment in 12 months required to induce the respondent to forego the fixed payment in six months, 
the lower the discount factor.11 Intertemporal optimisation predicts that the higher the discount 
factor ɴ, the greater the incentive to save and, correspondingly, the smaller the incentive to consume 
the additional funds. We estimate the ordinary discount factor as 
(1) Ⱦ ൌ ଵ଴଴଴௫భమ , 
where x12 is the amount the respondent requires in 12 months to forego payment of €1,000 in six 
months. Behavioural economists argue that a hyperbolic utility function that allows for additional 
short-run impatience is a better description of agents’ utility (Ainslie, 1975; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; 
Laibson, 1997; Angeletos et al., 2001). Hence, we include an additional discount factor measuring 
short-run impatience to control for deviations from standard economic theory. The additional 
measure of short-run impatience is estimated as 
(2) Ɂ ൌ ௫భమ௫ల , 
where x6 is the amount the respondent requires in six months to forego payment of €1,000 today 
(Item 11 in the Appendix). A low value of ɷ implies that the agent requires a lower payment in 12 
months to forego payment in six months than he or she does in six months to forego payment today, 
and hence expresses short-run impatience. 
We also include a measure of risk propensity derived from a behavioural experiment in which 
respondents are repeatedly asked to choose between a safe payoff and a lottery (Item 10 in the 
Appendix). The higher the safe payoff required to forego the lottery, the greater the respondent’s 
risk propensity. Theory does not give us clear guidance on this issue, but we expect that more risk-
averse respondents save a greater share of the tax reduction because of a precautionary saving 
motive. 
                                                            
10 The question was asked in a hypothetical way and did not actually involve monetary payments. However, 
the ‘experiments’ are taken from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) questionnaire, where actual 
monetary payments were made. As the distribution of answers is similar to the SOEP data, the lack of 
incentivisation appears unproblematic, also see Hayo and Neumeier (2013). 
11 We focus on the time span from six to 12 months, rather than the time span from today to six months to 
avoid measurement error due to extreme short-run impatience or hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie, 1975; Thaler 
and Shefrin, 1981), also see Hayo and Neumeier (2013). 
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Over the last years, public debt in Germany has increased dramatically. Rational economic agents 
behaving in accordance with Ricardian theory (Barro, 1974, 1979) should increase private saving so 
as to be able to offset the likely future increase in taxation. The recent build-up of public debt can be 
interpreted as a natural experiment that may help us identify Ricardian consumers. We enquired into 
respondents’ reaction to the recent increase in public debt. Specifically, we asked them to state 
whether they are spending less, spending more, or have not changed their spending and saving 
behaviour. We then include a dummy variable for ‘Ricardian consumers’ that takes the value 1 if 
respondents spend less and save more in reaction to the increased public debt. The payroll tax cut 
studied in this paper is a particularly interesting case because the budget of the statutory pension 
insurance system is somewhat more transparent than that of the general government. The pension 
insurance system is required to ensure that its current revenues match the level of predetermined 
pension benefits. Assuming that the defined pension benefits remain fixed, then either transfers 
from the general government budget to the pension budget or an increase in contribution rates will 
be necessary to offset demographic development toward an aging society.12 Hence, Ricardian agents 
have a clear incentive to save in response to the recent rate cut so as to offset variations in their 
intertemporal consumption level. 
A small literature studies how economic knowledge influences economic behaviour and opinions 
on economic policy. Walstad (1997) uses survey analysis to investigate the relationship between 
economic knowledge and opinions on economic topics and finds, inter alia, that respondents with 
more economic knowledge are more favourable to using fiscal stimulus to combat unemployment. 
Hayo (1999) analyses the relationship between objective knowledge about the EU and opinions 
about the European Monetary Union and finds that objective knowledge is positively associated with 
support for European monetary integration. Blinder and Krueger (2004) use survey methods to 
analyse the role of economic knowledge in shaping opinions and conclude that economic knowledge 
is less important than ideology, but more important than variables reflecting respondents’ self-
interest. Van der Cruijsen et al. (2013) use a household survey to study the relationship between 
economic knowledge and opinions about banking supervision. They conclude that more informed 
respondents have more realistic views on banking supervision and, hence, act in a more financially 
prudent manner. Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) and van Rooij et al. (2011) find that more 
knowledgeable persons tend to do more planning for retirement. 
We add to this literature by investigating whether economic knowledge is systematically 
associated with consumption responses to tax changes. Intertemporal utility maximisation requires 
economic agents to know the actual value of real interest rates. Likewise, Ricardian equivalence is 
based on the idea that rational agents take the government’s intertemporal budget constraint into 
account. Thus, both arguments require respondents to have information about macroeconomic 
variables. We test whether economic agents with correct knowledge about these variables react 
differently to the tax change than those with incorrect or no knowledge. We measure economic 
knowledge by asking respondents to choose—from four options—the correct last year’s budget 
deficit, as well as current long-term interest and inflation rates (Items 7 to 9 in the Appendix). In the 
regression, we then include dummy variables measuring whether the knowledge questions were 
answered correctly. Pertaining to information processing capability, we also include a dummy for 
higher education that takes the value 1 if the respondent has at least a university-entry diploma. It 
                                                            
12 This is evident in the report of the responsible parliamentary committee referring to the law 
implementing the payroll tax change (Gesetz zur Festsetzung der Beitragssätze in der gesetzlichen 
Rentenversicherung für das Jahr 2013). 
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could be argued that economic knowledge will enable the respondent to better analyse 
macroeconomic conditions. If so, respondents able to correctly assess the currently low interest rates 
may show different consumption responses. Similarly, respondents who closely monitor budget 
deficits may be more worried about the government’s intertemporal budget constraint and, hence, 
be less inclined to increase spending. Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) report that economic competence 
not only increases planning for retirement but is also associated with higher savings. 
A better understanding of economic covariates associated with individual reactions could be 
helpful to economic policymakers in designing a business cycle stimulus. For example, there is debate 
about whether different income levels are associated with different propensities to consume. The 
common view, which is based on Keynes (1936), is that households with smaller income are more 
likely to spend the additional income (Shapiro and Slemrod, 2009). Thus, measures targeted at low-
income households are often proposed as particularly effective approaches to business cycle 
stimulus.13 To study the impact of income on responses to the tax change, we introduce a dummy 
variable for medium net income (more than 1€,500, but less than €3,500) and a dummy for high net 
income (more than €3,500). 
We also control for a wide range of socio-demographic variables. The influence of socio-
demographic variables on consumption responses has the potential to identify those individuals who 
will have a particularly sensitive reaction to tax changes. We include dummy variables for the 
respondent’s sex, age, home region (East or West Germany), and being in a relationship. 
4.2 Empirical Results 
Table 3 contains the estimated average marginal effects. We find that variation in perception of the 
tax change as either temporary or permanent does not appear to matter, and our evidence suggests 
that temporary and permanent tax changes should have a similar impact. Although the proportion of 
spenders among those who perceive the rate cut to be temporary is greater (0.56) than among those 
who perceive the rate cut to be permanent (0.52), a Fisher exact test shows that the difference is not 
statistically significant. Comparing our findings to extant literature, we find that Shapiro and Slemrod 
(1995) report that 43 per cent of respondents increased spending after a temporary tax change, 
which supports our conclusion that temporary tax change can have a large impact. Likewise, Jappelli 
and Pistaferri (2012) find that consumers would on average spend 48 per cent of an unexpected 
transitory income change. Poterba (1988) estimates that up to 24 per cent of a temporary tax cut is 
consumed. Blinder (1981) concludes that temporary tax cuts have a much smaller impact than 
permanent ones, as do Watanabe et al. (2001), who study the consequences of Japanese tax 
changes. 
Individuals assessing the current return on savings to be low have a 10 percentage point (pp) 
higher probability of stating that they plan to spend the additional money. The effect is significant at 
the 1 per cent level. In fact, respondents reporting the current attractiveness of savings as low spend 
the additional funds in 59 per cent of all cases, and the Fisher exact test finds the difference in 
                                                            
13 This argument is discussed in Shapiro and Slemrod (2009). For Germany, the draft bill of the Gesetz zur 
Sicherung von Beschäftigung und Stabilität in Deutschland contains an official justification for the measures 
enacted to combat the recession following the 2007 financial crisis. A good example is the reduction in the 
marginal tax rate for low incomes, which is justified as specifically strengthening the domestic demand of low 
and medium income households. The bill also contains a one-time €100 child benefit payment, which is 
justified similarly. 
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spending rates to be significantly different across answer categories (p-value 0.00).14 This finding 
suggests that interest rates are an important determinant of consumption and saving decisions, and 
hence reinforces concerns that the current low level of interest rates causes lower savings. Given 
that the theoretical prediction was ambiguous, it is interesting that our survey evidence suggests that 
consumption responses to changes in income are stronger in a low interest rate environment. This 
finding is in contravention of permanent income models that predict consumption responses to 
transitory changes in income to be smaller under low interest rates. 
Table 3: Consumption responses and covariates 
 Marginal effects Confidence intervals 
Anticipating tax change as temporary 0.03 [-0.06, 0.11] 
Perceiving current returns on savings as low 0.10*** [0.03, 0.18] 
Expect worsening in economic situation -0.01 [-0.11, 0.08] 
Discount factor -0.27*** [-0.47, -0.08] 
Additional hyperbolic discount factor -0.05 [-0.19, 0.09] 
Index for risk propensity -0.02 [-0.08, 0.03] 
Ricardian consumer -0.22*** [-0.34, -0.11] 
Correct knowledge of budget deficit 0.04 [-0.07, 0.16] 
Correct knowledge of interest rate -0.03 [-0.10, 0.04] 
Correct knowledge of inflation rate -0.01 [-0.08, 0.07] 
Household income Base category ‘Low income’ 
Medium income 0.08 [-0.03, 0.18] 
High income 0.14** [0.01, 0.26] 
East Germany 0.02 [-0.06, 0.10] 
Female 0.04 [-0.03, 0.10] 
Number of children -0.04** [-0.07, -0.0001] 
Age 0.001 [-0.003, 0.004] 
Higher education -0.07 [-0.16, 0.01] 
In relationship 0.01 [-0.07, 0.10] 
Notes: Table shows average marginal effects of logistic regression with dependent variable ‘increase spending’ coded as 1, 
‘repay debt’ or ‘save’ coded as 0 (Item 1 in Appendix A). Confidence interval based on 95% level of confidence. Based on 
832 observations. ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
The respondents’ expectations of future economic outcomes are statistically insignificant. Thus, 
variation in expected income over the business cycle does not affect the impact of tax changes. 
Our indicator for the discount factor is statistically significant and suggests that economic agents 
who discount the future less heavily have a 27 pp lower probability of spending the additional funds. 
This is in line with intertemporal utility optimisation. Our indicator for the additional discount factor 
                                                            
14 One reason for this variation across respondents despite the same macroeconomic interest rate could be 
differences in personal investment opportunities. Another reason could be that respondents are not equally 
aware of the current interest rate situation, as only 36 per cent of respondents are able to identify the correct 
long-term interest rate from a list of four options.  
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reflecting short-run impatience, however, is not statistically significant, providing evidence that 
nonstandard utility functions may not be important in explaining consumption responses to tax 
changes. Our indicator for risk preferences is not statistically significant, either. 
Respondents identified as Ricardian have a 22 pp lower probability of spending the additional 
funds, which is significant at the 1 per cent level. This supports the theoretical hypothesis. However, 
only 86 out of 1,025 respondents stated that they spent less and increased savings in response to the 
recent accumulation of public debt, suggesting that the Ricardian argument is of limited practical 
importance. Moreover, drawing on Mankiw’s (2000) distinction of economic agents as either ‘Savers’ 
or ‘Spenders’, it could be argued that ‘Savers’ tend to save irrespective of Ricardian arguments. 
All three knowledge variables, as well as the dummy variable indicating higher education, are 
insignificant. This suggests that economic knowledge is not associated with different consumption 
reactions to tax changes. Referring to the demands placed on consumers in typical rational 
expectations models, it is interesting to note that only around 9 per cent of respondents were able to 
correctly answer the question about last year’s budget deficit, 36 per cent chose the correct long-
term interest rate, and around 66 per cent selected the correct current rate of inflation. Based on 
these outcomes, it appears that respondents in Germany are not particularly well informed about 
macroeconomic variables that are highly relevant in widely used models, such as those building on 
intertemporal utility maximisation, permanent income theory, or Ricardian equivalence. We find that 
with an average of slightly below 40 per cent of correct answers across the three knowledge 
questions, we are at the lower end of the range reported in other studies. In Walstad (1997), 43 per 
cent of economic knowledge questions were answered correctly by respondents in the United States. 
A question referring to the size of the US federal deficit, however, was answered correctly by only 19 
per cent of respondents. In Hayo (1999), around 48 per cent of knowledge questions were answered 
correctly by citizens of EU member countries. Walstad and Rebeck (2002) compare outcomes from 
five surveys on economic knowledge and conclude that on average, 48 per cent of all knowledge 
questions are answered correctly. 
We find that high-income households have a 14 pp higher probability of increasing spending in 
response to tax changes, which is significant at the 1 per cent level. In fact, the proportion of 
respondents replying ‘mostly spend’ monotonically increases from 49 per cent in the low-income 
class to 57 per cent for medium income and 60 per cent for high income. This contradicts the 
conventional wisdom, based on Keynes (1936), which assumes a higher marginal propensity to 
consume for low-income households. However, Coronado et al. (2005) study self-reported 
qualitative consumption responses to the child credit rebate and the change in the withholding tax 
enacted in the United States in 2003 and also find that households with higher incomes are more 
likely to spend the additional money. Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) do not find strong evidence for 
variations in response patterns across income categories, but report a somewhat lower proportion of 
respondents who plan to spend the additional money in the lower income brackets. The finding in 
Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) is similar. Hence, tax multipliers appear higher in the case of tax 
reductions for high-income households. 
In our set of socio-demographic variables, we find that households with children are 4 pp less 
likely to spend the additional funds. Similar to the result for income, this finding raises questions 
about the effectiveness of specific business cycle stimulus measures, such as the 2009 €100 increase 
in child benefits. However, the effects relating to income level and number of children are each 
significant only at the 5 per cent level. Other socio-demographic variables are insignificant. 
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5 Conclusion 
The general conclusion from our analysis of a representative population survey is that the effect of 
typically sized tax reductions on aggregate consumption and economic activity is economically 
relevant in Germany, as 55 per cent of the respondents report that they want to spend the extra 
money. In our view, this reveals considerable potential for taxation to affect consumption and hence 
economic activity. One way of comparing our results with the macroeconometric literature on fiscal 
multipliers is to transform our estimate of the marginal propensity to consume into a traditional 
Keynesian tax multiplier –MPC/(1-MPC) of -1.13. Hayo and Uhl (2013) use narratively identified tax 
shocks for Germany to study the consequences of tax changes for GDP and consumption in a vector-
autoregressive model and find peak effects of a unit increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio of -2.4 per cent 
on GDP and -1.8 per cent on consumption, which is not incompatible with the conclusions from our 
qualitative survey. 
With the help of individual socio-demographic and economic variables, we investigate widely 
employed assumptions about consumption responses to tax changes, with several interesting results. 
First, we asked our respondents whether they perceive the current rate cut to be temporary or 
permanent. We find no significant difference in consumption responses across this dimension, which 
casts some doubt on a core premise of the permanent income hypothesis. Second, we discover that 
individual returns on savings have a significant effect on consumption spending after a tax reduction: 
if returns are considered to be relatively low, the consumption response is relatively stronger. This 
finding poses a challenge to permanent income models, which predict consumption responses to 
transitory changes in income to be smaller under low interest rates. Third, expectations about future 
economic situation are not significant, which is neither consistent with consumers’ reacting to life-
time income nor the behavioural economics concept of ‘animal spirits’. Fourth, estimated discount 
factors have a significant effect on the decision about how to use the additional income. The lower 
the discount factor, the greater the likelihood that the additional income from the tax reduction is 
spent, which is in line with intertemporal utility maximisation. Our indicator for short-run impatience 
is not statistically significant, suggesting that the emphasis in behavioural economics on hyperbolic 
discounting (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981) may not be warranted in the present context. Fifth, variations 
in risk propensities are not statistically significant. Sixth, we find evidence that ‘Ricardian consumers’ 
spent significantly less of the tax reduction. However, only about 8 per cent of consumers are 
Ricardian, meaning that the practical relevance of this effect is small. Seventh, the various indicators 
for economic knowledge are neither individually nor jointly statistically significant, which suggests 
that economic knowledge is not associated with different consumption reactions to tax changes. 
Indeed, our results throw doubt on the practical relevance of rational expectation models, as the 
German population’s degree of knowledge about important economic variables is fairly low. Eighth, 
it is often argued that targeting policy measures at low-income households is a particularly effective 
approach to business cycle stabilisation. In contrast, our evidence suggests that consumption 
responses are particularly pronounced at the upper end of the income distribution. 
We see further scope for studying self-reported responses to tax changes using survey methods. 
Typically, investment is much more volatile than consumption and reacts far more sensitively to tax 
changes (Cloyne, 2013; Hayo and Uhl, 2013; Mertens and Ravn, 2012; Romer and Romer, 2010). 
Thus, investment responses appear to be particularly relevant in discovering macroeconomic 
responses to changes in taxation. Moreover, studying self-reported responses to tax changes at the 
firm level would be of interest. 
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Appendix: Summary of the Survey Instrument 
No Item 
Intro At the beginning of 2013, contribution rates to the statutory pension system have been 
reduced. In effect, this reduces the overall tax burden. We are interested in your responses to 
the rate cut. 
1 Thinking about your household’s financial situation, will you use the additional budget mostly 
to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt? 
Reply: ‘Increase spending’, ‘Repay debt’, ‘Increase savings’ 
2 Will the recent cut in pension insurance contribution rates lead to higher contribution rates in 
the future? 
Reply: ‘Yes’, ‘No’ 
3 Will the recent cut in pension insurance contribution rates lead to lower pension payments? 
Reply: ‘Yes’, ‘No’ 
4 How do you expect your economic situation to be in one year? 
Reply: ‘Much worse than today’ (–2) to ‘Much better than today’ (+2) 
5 How profitable do you think savings are in Germany today compared with ten years ago? 
Reply: ‘Much less than ten years ago’ (–2) to ‘Much more than ten years ago’ (+2) 
6 How large was the budget deficit of the federal government in 2012? 
Reply: ‘1%’, ‘3%’, ‘5%’, ‘7%’ 
7 What is the current interest rate on long-term government bonds (maturity 10 years), 
approximately? 
Reply: ‘1.5%’, ‘3%’, ’5.5%’, ‘10%’ 
8 How large was the rate of inflation in 2012, approximately? 
Reply: ‘0%’, ‘2%’, ‘5%’, ‘10%’ 
9 Between 2008 and 2012, we have seen a rapid acceleration of public debt. Did this increasing 
reliance on debt financing lead to changes in the way you spend or save? 
Reply: ‘Yes, I now spend a smaller proportion of my income and save a larger proportion’, 
‘Yes, I spend a larger proportion of my income and save a smaller proportion’, ‘No, I did not 
change my behaviour in consequence to the rapid increase in public debt’ 
10 In this experiment you can choose between a safe payment, and a lottery where you win 
€1,000 with 50% probability and nothing with 50% probability. 
You start with the amount ‘€0’ and choose the safe amount for which you forego the lottery. 
Reply: ‘€0’, ‘€100’, ‘€200’, ‘€300’, ‘€400’, ‘€500’, ‘€600’, ‘€700’, ‘€800’, ‘€900’ 
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No Item 
11 In this experiment you can choose between a fixed amount of €1,000 paid immediately, and a 
higher amount paid to you in 6 months. 
You start with the amount ‘€1,000’ and choose the amount for which you decide to take the 
payment in 6 months. 
Reply: ‘€1,000’, ‘€1,010’, ‘€1,020’, ‘€1,030’, ‘€1,050’, ‘€1,075’, ‘€1,100’, ‘€1,150’, ‘€1,200’, 
‘€1,300’, ‘€1,400’, ‘€1,500’, ‘€1,750’, ‘€2,000’ 
12 In this experiment you can choose between a fixed amount of €1,000 paid in 6 months, and a 
higher amount paid to you in 12 months. 
You start with the amount ‘€1,000’ and choose the amount for which you decide to take the 
payment in 12 months. 
Reply: ‘€1,000’, ‘€1,010’, ‘€1,020’, ‘€1,030’, ‘€1,050’, ‘€1,075’, ‘€1,100’, ‘€1,150’, ‘€1,200’, 
‘€1,300€’, ‘€1,400’, ‘€1,500’, ‘€1,750’, ‘€2,000’ 
Notes: Items 4 and 5 have a five-point scale. In Items 6, 7, and 8, correct answers are in bold. To preserve space, Items 10, 
11, and 12 are presented in slightly different form compared to the actual survey text. For a full documentation of the 
survey, including the German original of the survey instrument, see Hayo et al. (2014). 
 
 
1 
 
Joint Discussion Paper 
Series in Economics 
by the Universities of 
Aachen · Gießen · Göttingen 
 Kassel · Marburg · Siegen 
ISSN 1867-3678 
No. 38-2014 
Bernd Hayo and Matthias Uhl 
Taxation and Labour Supply: 
Evidence from a Representative Population Survey 
This paper can be downloaded from 
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/index_html%28magks%29 
Coordination: Bernd Hayo • Philipps-University Marburg 
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics • Universitätsstraße 24, D-35032 Marburg 
Tel: +49-6421-2823091, Fax: +49-6421-2823088, e-mail: hayo@wiwi.uni-marburg.de
  
2 
 
Taxation and Labour Supply: 
Evidence from a Representative Population Survey* 
 
Bernd Hayo and Matthias Uhl 
27 August 2014 
University of Marburg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
Bernd Hayo 
Marburg Centre for Institutional Economics (MACIE) 
University of Marburg 
D-35032 Marburg 
Germany 
Phone: +49-6421-2823091 
Email: hayo@wiwi.uni-marburg.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
* We thank Kerstin Marit Friebel, Edith Neuenkirch, Florian Neumeier, Duncan Roth, and seminar 
participants at the MAGKS research meeting in Rauischholzhausen and the University of Marburg for their 
helpful comments. 
 3 
 
Taxation and Labour Supply: 
Evidence from a Representative Population Survey 
 
 
Abstract We study the influence of taxation on labour supply using a specifically designed 
representative survey of the German population. First, we investigate whether taxes generally 
matter for the labour supply decisions of our respondents. Around 41 per cent report taking taxes 
into consideration, which implies that the majority of the German population appears unresponsive 
to taxation. Second, we look at self-reported labour supply adjustments following a recently enacted 
payroll tax change. Only around 12 per cent of all respondents report an actual labour supply 
response, but we find evidence of an income, as well as a substitution, effect of the tax change. Our 
conclusion is that effects of taxes on labour supply in Germany are likely small. We analyse the 
correlation with economic and socio-demographic variables, and find that the self-employed are 
relatively more sensitive to taxation and that low interest rates reduce incentives for an expansion of 
the labour supply. 
Keywords Taxation ͼ Labour supply ͼ Representative population survey ͼ Germany 
JEL Classification E62 ͼ H30 ͼ J22 
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1 Introduction 
The link between taxation and labour supply is of considerable interest to both academics and 
policymakers. For instance, labour supply responses to taxation are important for assessing the 
efficiency loss associated with distortive income taxation. Currently, there is also more interest in the 
impact of fiscal policy changes on economic activity, and tax changes may affect output through 
alterations in the labour supply. These issues are commonly analysed using macroeconomic or 
microeconomic approaches that attempt to estimate the reaction of labour supply indirectly based 
on observable economic variables.1 
In this paper, we research self-reported labour supply responses to taxation using two items from 
a specifically designed, representative population survey. First, we ask our respondents whether 
taxation commonly matters for their labour supply decisions. We then use a 2013 payroll tax change 
to investigate specific labour supply responses to a real-world tax policy change. 
In standard models, income taxation affects labour supply by inducing changes in net wages, 
which implies that the wage elasticity of hours supplied is a central concept. Borjas (2005) and Saez 
et al. (2012) claim that the wage elasticity of hours supplied is small, whereas Keane (2011) reports a 
small subset of studies estimating large wage elasticities (Hausman 1981; MaCurdy 1983; Imai and 
Keane 2004; see also Keane and Rogerson 2012). Hours of work supplied, however, is a narrow 
concept of labour supply, and labour market participation and effort per hour are likely important 
facets of real-world labour supply decisions. For example, female labour market participation is often 
found to be relatively responsive to taxation (Arrufat and Zabalza 1986; Eissa et al. 2008; Keane 
2011). Feldstein (1995) reports large elasticities of taxable income, roughly between 1 and 3.1, 
whereas Gruber and Saez (2000) estimate a considerably smaller effect of around 0.4. To sum up, the 
majority of studies find that labour supply is only moderately responsive to tax changes, but some 
research discovers large effects, especially for certain subgroups of the population and when broader 
concepts than hours worked are used to measure labour supply. 
We contribute to this discussion by providing evidence based on a nonstandard methodological 
approach. Rather than relying on indirect estimates of labour supply based on observable economic 
data, we use novel data from a specifically designed, representative survey of the German 
population. In the survey, we directly ask our respondents whether taxation matters for their labour 
supply decisions and, if so, how they have adjusted their labour supply in response to a recent payroll 
tax change in Germany. Our results indicate that taxation matters for around 41 per cent of our 
respondents, which implies that the majority is unresponsive to taxation. Moreover, only around 12 
per cent of all respondents adjusted their labour supply in response to a small real-world payroll tax 
change. However, further analysis shows that some individuals report having reduced, and others 
having increased, their labour supply. Thus, the overall net labour supply effect of tax changes 
appears to be small. We find no evidence of significant variation across employment status, income, 
and gender, but taxation generally seems to be more relevant for the self-employed. We also find 
that low interest rates reduce incentives for labour supply expansion. 
Directly asking respondents about the consequences of economic policy for their behaviour is 
nonstandard in economics, but has been done successfully for other research questions. For 
                                                            
1 Meghir and Phillips (2010), Keane (2011), Keane and Rogerson (2012), and Saez et al. (2012) review the 
literature on taxes and labour supply; Perotti (2007), Fontana (2009), and Parker (2011) survey the literature on 
the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal policy. 
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instance, Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 2003, 2009) use survey methodology to study self-reported 
consumption responses to various US tax changes. Using self-reported labour supply responses to 
taxation allows us to make several contributions to the literature on labour supply and taxation as 
well as to the literature on the economic consequences of tax policy changes. First, providing 
estimates of the relative importance of different transmission channels of tax changes—such as 
labour supply, consumption, and investment—is relevant for the design of structural models of tax 
policy transmission. Second, aggregate time series approaches to the consequences of tax policy 
changes for economic activity, as well as conventional approaches to the estimation of labour supply 
elasticities, are based on untestable identification assumptions. Here, we circumvent this 
identification problem by using self-reported responses. A potential problem with our approach is 
that self-reported responses may be unreliable if respondents do not answer the questions 
accurately. However, in our view, economic research should diversify the risk that underlying 
untestable assumptions are false, and we regard our survey as a useful alternative approach to the 
extant literature. Third, policymakers are interested in the effects of tax policy shocks on labour 
markets and our approach provides estimates of the size of these effects. Fourth, our survey 
estimates labour supply responses to one specific form of taxation, namely, payroll taxation, which is 
in contrast to the usual approach of averaging across tax types and measures. Fifth, we can use cross-
sectional variation in our survey sample to identify respondents who appear particularly sensitive to 
taxation. Such knowledge could allow targeting tax policy changes to specific social groups, which 
could make stabilisation policy more effective and would also be relevant for assessing the 
deadweight loss associated with different forms of taxation. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes our survey instrument. 
Section 3 discusses the general importance of taxation for the labour supply decisions of our 
respondents and its variation across employment status, income, and gender. Section 4 analyses 
specific labour supply adjustments to the 2013 payroll tax change. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Survey design and instrument 
General information on the survey 
The two questions on individual labour supply that we utilise here are from a larger research project 
measuring the German population’s perceptions, attitudes, and reactions to fiscal policy. The 
background paper of Hayo et al. (2014) contains a full description of the survey. The survey, which 
took place between 15 February and 1 March 2013, was conducted on our behalf by GfK in the form 
of face-to-face interviews using pen pads. GfK is one of the largest private research companies in 
Germany working in the fields of market research and public opinion. The interviewers followed 
specific instructions described in the survey instrument. Our sample encompasses 2,042 
representatively selected individuals from the German population aged 14 or above. Gfk uses quota 
sampling, where the sample distributions in terms of sex, age, household size, city size, occupation of 
head of household, and state of residence are made comparable to the population distribution. 
While this is a common sampling method, the resulting sample is not representative in the strict 
sense of being a completely random sample of the population. The correspondence between sample 
and population distributions is generally high (Hayo et al. 2014). 
One part of our survey instrument explicitly refers to a recently enacted payroll tax change. 
Specifically, contribution rates to the statutory pension insurance were reduced from 19.6 per cent 
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to 18.9 per cent at the beginning of 2013, and we use this real-world event to study specific labour 
supply responses to a tax change. The German pension insurance system is a pay-as-you-go system, 
in which current contributions are used to finance current pension obligations. The system is 
financed by a proportional rate—half paid by the employer and half by the employee—on all 
monthly income up to €5,800 in West Germany and €4,900 in East Germany. Pension entitlements 
depend on the insurant’s income, but not on the contribution rate. The contribution rate change was 
necessary because the pension insurance was generating surpluses, which is not generally allowed by 
law. Hence, the rate change was potentially anticipated.2 
The German public pension insurance system is compulsory for the majority of the working-age 
population. Public servants, students, and retired workers are generally not subject to payroll 
taxation and we thus exclude these groups from our sample, meaning that it only includes the 
remaining working-age population. In general, all employees in the private sector are compulsorily 
insured in the public insurance system. All self-employed individuals can voluntarily contribute to the 
statutory pension insurance system and some are compulsorily insured. Insignificant employment 
(Geringfügige Beschäftigung) is a German labour market vehicle aimed at promoting certain low-
income groups, and workers participating in this programme can voluntarily contribute to the 
statutory pension insurance. In both cases, we ask whether respondents participate in the statutory 
pension insurance. We also include unemployed workers in the survey, although they do not directly 
contribute to the statutory pension insurance, because the unemployed are expected to be subject 
to payroll taxation in the future and payroll taxation is likely to affect their reservation wage. 
Throughout the paper, we show the results using all employees, insignificantly employed, self-
employed, and unemployed, but restricting the analysis to only those who contribute to the pension 
insurance yields similar conclusions. 
In principle, it is possible that other tax changes or macroeconomic conditions around the time of 
implementing the payroll tax change affect the way our respondents answer the survey. At the 
beginning of 2013, there were some concerns about the stability of the financial system and about 
potential adverse consequences of the ongoing debt crisis in the euro area. Economic growth and 
labour market conditions, however, have been robust, and the German population has been little 
affected by the ongoing crisis. At the beginning of 2013, a different piece of tax legislation increased 
the tax-free amount from €7,834 to €8,130 to compensate for the influence of inflation in a 
progressive tax system. 
 
The survey instrument and further methodological considerations 
In a first step, we investigate whether taxation matters for the labour supply decisions of our 
respondents. Respondents could answer either ´Yes´ or ´No´. 
Item 1: Does the tax burden usually matter when you determine extent and intensity of your work 
activities? 
In our second item, we asked the subset of respondents who reported that taxation matters for 
their labour supply decision to state, on a five-point scale, whether they have increased or decreased 
                                                            
2 In the survey, we describe the tax change and explicitly link it to our survey question, so that we are not 
required to find (un)anticipated, exogenous variation to cleanly identify the effects of taxation. If the 
respondents reacted to the rate change before its announcement, our survey item should capture this. 
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their overall labour supply. A descriptive analysis of federal tax law changes in Germany between 
1964 and 2010 in Uhl (2013) suggests that the tax change we study is representative of normal tax 
changes in terms of its revenue impact. 
Item 2: What impact does the contribution rate cut have on your general job-related activities? 
There are several advantages to this two-step procedure for measuring labour supply responses. 
First, both items contain relevant information. Our first item allows us to study the general 
responsiveness of labour supply to taxation, while the second item focuses on real-world labour 
supply elasticities. We also aim at reducing measurement error in the survey responses. In our pre-
test of the questionnaire, many respondents reported that they work in fixed-hour contracts, and 
that the question of taxation is irrelevant to their labour supply decisions. Hence, applying our 
second item to the whole population would have introduced a great deal of statistical noise in the 
survey responses. Second, ‘general job-related activities’ is a broad concept, and we explicitly refer 
to both extent and intensity of labour supply. Thus, we believe our items cover several dimensions of 
labour supply decisions. 
Nevertheless, our survey strategy is not perfect. First, the responses are subjective. The answer 
scale, for example, may have different meaning for different respondents and this makes it difficult 
to compute overall net effects of taxation on labour supply. Second, we cannot discover which 
specific component of labour supply has been adjusted. Third, the responses are qualitative in the 
sense that we cannot directly measure the size of the effect by a number. 
Throughout the paper, we investigate correlations of our survey responses with standard socio-
demographic variables and with other survey items. These survey items are explained and 
introduced throughout the text. The Appendix contains a short characterisation of the survey items 
relevant for the present paper. A detailed description of the survey instrument can be found in Hayo 
et al. (2014). Throughout the paper, we use unweighted observations, which is common in the 
economic literature. However, the results hold when using weighted observations, where the 
weights are the inverse probabilities of being included in the sample.3 Standard errors are analytically 
derived, linearised standard errors in the cross-tabulates and robust to heteroscedasticity in the 
regressions. 
In analysing correlations between survey responses and our main survey items as well as other 
variables, we mainly use cross-tabulates and descriptive statistics. The main advantage of cross-
tabulates is that they do not require many assumptions about underlying distributions and functional 
relationships. These unconditional correlations can be interesting for policymakers. For example, if 
income is correlated with labour supply responses, the potential correlation with age or other 
variables is not relevant for policy decisions. The disadvantage of this approach is a potential omitted 
variable bias and we thus test the robustness of our results with a multivariate regression approach. 
 
                                                            
3 According to the six criteria mentioned previously—sex, age, household size, city size, occupation of head 
of household, and state of residence. 
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3 Do taxes matter for labour supply decisions? 
Descriptive statistics 
As shown in Table 1, around 41 per cent of respondents state that taxes are important for their 
labour supply decisions. 
Table 1: Do taxes matter for labour supply decisions? 
 Proportion Standard error Confidence interval Frequency 
Taxes are important 40.6 1.4 [38.2, 42.9] 494 
Taxes are unimportant 59.4 1.4 [57.1, 61.8] 724 
Notes: Confidence interval based on 90 per cent level of confidence using analytically derived standard errors. 
This suggests that the majority of workers are unresponsive to taxation, which is in line with 
extant literature reporting labour supply elasticities close to zero for the majority of (male) workers 
(Borjas 2005; Saez et al. 2012). Our results provide only limited support for the intertemporal 
maximising macroeconomic model (Baxter and King 1993; Galí 2009), in which all individuals should 
take taxation into account when making labour supply decisions. However, 41 per cent of 
respondents do seem to react to tax changes, which could still generate large aggregate labour 
supply elasticities. Section 4 takes up this issue and analyses labour supply adjustment to a recent 
real-world payroll tax change. 
 
For which individuals do taxes matter? 
In a first step, we investigate differences in the importance of taxation for labour supply decisions 
across employees, apprentices, unemployed, self-employed, and insignificantly employed 
respondents (see Table 2). We expect self-employed respondents to react relatively more to 
taxation, as they are more independent in making labour supply decisions. 
Table 2: The importance of taxation by occupation 
  Do taxes matter for your labour supply decision?  
  Yes No Total 
Oc
cu
pa
tio
na
l s
ta
tu
s 
Employee 37.5 
[34.8, 40.2] 
62.5 
[59.8, 65.2] 
100.0 
N = 883 
Apprentice 35.9 
[23.1, 48.7] 
64.1 
[51.3, 76.9] 
100.0 
N = 39 
Unemployed 39.3 
[30.5, 48.1] 
60.7 
[51.9, 69.5] 
100.0 
N = 84 
Self-employed 61.2 
[54.7, 67.6] 
38.9 
[32.4, 45.3] 
100.0 
N = 157 
Insignificantly employed 36.4 
[25.6, 47.1] 
63.6 
[52.9, 74.4] 
100.0 
N = 55 
 Total 40.6 
[38.2, 42.9] 
59.4 
[57.1, 61.8] 
100.00 
N = 1,218 
 Fisher’s exact test for independence: p-value = 0.00   
Notes: The table shows the importance of taxation for labour supply decisions (Item 1, see Appendix) by occupation. Cells 
show row-normalised proportions in per cent, 90 per cent confidence interval [in brackets], and frequency. Proportions 
may not sum to one due to rounding errors. 
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Fisher’s exact test for independence suggests a significant difference in the proportion of 
respondents attaching importance to taxation across occupation. This result, however, is entirely 
driven by self-employed respondents, 61 per cent of whom report that taxes matter for their labour 
supply decisions. This suggests that taxing the self-employed is potentially associated with 
particularly large efficiency costs. Unemployed respondents do not report a significantly different 
importance of taxation and, hence, our survey evidence does not provide support for the view that 
taxation is more relevant at the extensive margin. 
Differences in the disincentive effect of taxation for individuals at different levels of income 
receive a great deal of attention in the labour supply literature (Hausman 1985). One reason for this 
is that progressive taxation induces a differential burden across income groups, which has 
implications for the deadweight loss associated with certain forms of taxation. Another reason is that 
taxation is a potentially relevant policy instrument for fostering job market activity by low-income 
groups. Table 3 investigates the general importance of taxation across three levels of household 
income—low income (up to €1,499 net of taxes), middle income (€1,500 to €3,499), and high income 
(more than €3,500). 
Table 3: The importance of taxation by income 
  Do taxes matter for your labour supply decision?  
  Yes No Total 
In
co
m
e 
Low income (up to €1,499€) 34.6 
[29.1, 40.1] 
65.4 
[59.9, 70.9] 
100.0 
N = 205 
Middle income (€1,500 to 
€3,499) 
42.3 
[38.9, 45.6] 
57.8 
[54.4, 61.1] 
100.0 
N = 587 
High income (more than 
€3,500) 
36.1 
[30.4, 41.9] 
63.9 
[58.1, 69.6] 
100.0 
N = 191 
 Total 39.5 
[36.9, 42.0] 
60.5 
[58.0, 63.1] 
100.00 
N = 983 
 Fisher’s exact test for independence: p-value = 0.09   
Notes: The table shows the importance of taxation for labour supply decisions (Item 1, see Appendix) by income groups. 
Cells show row-normalised proportions in per cent, 90 per cent confidence interval [in brackets], and frequency. 
Proportions may not sum to one due to rounding errors. 
Taxes matter for 42 per cent of the middle-income group, which is higher than the proportion in 
the low-income group, where less than 35 per cent of all respondents report that taxes matter, and 
higher than the proportion in the high-income group (36 per cent). Fisher’s exact test for 
independence is rejected, which suggests that the importance of taxation increases with income. 
However, the proportion of respondents stating that taxes matter does not increase monotonically. 
Moreover, when we investigate the robustness of our conclusions in a regression framework (see 
below), we no longer find a significant impact of income. 
Borjas (2005), Keane (2011), and others report that women are more sensitive to taxation, 
particularly at the extensive margin. We investigate whether the self-reported importance of 
taxation for labour supply differs across gender, but find no significant difference (see Table 4). 
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Table 4: The importance of taxation by gender 
  Do taxes matter for your labour supply decision?  
  Yes No Total 
 Male 41.7 
[38.3, 45.0] 
58.3 
[55.0, 61.7] 
100.0 
N = 588 
Female 39.5 
[36.3, 42.7] 
60.5 
[57.3, 63.7] 
100.0 
N = 630 
 Total 40.6 
[38.2, 42.9] 
59.4 
[57.1, 61.8] 
100.00 
N = 1,218 
 Fisher’s exact test for independence: p-value = 0.45   
Notes: The table shows the importance of taxation for labour supply decisions (Item 1, see Appendix) by gender. Cells show 
row-normalised proportions in per cent, 90 per cent confidence interval [in brackets], and frequency. Proportions may not 
sum to one due to rounding errors. 
In fact, the proportion of respondents attaching importance to taxes is somewhat larger for males 
(42 per cent) than it is for females (40 per cent). The labour supply literature predicts that subgroups 
of females will be particularly tax sensitive, such as the unemployed or females in relationships or 
with children (see, e.g., Eissa et al. 2008). However, looking at these subgroups does not change our 
conclusion (results available on request). 
 
Robustness in a regression framework 
We now estimate a multivariate logit regression model as a robustness check. The dependent 
variable measures the general importance of taxation for labour supply and is coded as 1, taxes are 
important, or 0, taxes are unimportant. In the empirical model, we include dummies indicating 
membership in specific occupational groups, household income in €1,000s, sex, whether the 
respondent is in a relationship, and number of children. Finally, we control for other socio-economic 
variables, namely, age, union membership, and whether the respondent has obtained higher 
education in the form of at least a university-entry diploma. Table 5 contains the estimation results. 
The coefficients in the third column of Table 5 are average marginal effects. Our previous 
conclusions derived in the cross-tabulates hold, with the exception of income. Self-employed 
respondents have a 31 percentage point (pp) higher probability of stating that taxes are important 
for their labour supply decisions than do employees, which is a very large value. In addition, we 
estimate that union members have a 13 pp greater likelihood of finding taxes important. More 
educated respondents are 7 pp less likely to consider taxation relevant than are less-educated 
respondents. Finally, with each 10-year increase in age, the probability of answering that taxes are 
important declines by 3 pp. Note that the last two effects are significant only at a 10 per cent level. 
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Table 5: For whom do taxes matter? 
 Coefficient Marginal effect 
Base category ‘Employees’   
In apprenticeship -0.19 -0.04 
Unemployed 0.10 0.02 
Self-employed 1.36*** 0.31*** 
Insignificantly employed -0.17 -0.04 
Household income -0.05 -0.01 
Female -0.04 -0.01 
In relationship 0.19 0.04 
Number of children 0.04 0.01 
Highly educated -0.31* -0.07* 
Age -0.01* -0.003* 
Union member 0.58*** 0.13*** 
Constant -0.08  
Pseudo-R² 0.04 Log pseudolikelihood -634.89 
Significance of the model (p-value) 0.00   
Notes: The table shows results of logistic regression with dependent variable measuring the general importance of taxation 
for labour supply, coded as: 1, taxes are important, or 0, taxes are unimportant. Statistical tests based on robust standard 
errors. Marginal effects are average marginal effects. Based on 981 observations. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance 
at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, 1 per cent level, respectively. 
 
4 Labour supply adjustment to a tax change 
Descriptive statistics 
We asked the subset of respondents who reported that taxation matters for their labour supply 
decisions to state, on a five-point scale, whether they increased or decreased their labour supply in 
response to the recent 2013 payroll tax change. Table 6 shows that 17 per cent increased, and 12 per 
cent decreased, their labour supply. 
Table 6: Labour supply response to the 2013 payroll tax change 
 Proportion Standard error Confidence interval Frequency 
Strongly increased labour supply 3.2 0.8 [1.7, 4.8] 16 
Increased labour supply 13.6 0.02 [10.5, 16.6] 67 
Unchanged labour supply 70.9 2.0 [66.8, 74.9] 350 
Reduced labour supply 8.9 1.5 [6.4, 11.4] 44 
Strongly reduced labour supply 3.4 0.8 [1.8, 5.1] 17 
Notes: Confidence interval based on 90 per cent level of confidence using analytically derived standard errors. 
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These results suggest that both income and substitution effects of tax changes appear to be of 
empirical relevance, which matches the consensus estimate for a wage elasticity of -0.1 reported in 
Borjas (2005); note that the negative sign implies that income effects are slightly dominant. Taken 
together, about 30 per cent of those respondents indicating that taxation is important for their 
labour supply decisions—and 12 per cent of all respondents—report an actual labour supply 
adjustment, but because income and substitution effects seem to balance out, the overall response 
of labour supply to the tax change is small. 
 
Determinants of labour supply adjustment 
Table 7 shows how labour supply responses vary across employment status and occupation. 
Table 7: Labour supply responses by occupation 
  Impact on general job-related efforts  
  Reduced labour supply Unchanged Increased labour supply Total 
Oc
cu
pa
tio
n 
Employee 14.2 
[11.0, 17.4] 
68.6 
[64.4, 72.8] 
17.2 
[13.8, 20.6] 
100.0 
N = 331 
Apprentice 7.1 
[-4.6, 18.9] 
71.4 
[50.8, 92.1] 
21.4 
[2.7, 40.2] 
100.0 
N = 14 
Unemployed 24.2 
[11.8, 36.7] 
69.7 
[56.3, 83.1] 
6.1 
[-0.9, 13.0] 
100.0 
N = 33 
Self-employed 3.1 
[0.2, 6.1] 
77.1 
[70.0, 84.2] 
19.8 
[13.1, 26.5] 
100.0 
N = 96 
Insignificantly employed 10.0 
[-1.3, 21.3] 
80.0 
[64.9, 95.1] 
10.0 
[-1.3, 21.3] 
100.0 
N = 20 
 Total 12.4 
[9.9, 14.8] 
70.9 
[67.5, 74.2] 
16.8 
[14.0, 19.6] 
100.0 
N = 494 
 Fisher’s exact test for independence: p-value = 0.02   
Notes: The table shows labour supply responses to the 2013 payroll tax change (Item 2, see Appendix) by occupation. Cells 
show row-normalised proportions in per cent, 90 per cent confidence interval [in brackets] and frequencies. Proportions 
may not sum to one due to rounding errors. 
Although Fisher’s exact test for independence is rejected, in most cases the proportion of the 
total population reporting reduced, unchanged, or increased labour supply falls well within the 
confidence region reported for the respective proportions per occupation. It is hence unclear in what 
way these deviations are statistically meaningful individually. It appears, however, that the self-
employed avoid reducing their labour supply, a result confirmed in the regression approach (see 
below). 
Table 8 investigates the influence of income on labour supply responses. We find no significant 
differences across the three income groups. 
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Table 8: Labour supply responses by income 
  Impact on general job-related efforts  
  Reduced labour 
supply 
Unchanged Increased labour 
supply 
Total 
In
co
m
e 
Low income (up to €1,499) 19.7 
[11.9, 27.6] 
67.6 
[58.4, 76.8] 
12.7 
[6.1, 19.2] 
100.0 
N = 71 
Middle income (€1,500 to 
€3,499) 
12.1 
[8.7, 15.5] 
68.6 
[63.7, 73.4] 
19.4 
[15.2, 23.5] 
100.0 
N = 248  
High income (more than 
€3,500) 
10.1 
[4.1, 16.2] 
72.5 
[63.5, 81.4] 
17.4 
[9.8, 25.0] 
100.0 
N = 69 
 Total 13.1 
[10.3, 16.0] 
69.1 
[65.2, 72.9] 
17.8 
[14.6, 21.0] 
100.0 
N = 388  
 Fisher’s exact test for independence: p-value = 0.37   
Notes: The table shows labour supply responses to the 2013 payroll tax change (Item 2, see Appendix) by income. Cells 
show row-normalised proportions in per cent, 90 per cent confidence interval [in brackets] and frequencies. Proportions 
may not sum to one due to rounding errors. 
Borjas (2005) and Meghir and Phillips (2010) conclude that the effect of tax changes on women’s 
hours worked is slightly stronger than it is for men. Table 9 indicates, however, that gender does not 
have a significant influence on labour supply responses in our data. 
Table 9: Labour supply responses by gender 
  Impact on general job-related efforts  
  Reduced labour supply Unchanged Increased labour supply Total 
Ge
nd
er
 Male 9.8 
[6.7, 12.9] 
71.4 
[66.7, 76.2] 
18.8 
[14.7, 22.9] 
100.0 
N = 245 
Female 14.9 
[11.1, 18.6] 
70.3 
[65.5, 75.1] 
14.9 
[11.1, 18.6] 
100.0 
N = 249 
 Total 12.4 
[9.9, 14.8] 
70.9 
[67.5, 74.2] 
16.8 
[14.0, 19.6] 
100.0 
N = 494 
 Fisher’s exact test for independence: p-value = 0.16   
Notes: The table shows labour supply responses to the 2013 payroll tax change (Item 2, see Appendix) by gender. Cells 
show row-normalised proportions in per cent, 90 per cent confidence interval [in brackets] and frequencies. Proportions 
may not sum to one due to rounding errors. 
Again, this continues to hold when considering interactions of female with employment status, 
number of children, and an indicator for whether the woman is in a relationship. 
Table 10 focuses on whether perceiving the tax change as permanent or only temporary matters 
for labour supply reactions of our respondents. Life-cycle models predict that permanent and 
temporary tax changes will have different impacts and the matter is also of practical interest because 
many business cycle stimulus measures are temporary. We measure the respondents’ perception of 
the tax change using two items from the survey. First, we ask whether respondents expected the 
current rate cut to be reversed in the future and, second, whether respondents expect lower 
pensions as a consequence of the payroll reduction. Respondents answering either question 
affirmatively are viewed as perceiving the tax change to be temporary. 
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Table 10: Do temporary tax changes have a different impact? 
  Impact on general job-related efforts  
  Reduced labour supply Unchanged Increased labour supply Total 
Pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of
 ta
x 
ch
an
ge
 Permanent 12.2 
[5.9, 18.5] 
63.5 
[54.2, 72.8] 
24.3 
[16.1, 32.6] 
100.0 
N = 74 
Temporary 12.5 
[9.5, 15.6] 
71.0 
[66.8, 75.1] 
16.5 
[13.1, 19.9] 
100.0 
N = 327 
 Total 12.5 
[9.7, 15.2] 
69.6 
[65.8, 73.4] 
18.0 
[14.8, 21.1] 
100.0 
N = 401 
 Fisher’s exact test for independence: p-value = 0.28   
Notes: The table shows labour supply responses to the 2013 payroll tax change (Item 2, see Appendix) by perception of the 
tax change as either temporary or permanent (Items 3 and 4, see Appendix). Cells show row-normalised proportions in per 
cent, 90 per cent confidence interval [in brackets] and frequencies. Proportions may not sum to one due to rounding errors. 
We find no statistically significant differences between respondents perceiving the tax change as 
permanent and those who view it as temporary. Note that the result also holds when studying each 
of the two items separately. 
Table 11 investigates the importance of interest rates for labour supply adjustment. 
Table 11: Labour supply responses by assessment of savings’ profitability 
  Impact on general job-related efforts  
  Reduced labour supply Unchanged Increased labour 
supply 
Total 
As
se
ss
m
en
t o
f 
sa
vin
gs
’ 
pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y 
Less than 10 years 
ago 
13.6 
[10.2, 17.0] 
72.0 
[67.6, 76.5] 
14.3 
[10.9, 17.8] 
100.0 
N = 279 
Unchanged 11.0 
[5.6, 16.4] 
64.8 
[56.5, 73.1] 
24.2 
[16.7, 31.6] 
100.0 
N = 91 
More than 10 years 
ago 
6.5 
[-0.9, 13.8] 
61.3 
[46.6, 76.0] 
32.3 
[18.2, 46.3] 
100.0 
N = 31 
 Total 12.5 
[9.7, 15.2] 
69.6 
[65.8, 73.4] 
18.0 
[14.8, 21.1] 
100.0 
N = 401 
 Fisher’s exact test for independence: p-value = 0.05   
Notes: The table shows labour supply responses to the 2013 payroll tax change (Item 2, see Appendix) by assessment of 
savings’ profitability (Item 5, see Appendix). Cells show row-normalised proportions in per cent, 90 per cent confidence 
interval [in brackets] and frequencies. Proportions may not sum to one due to rounding errors. 
We asked our respondents how they perceive current returns to savings relative to a benchmark 
(see Item 5 in Appendix). Fisher’s exact test lends some credibility to the view that individual 
perception of the current attractiveness of savings is related to differential labour supply responses. 
Respondents who find savings relatively unattractive are more likely to reduce labour supply than to 
increase labour supply. This suggests that returns on savings provide an incentive for labour supply 
expansion. One potential explanation for this is that in a life-cycle perspective, interest rates 
determine the marginal benefits of expanding or reducing labour supply. 
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Robustness in a regression framework 
To analyse the robustness of our previous conclusions in a regression framework, we run an ordered 
logistic regression using as a dependent variable the answers to our second item collapsed into a 
three-point-scale. As explanatory variables, we include dummies for different occupational groups, 
household income in €1,000s, and indicator variables for sex and whether the respondent is in a 
relationship. Additionally, we include the respondent’s age, the number of children, an indicator 
variable for whether the respondent has achieved at least a university-entrance diploma, and 
dummy variables indicating union membership, perception of the tax change as temporary, and 
assessment of savings’ return as currently low. Table 12 contains the results. 
Table 12: Covariates of labour supply adjustments 
 Odd ratio Marginal effects 
  Decreased labour 
supply 
Unchan
ged 
Increased 
labour supply 
Base category ‘All employees’     
In apprenticeship 1.03 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 
Self-employed 1.69* -0.058 -0.019 0.077* 
Insignificantly employed 1.36 -0.033 -0.011 0.045 
Household income 1.14 -0.014 -0.005 0.019 
Female 0.82 0.022 0.007 -0.029 
In relationship 0.55* 0.065* 0.022 -0.087* 
Number of children 1.31* -0.030* -0.010 0.040* 
Perceiving tax change as temporary 0.90 0.012 0.004 -0.016 
Perceiving current returns on savings as low 0.49** 0.078** 0.026 -0.104** 
Highly educated 1.67 -0.056 -0.019 0.075 
Age 0.98 0.002 0.001 -0.003 
Union member 0.89 0.012 0.004 -0.017 
Pseudo-R² 0.04 Log pseudolikelihood -256.31 
Significance of the model (p-value) 0.04   
Notes: The table shows results of an ordered logistic regression with dependent variable coded as: 1, reduced labour 
supply; 2, unchanged labour supply; and 3, increased labour supply. Statistical tests based on robust standard errors. Based 
on 317 observations. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, 1 per cent level, respectively. 
The second column of Table 12 shows coefficients in the form of odd ratios, whereas columns 3 to 
5 contain average marginal effects. Our results indicate that respondents who perceive interest rates 
as low and those who are in a relationship are 10 pp and 9 pp, respectively, less likely to increase 
their labour supply. The self-employed and those with two children have an 8 pp greater likelihood of 
exhibiting a more expansionary labour supply reaction. 
 
5 Conclusion 
We study self-reported labour supply responses to taxation using two questions from a specifically 
designed, representative survey of the German population. First, we investigate the extent to which 
the German population is sensitive to taxation. Around 41 per cent of our respondents state that 
taxation is generally relevant for their labour supply decisions. This suggests that taxation appears to 
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be unimportant in the everyday labour supply decisions of the majority of the German population. 
Second, we use a recently enacted payroll tax change to study specific labour supply responses to a 
real-world tax change. Around 12 per cent of all respondents report a labour supply adjustment. 
However, income and substitution effects of the tax change nearly cancel each other out, so that the 
net effect on labour supply is likely small. 
We use our representative survey data to analyse the influence of socio-demographic and 
economic variables on labour supply responses to taxation. Around 61 per cent of the self-employed 
state that taxation is relevant for their labour supply decisions, which is significantly higher than the 
corresponding share of the total working population. However, responses do not vary significantly 
across employment status, gender, and income. Using our second research item, we find that around 
12 per cent of all respondents report an actual labour supply adjustment to the 2013 payroll tax 
change. Again, this share does not vary across employment status, gender, and income. Instead, we 
find that respondents perceiving current interest rates as relatively low have a significantly reduced 
probability of expanding their labour supply. 
Our results have several implications for economic modelling and policy making. First, we 
conclude that labour supply responses to tax changes are not a central element of the transmission 
mechanism of tax policy shocks in Germany. This is compatible with aggregate time series evidence 
from Hayo and Uhl (2014a), who, despite discovering a strong reaction of aggregate economic 
activity, do not find effects of tax changes on employment or hours worked over the medium term. 
Hence, consumption and investment responses to tax changes appear more important in the 
transmission of tax policy shocks (Hayo and Uhl 2014a, 2014b) and this result could guide future 
empirical and theoretical research. Our results also imply that the deadweight loss associated with 
taxation of labour income is low for all the income brackets covered by our survey data and that 
normal-sized tax policy changes have limited effects on labour markets.4 However, we find self-
employed respondents to be relatively more responsive to taxation. Hence, taxation of the self-
employed appears to be associated with relatively large efficiency costs. Finally, if respondents 
perceive the current interest rates in Germany as low, they tend to reduce their labour supply. 
Using self-reported responses to economic policy could supplement extant quantitative, 
econometric approaches in other applications, too. For example, investment is likely to be much 
more responsive to taxation than is labour supply (Mertens and Ravn 2012; Hayo and Uhl 2014a), 
and thus studying self-reported responses to tax changes at the firm level seems a promising 
endeavour. 
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Appendix: Summary of the survey instrument 
No Item 
Intro At the beginning of 2013, contribution rates to the statutory pension system have been 
reduced. In effect, this reduces the overall tax burden. We are interested in your responses to 
the rate cut. 
1 Does the tax burden usually matter when you determine extent and intensity of your work 
activities? 
Reply: ‘Yes’, ‘No’ 
2 What impact does the contribution rate cut have on your general job-related activities? 
Reply: ‘I substantially reduced my job-related activities’ (–2) to ‘I substantially expanded my 
job-related activities’ (+2) 
3 Will the recent cut in pension insurance contribution rates lead to higher contribution rates in 
the future? 
Reply: ‘Yes’, ‘No’ 
4 Will the recent cut in pension insurance contribution rates lead to lower pension payments? 
Reply: ‘Yes’, ‘No’ 
5 How profitable do you think savings are in Germany today compared with ten years ago? 
Reply: ‘Much less than ten years ago’ (–2) to ‘Much more than ten years ago’ (+2) 
Notes: The table provides information on our main survey items. Items 2 and 5 have a five-point scale. Hayo et al. (2014) 
contains a full documentation of the survey instrument, as well as the original version of the questionnaire in German. 
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Abstract This paper provides background information and basic descriptive statistics for a 
representative survey of the German population conducted on our behalf by GfK in the first 
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1. Introduction 
This paper provides background information and basic descriptive statistics for a 
representative survey of the German population conducted on our behalf by GfK in the first 
quarter of 2013. The survey addresses important topics in fiscal policy, including: 1) public 
preferences on the composition of fiscal expenditures; 2) public preferences on public debt 
and different consolidation measures; 3) the effect of tax changes on consumption and 
savings; and 4) the effect of tax changes on labour market activities. The survey data are 
analysed in a series of research papers by the Macroeconomics Group of Marburg 
University, with the purpose of the present paper being to give full documentation of the 
survey. 
Section 2 introduces the survey instrument and Appendix A contains the full 
questionnaire, both in the original German version as well as an English translation. 
Appendix B gives basic descriptive statistics for all survey items. 
 
2. The survey instrument  
The survey was conducted as part of an omnibus survey between February 15th, 2013 and 
March 1st, 2013, and administered by GfK. GfK is one of the largest private research 
companies in Germany, focusing on the fields of market research and public opinion. The 
sample consists of 2,042 representatively selected persons from the German population 
aged 14 or above. Methodologically, the survey is based on quota sampling. Table 1 
compares important characteristics of our survey sample with those of the general 
population. The correspondence level is high, indicating that our survey sample is 
representative of the general population. The survey questions were implemented in face-
to-face interviews using Pen-Pads. The interviewers followed specific instructions as 
described in the survey instrument. Appendix A contains the full text of the questionnaire, 
including comments for the interviewers, both in the original German version as well as an 
English translation. 
The first part of the survey sheds light on the interviewees’ preferences on public 
spending priorities. At the beginning of the survey, six major policy areas are listed and 
briefly described; the current amount of public spending on these areas is then given both in 
euros per capita as well as in relation to total public spending. We believe these relative 
measures to be more comprehensible to the respondents than absolute figures. The policy 
areas listed in the survey are those on which the German government currently spends the 
most: social security, public safety, education, infrastructure, economic development, and 
defence. The interviewees were asked about the policy areas the government should spend 
more (Item 1) or less (Item 2) money on according to their opinion. Multiple answers are 
possible. Interviewees who prefer spending hikes in at least one policy area are then asked 
about how additional spending should be financed (Item 1a), and those who prefer spending 
cuts in any area are asked about how the additional funds should be used (Item 2a). In both 
cases, three options are given: spending hikes (spending cuts) possibly financed through 
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(used for) a tax hike (tax cut); public borrowing (public debt reduction); or a decrease 
(increase) in public spending in any other policy area. Again, we allow for multiple answers. 
 
Table 1 Comparison of sample to population 
Property Population 
distribution 
in % 
Sample 
distribution 
in % 
Frequency 
in sample 
Property Population 
distribution 
in % 
Sample 
distributi
on in % 
Frequency 
in sample 
Gender    Occupation of head of household 
Male 49 49 996 Blue-collar worker 24 24 494 
Female 51 51 1046 White-collar worker 32 32 653 
    Public servant 4 4 82 
Age    Self-employed 8 8 159 
14 – 15 2 2 39 Non-working 32 32 653 
16 – 19 5 5 104     
20 – 29 14 14 278 State    
30 – 39 13 13 270 Schleswig-Holstein 4 4 74 
40 – 49 19 19 389 Hamburg 2 2 41 
50 – 59 17 17 341 N.sachsen/Bremen 11 11 216 
60 – 69 13 13 265 Nordrhein-Westfalen 22 21 439 
70 +  17 17 356 Hessen 7 7 151 
    R.-Pfalz/Saarland 6 6 127 
Household size B.-Wuerttemberg 13 13 261 
1 22 22 457 Bayern 15 15 312 
2 39 38 784 M.-Vorpommern 2 2 43 
3 18 18 366 Sachsen-Anhalt 3 3 59 
More 21 21 436 Brandenburg 3 3 65 
    Thueringen 3 3 59 
City size Sachsen 5 6 112 
- 4999 15 15 314 Berlin 4 4 82 
5000 – 
19999 
27 27 549     
20000 – 
99999 
28 28 564     
100000 +  30 30 615     
Notes: Table compares the distribution of specific characteristics in the general population with the survey sample. Sample 
distribution is based on a total of 2,042 observations. 
 
By directly relating public spending to public revenues, we compel the interviewees to take 
the public budget constraint into account when giving their answers, so as to circumvent the 
occurrence of the ‘more-for-less paradox’ (Welch, 1985). Note that the questionnaire is 
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constructed in such a way that interviewees have to answer consistently, e.g. interviewees 
who prefer an increase in public spending in any policy area and believe that the increase 
should be financed through a reduction in public spending in another area are obliged to 
name at least one policy area in which public spending should be cut. Note, however, that 
this set-up does not necessarily result in a balanced budget when considering actual financial 
flows. For instance, cuts in defence spending are unlikely to be sufficient for a notable 
increase in social security spending.  
Item 3 refers to a tax estimation according to which the German government is going to 
increase revenues by €23 billion more than previously expected within the next four years. 
The estimate is provided by the Working Party on Tax Revenue Forecasting (‘Arbeitskreis 
Steuerschätzung’) and was published in October 2012, i.e. roughly four months before the 
survey was conducted (cf. BMF, 2012). The interviewees are asked how the state should use 
these additional revenues. The choice was between nine alternatives: decreasing taxes, 
reducing public debt, or increasing public spending on social security, public safety, 
education, infrastructure, economic development, defence, or other areas. The interviewees 
can voice a maximum of three preferences, which must also be ranked. In this specific 
scenario, money comes ‘out of the blue’, so that respondents do not have to take public 
budget constraints into account. 
Item 4 studies the interviewees’ attitudes toward public indebtedness. First, we asked the 
interviewees whether they think that the state should reduce public debt, keep the level of 
public debt unchanged, or incur additional public debt. Those who opt for a reduction of 
public debt are then asked about their preferred consolidation measure (Item 4a); those 
who favour an incurrence of additional public debt are asked what the additional funds 
should be used for (Item 4c). In both cases, the respondents can choose between eight 
different options: increase (decrease) taxes or decrease (increase) public spending on social 
security, public safety, education, infrastructure, economic development, defence, or other 
areas. Yet again, each interviewee can voice at most three alternatives, which must also be 
ranked. 
Interviewees who state that public debt should be reduced are asked to answer an 
additional question. In Item 4b, we introduce three alternative (hypothetical) debt-reduction 
paths, and ask respondents which path they think the government should adopt. According 
to path A, debt reduction will be distributed evenly over the following years. Path B implies 
that a smaller amount of public debt will be reduced in the near future and a larger amount 
in the far future; according to path C, a larger amount of debt will be reduced in the near 
future and a smaller amount in the far future. The different debt-reduction paths are 
graphically illustrated on the interviewer’s laptop by means of different stacks of money 
coins. The aim of this item is to analyse the intensity of the respondents’ public debt 
aversion. We believe that respondents who chose path C can be considered more debt 
averse than those who prefer path A or B; respondents who chose path A may be considered 
more debt averse than those who opted for path B. 
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Item 5 elicits the interviewees’ attitudes toward the German ‘debt brake’. In 2009, the 
German constitution was amended, introducing a balanced budget rule. According to this 
rule, the German federal government is not allowed to run an annual structural deficit of 
more than 0.35% of GDP from 2016 onwards. To simplify matters for the respondents, we 
refrain from using the term ‘structural deficit’ along with the measure of 0.35% of GDP in the 
wording of the item. Instead, we state that the government can take on ‘almost no 
additional public debt’ from 2016 onwards. Exemptions are allowed only in case of economic 
crises or natural disasters. Respondents are asked to indicate whether they are (i) against 
the debt brake; (ii) in favour of the debt brake; or (iii) believe that the debt brake does not 
go far enough, i.e. that the government should not be allowed to incur additional public debt 
at all. 
Item 6 is designed to qualitatively evaluate individual consumption responses to the 
accumulation of public debt. All interviewees were asked to indicate whether they (i) spent a 
larger proportion of their income; (ii) a smaller proportion of their income (in reaction to the 
government’s increasing reliance on debt financing); or (iii) their behaviour was not affected 
by the public debt situation at all. 
Items 7 to 9 are included for assessing the interviewees’ risk and time preferences, 
respectively. Within the context of these questions, non-incentivised ‘experiments’ were 
conducted involving financial decisions. All three items emulate incentivised experiments 
conducted within the 2006 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). In particular, 
the wording of the instructions for both the interviewer and the interviewee, the structure 
of the payoff tables, and the sequence of actions is the same as in the SOEP experiments (cf. 
TNS-Infratest Sozialforschung, 2011a; 2011b). We modify the payoffs in column A of Item 7, 
respective column B of Item 8 and 9, to show that, as in the SOEP data, the distribution of 
answers is strongly convex, i.e. only a few people choose small payoffs, while many people 
choose large payoffs. Two experiments are conducted to assess the respondents’ time 
preferences (Items 8 and 9) in order to account for the fact that many people are observed 
to have time-inconsistent preferences, meaning that they are more patient in the long run 
than in the short run. By varying the timing of the payoffs across Items 8 and 9, we allow 
individual discount rates between two equidistant periods to vary with the timing of the 
earliest possible payoff. 
For the remaining items, the laptop is handed over to the interviewee. The interviewer is 
not able to monitor what the interviewee enters, and provides assistance only in the case of 
questions. That way, we want to make sure that each interviewee answers the following 
questions honestly. 
Item 10 contains five couples of contradictory statements. For each couple of statements, 
the interviewee is asked to indicate with which statement he or she agrees. The first four 
statement couples assess different dimensions of (dis)trust in politicians. With the help of 
the last couple of statements, we are able to evaluate whether a respondent holds an 
egalitarian attitude. In Item 11, we ask which political party the respondent would vote for if 
6 
 
elections were held next Sunday. Altogether, we consider seven major German parties. In 
Item 12, respondents are asked to indicate whether they are union members. In Item 13, we 
ask whether the interviewee has children, and if so, how many. Item 14 evaluates the 
interviewees’ satisfaction with their current economic situation. This item is based on a 
question from the German General Social Survey (GGSS/ALLBUS; cf. Terwey and Baltzer, 
2013), the only exception being that we refer to the ‘economic’ situation, whereas 
respondents in the GGSS are asked about their ‘personal’ situation. 
Item 15 is designed for studying the extent of the respondents’ economic knowledge. We 
are particularly interested in their factual knowledge about debt-related economic 
indicators. Using multiple choice questions, we ask about (i) the German federal 
government’s budget deficit in 2012 (correct answer: 1% of GDP); (ii) the current interest 
rate on government bonds with a maturity of 10 years (correct answer: 1.5%); and (iii) the 
inflation rate in 2012 (correct answer: 2%). All figures were released a couple of weeks 
before the survey was conducted and widely reported by the media. 
Items 16 to 24 study consumption and labour supply responses to a recent payroll tax 
change in Germany. Specifically, at the beginning of 2013, contribution rates to the statuary 
pension insurance system in Germany were reduced from 19.6% to 18.9%, thereby lessening 
the overall tax burden for employees and employers. This payroll tax reduction is explicitly 
mentioned at the start of our survey on consumption and labour supply responses to tax 
changes. 
The payroll tax change that forms the basis of our analysis affects only a subsample of the 
general German population. All employees contribute to the statutory pension insurance 
system. In addition, certain employers, freelancers, and the insignificantly employed pay into 
the government’s pension insurance system, some doing so voluntary. The Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit, the German federal job centre, directly pays pension insurance contribution rates 
for the unemployed, whereas public servants and those not part of the labour force – 
including pensioners and inactive working-age population – are not subject to payroll 
taxation. Adequate filtering is in place to ensure that only respondents that are subject to 
payroll taxation are confronted with our questions. Thus, we ask all employees and those 
employers, freelancers, and insignificantly employed who state that they contribute to the 
statutory pension insurance system for their consumption responses. When observing 
labour supply effects, we also add unemployed persons. Items 16 and items 17 contain the 
corresponding filter questions. 
Item 18 is designed for measuring consumption responses. The main references for this 
question are Sahm et al. (2012) and Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 2003, 2009). We measure 
consumption responses using a qualitative approach, assuming that respondents are more 
likely to accurately answer a qualitative question rather than a quantitative one. Item 19 and 
item 20 are constructed for capturing whether the payroll tax change is perceived to be 
temporary or permanent. Item 21 builds on ideas proposed in Shapiro and Slemrod (2003), 
and is designed to measure the specific budgeting approach taken by the household. Item 22 
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is a statement battery intended to capture interviewees’ perceptions of the macroeconomic 
environment. Specifically, it measures expectations about the future economic situation, 
inflation expectations, as well as assessments of savings’ security and their profitability. 
Items 23 and 24 measure interviewees’ labour supply responses. In a pretest, many 
respondents were confused by being asked about their labour supply responses, as they 
seemed to think in terms of a fixed labour supply, with work organised in fixed-hour 
contracts. Accordingly, we opt for a two-stage approach, with the aim of reducing 
measurement error. First, we ask all respondents whether taxation matters for their labour 
supply decisions. We then ask the subset of respondents who have indicated that taxation is 
important for their labour supply decisions to state on a five-point scale whether they have 
increased or decreased labour supply following the 2013 payroll tax change. 
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Appendix A: The survey instrument 
A.1 The questionnaire (German original) 
Die folgende Tabelle zeigt, wie viel Geld der Staat für verschiedene Aufgabenbereiche in der 
Vergangenheit pro Jahr ausgegeben hat und zwar sowohl in Euro pro Einwohner als auch als 
Anteil an den gesamten öffentlichen Ausgaben. Berücksichtigt wurden dabei die 
Aufgabenbereiche, für die der Staat am meisten ausgegeben hat. 
 
Interviewer: Bitte geben Sie dem Befragten Zeit, die Tabelle aufmerksam zu betrachten! 
 
Politikbereich Ausgabenposten Ausgaben 
pro 
Einwohner 
Anteil an 
Gesamtausgaben 
Soziale Sicherung u.a. Arbeitslosenunterstützung, 
Sozialhilfe, Familien- und 
Jugendhilfe 
7.660€ 56,6% 
Bildung u.a. öffentliche Schulen und 
Hochschulen 
1.125€ 8,3% 
Öffentliche Sicherheit 
und Ordnung 
u.a. Polizei, Rechtsschutz 455€ 3,3% 
Infrastruktur u.a. Straßen- und Städtebau 350€ 2,6% 
Wirtschaftsförderung u.a. Mittelstandsförderung, 
Investitionszuschüsse an 
Unternehmen, Finanzhilfen an 
strukturschwache Regionen 
335€ 2,5% 
Verteidigung u.a. Militärausrüstung, Wehrsold, 
Bundeswehrverwaltung 
335€ 2,5% 
Zusammen  10.260€ 75,8% 
 
Angenommen, Sie könnten die öffentlichen Ausgaben und Einnahmen nach Ihren Wünschen 
verändern. Beispielsweise könnten Sie die Ausgaben in einem Politikbereich erhöhen, 
müssten dafür aber entweder zusätzliche Kredite aufnehmen, die Steuern erhöhen, oder 
aber die Ausgaben in einem anderen Bereich senken. Oder aber Sie senken die Ausgaben in 
einem Politikbereich und nutzen die frei werdenden Mittel zum Abbau der öffentlichen 
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Schulden, zur Senkung der Steuern, oder zur Erhöhung der Ausgaben in einem anderen 
Politikbereich. Geben Sie im Folgenden bitte an, für welche der oben genannten Bereiche 
der Staat in Zukunft mehr und für welche er weniger ausgeben sollte. Geben Sie bitte auch 
an, auf welche Weise gewünschte Ausgabenerhöhungen finanziert werden sollten bzw. was 
mit frei werdenden Mitteln im Falle von Ausgabenkürzungen geschehen sollte. 
 
Interviewer: Bitte klären Sie, ob der Befragte die Aufgabenstellung verstanden hat! Wenn 
nicht, bitte wiederholen und erläutern. 
 
1 Für welche Politikbereiche sollte der Staat Ihrer Meinung nach in Zukunft mehr Geld 
ausgeben? 
Der Staat sollte mehr Geld ausgeben für (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)…  
… Soziale Sicherung ප 
… Bildung ප 
… Öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung ප 
... Infrastruktur ප 
… Wirtschaftsförderung ප 
… Verteidigung ප 
… andere, hier nicht genannte Bereiche ප 
Der Staat sollte in Zukunft nicht mehr Geld ausgeben ප 
 
Hinweis: Wird „Der Staat sollte in Zukunft nicht mehr Geld ausgeben“ gewählt ist keine 
weitere Nennung zulässig! 
 
[Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn in 
irgendeinem Politikbereich höhere Ausgaben bevorzugt wurden] 
 
1A Die Ausgabenerhöhung(en) soll(en) finanziert werden durch (Mehrfachnennungen 
möglich)… 
… Steuererhöhungen ප 
… öffentliche Kreditaufnahme ප 
… eine Kürzung der Ausgaben in anderen Bereichen (siehe unten) ප 
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2 Für welche Politikbereiche sollte der Staat Ihrer Meinung nach in Zukunft weniger Geld 
ausgeben? 
Der Staat sollte weniger Geld ausgeben für (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)…  
… Soziale Sicherung ප 
… Bildung ප 
… Öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung ප 
... Infrastruktur ප 
… Wirtschaftsförderung ප 
… Verteidigung ප 
… andere, hier nicht genannte Bereiche ප 
Der Staat sollte in Zukunft nicht weniger Geld ausgeben ප 
 
Hinweis: Wird „Der Staat sollte in Zukunft nicht weniger Geld ausgeben“ gewählt ist keine 
weitere Nennung zulässig! 
 
[Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn in 
irgendeinem Politikbereich geringere Ausgaben bevorzugt wurden] 
 
2A Die frei werdenden Mittel sollen genutzt werden (Mehrfachnennungen möglich)… 
… für Steuersenkungen ප 
… zum Abbau öffentlicher Schulden ප 
… zur Erhöhung der Ausgaben in anderen Bereichen (siehe oben) ප 
 
 
Interviewer: Bitte auf Konsistenz der Antworten achten! Wünscht ein Befragter 
beispielsweise in einem Bereich zusätzliche Ausgaben und gibt dabei in Frage 1A gleichzeitig 
an, dass diese durch Kürzungen der Ausgaben in anderen Bereichen finanziert werden sollte, 
impliziert das mindestens eine Nennung in den ersten sieben Kategorien bei Frage 2! 
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3 Die letzte Steuerschätzung hat ergeben, dass der Staat über die nächsten 4 Jahre hinweg 
insgesamt etwa 23 Milliarden Euro mehr einnehmen wird als zunächst erwartet worden war. 
Was sollte der Staat Ihrer Meinung nach mit diesen zusätzlichen 23 Milliarden Euro tun? 
Geben Sie bitte maximal drei Alternativen an, die Sie am stärksten befürworten. 
 Befürworte ich 
am stärksten 
Befürworte ich am 
zweitstärksten 
Befürworte ich am 
drittstärksten 
Die Steuern senken ප ප ප 
Öffentliche Schulden 
abbauen 
ප ප ප 
Die öffentlichen Ausgaben 
erhöhen für… 
   
… Soziale Sicherung ප ප ප 
… Öffentliche Sicherheit und 
Ordnung 
ප ප ප 
… Bildung ප ප ප 
… Infrastruktur ප ප ප 
… Wirtschaftsförderung ප ප ප 
… Verteidigung ප ප ප 
… andere, hier nicht 
genannte Bereiche 
ප ප ප 
Keine Angabe ප ප ප 
 
Hinweis: In jeder Spalte ist jeweils nur eine Nennung zulässig! 
 
 
4 Ende 2012 lag die Staatsverschuldung in Deutschland bei über 2 Billionen Euro. Das sind 
etwa 26.000 Euro pro Einwohner bzw. 80% des Bruttoinlandsprodukts. Wenn es nach Ihnen 
ginge: Sollte der Staat seine Schulden abbauen, sie auf dem derzeitigen Niveau belassen, 
oder sogar noch zusätzliche Schulden aufnehmen? 
Schulden abbauen ප 
Schulden auf derzeitigem Niveau halten ප 
Zusätzliche Schulden aufnehmen ප 
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[Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn angegeben 
wurde, dass der Staat Schulden abbauen sollte] 
 
4A Was sollte der Staat am ehesten tun, um die Schulden abzubauen? Geben Sie bitte 
maximal drei Alternativen an, die Sie am stärksten befürworten. 
 Befürworte ich 
am stärksten 
Befürworte ich am 
zweitstärksten 
Befürworte ich am 
drittstärksten 
Die Steuern erhöhen ප ප ප 
Die öffentlichen Ausgaben 
kürzen für… 
   
… Soziale Sicherung ප ප ප 
… Öffentliche Sicherheit und 
Ordnung 
ප ප ප 
… Bildung ප ප ප 
… Infrastruktur ප ප ප 
… Wirtschaftsförderung ප ප ප 
… Verteidigung ප ප ප 
… andere, hier nicht 
genannte Bereiche 
ප ප ප 
Keine Angabe ප ප ප 
Hinweis: Bei dieser Frage ist in jeder Spalte jeweils nur eine Nennung zulässig! 
 
 
[Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn angegeben 
wurde, dass der Staat Schulden abbauen sollte] 
 
4B Angenommen, Sie könnten zwischen drei Strategien zum Schuldenabbau wählen (Stellen 
Sie sich vor, die unten dargestellten Münzstapel verdeutlichen den Schuldenabbau. Ein 
kleiner Münzstapel bedeutet, dass wenige Schulden abgebaut werden, ein großer Stapel 
bedeutet, dass viele Schulden abgebaut werden.): 
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Option A: Der Schuldenabbau wird gleichmäßig über alle Jahre verteilt, d.h. in jedem Jahr 
wird ein in etwa gleich großer Teil des Schuldenbergs abgetragen. 
 
 
Option B: Das Ausmaß des Schuldenabbaus wird über die Jahre hinweg Stück für Stück 
erhöht, d.h. in naher Zukunft wird ein kleinerer Teil des Schuldenbergs abgebaut und in 
ferner Zukunft ein größerer Teil. 
 
Option C: Das Ausmaß des Schuldenabbaus wird über die Jahre Stück für Stück verringert, 
d.h. in naher Zukunft wird ein größerer Teil des Schuldenbergs abgebaut und in ferner 
Zukunft ein kleinerer Teil. 
 
 
Für welche dieser Optionen würden Sie sich am ehesten entscheiden? 
Option A: In jedem Jahr sollte ein etwa gleich großer Teil des Schuldenbergs abgebaut 
werden 
ප 
Option B: In naher Zukunft sollte ein kleinerer Teil des Schuldenbergs abgebaut werden 
und in ferner Zukunft ein größerer Teil 
ප 
Option C: In naher Zukunft sollte ein größerer Teil des Schuldenbergs abgebaut werden 
und in ferner Zukunft ein kleinerer Teil 
ප 
Keine Angabe ප
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[Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn angegeben 
wurde, dass der Staat zusätzliche Schulden aufnehmen sollte] 
 
4C Wofür sollte der Staat am ehesten zusätzliche Schulden aufnehmen? Geben Sie bitte 
maximal drei Alternativen an, die Sie am stärksten befürworten. 
 Befürworte ich 
am stärksten 
Befürworte ich am 
zweitstärksten 
Befürworte ich am 
drittstärksten 
Die Steuern senken ප ප ප 
Die öffentlichen Ausgaben 
erhöhen für… 
   
… Soziale Sicherung ප ප ප 
… Öffentliche Sicherheit und 
Ordnung 
ප ප ප 
… Bildung ප ප ප 
… Infrastruktur ප ප ප 
… Wirtschaftsförderung ප ප ප 
… Verteidigung ප ප ප 
… andere, hier nicht 
genannte Bereiche 
ප ප ප 
Keine Angabe ප ප ප 
Hinweis: Bei dieser Frage ist in jeder Spalte jeweils nur eine Nennung zulässig! 
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5 Ab 2016 tritt auf Bundesebene die Schuldenbremse in Kraft. Diese sieht vor, dass der Bund 
so gut wie keine zusätzlichen Schulden mehr aufnehmen darf. Ausnahmen sind nur bei 
schlechter wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung oder bei Auftreten von Naturkatastrophen zulässig. 
Was ist Ihre Meinung zur Schuldenbremse? 
Ich bin gegen die Schuldenbremse, die Kreditaufnahme des Bundes sollte nicht 
beschränkt werden 
ප 
Ich befürworte die Schuldenbremse in der oben beschriebenen Form ප 
Die Schuldenbremse geht nicht weit genug, der Bund sollte überhaupt keine Kredite 
aufnehmen dürfen 
ප 
Keine Angabe ප 
 
 
6 Der Schuldenstand des Staates ist zwischen 2008 und 2012 deutlich gewachsen. Hat die 
zunehmende Kreditfinanzierung der öffentlichen Ausgaben in den vergangenen Jahren 
etwas an Ihrem Ausgabe- und Sparverhalten geändert? 
Ja, ich gebe einen geringeren Teil meines Einkommens aus und spare dafür einen 
größeren Teil 
ප 
Ja, ich gebe einen größeren Teil meines Einkommens aus und spare dafür einen 
geringeren Teil 
ප 
Nein, ich habe mein Verhalten infolge der wachsenden Staatsverschuldung nicht 
geändert 
ප 
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7 Als nächstes möchten wir gerne einige kurze Verhaltensexperimente durchführen, bei 
denen es um finanzielle Entscheidungen geht. Beim ersten Experiment treffen Sie Ihre 
Entscheidungen anhand dieser Tabelle (untenstehende Liste vorlegen). In jeder Zeile sehen 
Sie zwei Alternativen. Sie können wählen zwischen einem festen Geldbetrag, den Sie 
„sicher“ ausbezahlt bekommen und einer Lotterie nach dem Prinzip „Alles oder nichts“: hier 
können Sie mit 50% Wahrscheinlichkeit 1.000 Euro gewinnen und mit 50% 
Wahrscheinlichkeit nichts. 
Sie beginnen bitte mit Zeile 1 und gehen dann von Zeile zu Zeile weiter. In jeder Zeile 
entscheiden Sie sich bitte zwischen der sicheren Auszahlung (Spalte A) und der Lotterie 
(Spalte B). Die Lotterie bleibt in allen Zeilen gleich. Nur der Betrag der sicheren Auszahlung 
(links) steigt von Zeile zu Zeile. 
 Sie erhalten…  Sie erhalten… 
 
Sicher 
 
1.000€ oder nichts 
Gewinnchance 50:50 
 A oder B 
1 0 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
2 100 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
3 200 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
4 300 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
5 400 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
6 500 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
7 600 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
8 700 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
9 800 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
10 900 € sicher  Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€ 
 
Interviewer: Starten Sie bitte mit Zeile 1 und der Frage: „Wie entscheiden Sie sich? 0€ sicher 
oder Gewinnchance 1.000€ / 0€?“. Entscheidet sich der Befragte für Option B, geht es weiter 
mit Zeile zwei und der Frage „Wie entscheiden Sie sich? 100€ sicher oder Gewinnchance 
1.000€ / 0€?“ usw. Das Experiment ist beendet, sobald der Befragte sich das erste Mal für 
Option A entscheidet. Bitte notieren Sie die Nummer der Zeile, in der sich der Befragte das 
erste Mal für Option A entschieden hat. 
 
Option A wurde gewählt in Zeile Nummer:   
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8 Im nächsten Experiment treffen Sie Ihre Entscheidungen anhand dieser Tabelle 
(untenstehende Liste vorlegen). In jeder Zeile sehen Sie zwei Alternativen. Sie können 
wählen zwischen einem festen Betrag von 1.000€, den Sie sofort ausgezahlt bekommen und 
einem etwas höheren Betrag, der Ihnen aber erst in 6 Monaten ausgezahlt wird. 
Sie beginnen bitte mit Zeile 1 und gehen dann von Zeile zu Zeile weiter. In jeder Zeile 
entscheiden Sie sich bitte zwischen den 1.000€ sofort (Spalte A) und dem höheren Betrag in 
6 Monaten (Spalte B). Der Betrag links bleibt in allen Zeilen gleich, nur der Betrag rechts 
steigt von Zeile zu Zeile. 
 Sie erhalten…  Sie erhalten… 
 Heute  In 6 Monaten 
 A oder B 
1 1.000 €  1.000 € 
2 1.000 €  1.010 € 
3 1.000 €  1.020 € 
4 1.000 €  1.030 € 
5 1.000 €  1.050 € 
6 1.000 €  1.075 € 
7 1.000 €  1.100 € 
8 1.000 €  1.150 € 
9 1.000 €  1.200 € 
10 1.000 €  1.300 € 
11 1.000 €  1.400 € 
12 1.000 €  1.500 € 
13 1.000 €  1.750 € 
14 1.000 €  2.000 € 
 
Interviewer: Starten Sie bitte mit Zeile 1 und der Frage: „Wie entscheiden Sie sich? 1.000€ 
heute oder 1.000€ in 6 Monaten?“. Entscheidet sich der Befragte für Option A, geht es weiter 
mit Zeile zwei und der Frage „Wie entscheiden Sie sich? 1.000€ heute oder 1.010€ in 6 
Monaten?“ usw. Das Experiment ist beendet, sobald der Befragte sich das erste Mal für 
Option B entscheidet. Bitte notieren Sie die Nummer der Zeile, in der sich der Befragte das 
erste Mal für Option B entschieden hat. 
 
Option B wurde gewählt in Zeile Nummer:   
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9 Im letzten Experiment treffen Sie Ihre Entscheidungen anhand dieser Tabelle 
(untenstehende Liste vorlegen). In jeder Zeile sehen Sie wieder zwei Alternativen. Sie 
können wählen zwischen einem festen Betrag von 1.000€, den Sie in 6 Monaten ausgezahlt 
bekommen und einem etwas höheren Betrag, der Ihnen aber erst in 12 Monaten ausgezahlt 
wird. 
Sie beginnen bitte mit Zeile 1 und gehen dann von Zeile zu Zeile weiter. In jeder Zeile 
entscheiden Sie sich bitte zwischen den 1.000€ in 6 Monaten (Spalte A) und dem höheren 
Betrag in 12 Monaten (Spalte B). Der Betrag links bleibt in allen Zeilen gleich, nur der Betrag 
rechts steigt von Zeile zu Zeile. 
 Sie erhalten…  Sie erhalten… 
 In 6 Monaten  In 12 Monaten 
 A oder B 
1 1.000 €  1.000 € 
2 1.000 €  1.010 € 
3 1.000 €  1.020 € 
4 1.000 €  1.030 € 
5 1.000 €  1.050 € 
6 1.000 €  1.075 € 
7 1.000 €  1.100 € 
8 1.000 €  1.150 € 
9 1.000 €  1.200 € 
10 1.000 €  1.300 € 
11 1.000 €  1.400 € 
12 1.000 €  1.500 € 
13 1.000 €  1.750 € 
14 1.000 €  2.000 € 
 
Interviewer: Starten Sie bitte mit Zeile 1 und der Frage: „Wie entscheiden Sie sich? 1.000€ in 
6 Monaten oder 1.000€ in 12 Monaten?“. Entscheidet sich der Befragte für Option A, geht es 
weiter mit Zeile zwei und der Frage „Wie entscheiden Sie sich? 1.000€ in 6 Monaten oder 
1.010€ in 12 Monaten?“ usw. Das Experiment ist beendet, sobald der Befragte sich das erste 
Mal für Option B entscheidet. Bitte notieren Sie die Nummer der Zeile, in der sich der 
Befragte das erste Mal für Option B entschieden hat. 
Option B wurde gewählt in Zeile Nummer:   
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Für die folgenden Fragen würde ich Ihnen jetzt gerne das Gerät übergeben und Sie bitten, 
die entsprechenden Antworten selbst auszufüllen. Bitte antworten Sie ganz ehrlich. Ich 
versichere Ihnen, dass Ihre Angaben absolut vertraulich und anonym behandelt werden. Die 
Auswertung der Daten wird nur auf Basis aller durchgeführten Interviews erfolgen, eine 
Zuordnung Ihrer Angaben zu Ihrer Person ist nicht möglich. 
 
Bei Fragen stehe ich Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung. 
 
Interviewer: Bitte für diesen Komplex das Gerät zum Selbstausfüllen an die Befragte 
übergeben! 
 
 
10 Sie finden weiter unten eine Gegenüberstellung einiger gegensätzlicher Aussagen über 
Staat und Politik. Bitte geben Sie jeweils an, welcher der Aussagen sie am ehesten 
zustimmen. 
Den Politikern in 
Deutschland kann man im 
Großen und Ganzen 
vertrauen 
ප ප ප ප ප 
Ich habe überhaupt kein 
Vertrauen in die Politiker in 
Deutschland 
Die meisten Politiker in 
Deutschland handeln im 
Sinne des Allgemeinwohls 
ප ප ප ප ප 
Die meisten Politiker in 
Deutschland bedienen 
lediglich die Interessen 
einzelner Gruppen  
Den meisten Politikern 
geht es bei Ihren 
Entscheidungen darum, 
was langfristig am besten 
für das Land ist 
ප ප ප ප ප 
Die meisten Politiker denken 
bei ihren Entscheidungen nur 
bis zur nächsten Wahl 
Der Staat geht 
gewissenhaft mit 
Steuergeldern um 
ප ප ප ප ප Der Staat verschwendet Steuergelder 
Der Staat sollte für 
gleichwertige 
Lebensverhältnisse sorgen 
ප ප ප ප ප 
Der Staat sollte in die 
Lebensverhältnisse der 
Menschen nicht eingreifen 
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11 Wenn am kommenden Sonntag Bundestagswahl wäre, welche Partei würden Sie dann 
mit Ihrer Zweitstimme wählen? 
CDU/CSU ප 
SPD ප 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen ප 
FDP ප 
Piraten ප 
Linkspartei/PDS ප 
NPD ප 
Andere Partei ප 
Würde nicht wählen ප 
 
 
12 Sind Sie Mitglied in einer Gewerkschaft? 
Ja ප 
Nein ප 
 
 
13 Haben Sie Kinder? Wenn ja, wie viele? 
Ja පŝƚƚĞŶǌĂŚůĞŝŶŐĞďĞŶ͗ͺͺͺͺ 
Nein ප 
 
 
14 Wie zufrieden sind Sie, alles in allem, mit Ihrer wirtschaftlichen Situation? 
Ganz und gar zufrieden ප ප ප ප ප Ganz und gar unzufrieden 
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15 Anschließend würden wir Ihnen gerne einige Wissensfragen stellen. Bitte kreuzen Sie 
diejenige Antwort an, die Sie für richtig halten. 
Wie hoch war 2012 die 
Neuverschuldung des Bundes in 
Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts 
ungefähr? 
1% 
ප 
3% 
ප 
5% 
ප 
7% 
ප 
Wie hoch ist derzeit der Zins auf 
langfristige Staatsanleihen (Laufzeit: 
10 Jahre) ungefähr? 
1,5% 
ප 
3% 
ප 
5,5% 
ප 
10% 
ප 
Wie hoch war die Inflationsrate in 
2012 ungefähr? 
0% 
ප 
2% 
ප 
5% 
ප 
10% 
ප 
 
 
Anfang 2013 wurde der Beitragssatz zur gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung gesenkt. Im 
Ergebnis sinkt dadurch die Abgabenbelastung. Wir möchten Ihnen nun einige Fragen zu Ihrer 
Reaktion auf die Beitragssatzsenkung stellen. 
 
 
16 Um Ihnen im Folgenden die passenden Fragen stellen zu können, benötigen wir eine 
Information zu Ihrer beruflichen Situation. Was trifft auf Sie am ehesten zu?  
Arbeiter(in) oder Angestellte(r) ප 
Auszubildende(r) ප 
Arbeitssuchende(r) ප 
Unternehmer(in), Selbstständige(r) oder Freiberufler(in) ප 
Beamter/in ප 
Schüler(in) oder Student(in) ප 
Geringfügig oder unregelmäßig Beschäftigte(r) ප 
Rentner(in) oder Pensionär(in) ප 
Sonstiges ප 
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[Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn bei Frage 
16 „Unternehmer(in), Selbstständige(r) oder Freiberufler(in)“ oder „Geringfügig oder 
unregelmäßig Beschäftigte(r)“ gewählt wurde] 
 
17 Zahlen Sie zurzeit in die gesetzliche Rentenversicherung ein, um für sich selber 
Rentenversicherungsansprüche zu erwerben?  
Ja ප 
Nein ප 
 
 
[Automatische Filterung: Die Fragen 18 bis 22 waren nur dann zu beantworten, wenn bei 
Frage 16 „Arbeiter(in) oder Angestellte(r)“ oder „Auszubildende(r)“ oder bei Frage 17 mit „Ja“ 
angegeben wurde] 
 
18 Wenn Sie an die Finanzsituation Ihres Haushaltes denken, wofür verwenden Sie das durch 
die Beitragssatzsenkung zusätzlich bereitgestellte Haushaltseinkommen am ehesten? Um 
zusätzliche Ausgaben zu tätigen, um Schulden abzubauen oder um zu sparen? 
Um Ausgaben zu tätigen ප 
Um Schulden abzubauen ප 
Um zu sparen ප 
 
 
19 Was denken Sie, wird die aktuelle Senkung der Rentenversicherungsbeiträge in Zukunft 
zu höheren Rentenversicherungsbeiträgen führen? 
Ja ප 
Nein ප 
 
 
20 Und denken Sie, dass die aktuelle Senkung der Rentenversicherungsbeiträge in Zukunft zu 
niedrigeren Renten aus der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung führen wird? 
Ja ප 
Nein ප 
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21 Haushalte haben verschiedene Arten, Ihr Haushaltsbudget zu planen. Was würde Ihre 
Vorgehensweise am ehesten beschreiben? 
Ich versuche, monatlich einen festen Betrag zu sparen oder zum Rückzahlen von 
Schulden zu verwenden. 
ප 
Ich versuche, monatlich einen festen Betrag für Ausgaben zu verwenden. ප 
Nichts davon ප 
 
 
22 Wir möchten Ihnen noch einige allgemeine Fragen stellen. 
Was denken Sie, wie wird Ihre eigene 
wirtschaftliche Lage in einem Jahr sein? 
Wesentlich 
schlechter als heute 
   Wesentlich besser 
als heute 
 ප ප ප ප ප 
      
Was denken Sie, wie wird die Inflation 
in Deutschland in den nächsten fünf 
Jahren sein? 
Wesentlich niedriger 
als heute 
   Wesentlich höher 
als heute 
 ප ප ප ප ප 
      
Was denken Sie, wie sicher sind 
Sparanlagen heute in Deutschland im 
Vergleich zu vor zehn Jahren? 
Wesentlich 
unsicherer als vor 
zehn Jahren 
   Wesentlich 
sicherer als vor 
zehn Jahren 
 ප ප ප ප ප 
      
Was denken Sie, wie sehr lohnen sich 
Sparanlagen heute in Deutschland im 
Vergleich zu vor zehn Jahren? 
Wesentlich weniger 
als vor zehn Jahren 
 
   Wesentlich mehr 
als vor zehn 
Jahren 
 ප ප ප ප ප 
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[Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn bei Frage 
16 „Arbeiter(in) oder Angestellte(r)“, „Auszubildende(r)“, „Arbeitssuchende(r)“, 
„Unternehmer(in), Selbstständige(r) oder Freiberufler(in)“ oder „Geringfügig oder 
unregelmäßig Beschäftigte(r)“ angegeben wurde] 
 
23 Wenn Sie über Umfang und Intensität Ihres beruflichen Engagements entscheiden, spielt 
dabei im Allgemeinen die Steuer- und Abgabenbelastung eine Rolle? 
Ja ප 
Nein ප 
 
 
[Automatische Filterung: Die folgende Frage war nur dann zu beantworten, wenn bei Frage 
23 „Ja“ angegeben wurde] 
 
24 Ganz allgemein gesprochen, welchen Einfluss hat die Senkung der 
Rentenversicherungsbeiträge auf Ihr berufliches Engagement? 
Mein berufliches Engagement ist 
jetzt wesentlich kleiner ප ප ප ප ප 
Mein berufliches Engagement ist jetzt 
wesentlich größer 
 
 
Bitte übergeben Sie das Gerät wieder an die Interviewerin / den Interviewer! 
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A.2 The questionnaire (English translation) 
The following table contains information on annual public expenditures by policy areas in 
euros per capita, and also as proportion of total state expenditures. The table focuses on 
important spending categories. 
 
Interviewer: Please give the interviewee sufficient time to study the table attentively. 
 
Policy area Description Spending per 
capita 
Proportion on 
total 
Social security e.g. unemployment 
compensation, social welfare, 
family and youth welfare 
7,660€ 56.6% 
Education e.g. public schools and 
universities 
1,125€ 8.3% 
Public safety e.g. police, justice system 455€ 3.3% 
Infrastructure e.g. road and town construction 350€ 2.6% 
Economic development e.g. promotion of small- and 
medium-sized companies, 
investment allowances, financial 
support for disadvantaged 
regions 
335€ 2.5% 
Defence e.g. military equipment, service 
pay, defence administration 
335€ 2.5% 
Total  10,260€ 75.8% 
 
Assume that you could modify public expenditures and revenues according to your wishes. 
For example, presume that you could increase public spending in any particular policy area. 
In this case, however, you would need either to incur additional public debts, increase taxes, 
or cut public spending in another policy area. Or in order to decrease public spending in a 
policy area, you must either reduce public debts, decrease taxes, or increase public spending 
in another policy area. In the following, please state for which of the aforementioned policy 
areas should public spending be increased or decreased. Also state how a potential increase 
in public spending should be financed or for what the excess funds should be used. 
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Interviewer: Please make sure that the interviewee has understood the task. Otherwise, 
please repeat and explain. 
 
1 In which policy areas should the state spend more? 
The state should spend more on (check as many as apply)…  
… social security ප 
… education ප 
… public safety ප 
... infrastructure ප 
… economic development ප 
… defence ප 
… other areas ප 
The state should not spend more ප 
 
Note: If ‘The state should not spend more’ is checked then no other option can be mentioned.  
 
[Automatic filtering: The following question is only applicable if the respondent would like to 
increase public spending in at least one policy area.] 
 
1A The increase in public spending should be financed via (check as many as apply)… 
… a tax increase ප 
… incurrence of public debt ප 
… a decrease in public spending in another policy area (see below) ප 
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2 In which policy areas should the state spend less? 
The state should spend less on (check as many as apply)…  
… social security ප 
… education ප 
… public safety ප 
... infrastructure ප 
… economic development ප 
… defence ප 
… other areas ප 
The state should not spend less ප 
 
Note:  If ‘The state should not spend less’ is checked than no other option can be mentioned. 
 
[Automatic filtering: The following question is only applicable if the respondent would like to 
decrease public spending in at least one policy area.] 
 
2A The excess funds should be used for (check as many as apply)… 
… a tax decrease ප 
… a reduction of public debt ප 
… an increase in public spending in another policy area (see above) ප 
 
 
Interviewer: Please control for the consistency of replies. If a respondent opts for additional 
spending in one area and answers in question 1A that this increase in spending should be 
financed by cutting expenditures in another area, this implies that one of the first seven 
options in question 2 need to be chosen. 
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3 According to the latest tax estimation, the state is going to increase revenues by a further 
€23 billion within the next four years. In your opinion, how should the state use the 
additional revenues? Please name at maximum those three alternatives you prefer the most. 
 1st choice  2nd choice  3rd choice 
Decrease taxes ප ප ප 
Reduce public debt ප ප ප 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security ප ප ප 
… public safety and order ප ප ප 
… education ප ප ප 
… infrastructure ප ප ප 
… economic development ප ප ප 
… defence ප ප ප 
… other areas ප ප ප 
No response ප ප ප 
Note: Please check only one box per column 
 
 
4 At the end of 2012 the outstanding amount of public debt in Germany was above 
€2 trillion. This equals €26,000 per inhabitant or 80% of gross domestic product (GDP), 
respectively. In your opinion, should the state reduce public debts, keep the amount of 
public debt at its current level, or incur additional public debts? 
Reduce debt ප 
Keep debt at current level ප 
Incur additional debt ප 
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[Automatic filtering: The following question is only applicable if the interviewed person would 
like to reduce public debt] 
 
4A What should the state do to reduce public debt? Please name a maximum of three 
alternatives you prefer the most. 
 1st choice   2nd choice   3rd choice 
Increase taxes ප ප ප 
Cut public spending on …    
… social security ප ප ප 
… public safety ප ප ප 
… education ප ප ප 
… infrastructure ප ප ප 
… economic development ප ප ප 
… defense ප ප ප 
… other areas ප ප ප 
No response ප ප ප 
Note: Please check only one box per column 
 
 
[Automatic filtering: The following question is only applicable if the interviewed person would 
like to reduce public debt] 
 
4B Assume you could choose between three alternatives for public debt reduction (suppose 
that the reduction of public debt is illustrated by means of the money piles shown below. A 
small money pile means that little debt is reduced, a big money pile means that much debt is 
reduced): 
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Option A: Debt reduction is distributed evenly over the next years, i.e., in each year a similar 
amount of debt is reduced. 
 
 
Option B: The extent of debt reduction increases over the next years, i.e., in the near future 
a smaller part of debt is reduced and in the far future a larger part of debt is reduced.  
 
Option C: The extent of debt reduction decreases over the next years, i.e., in the near future 
a larger part of debt is reduced and in the far future a smaller part of debt is reduced. 
 
 
For which option would you decide? 
Option A: In each year a similar amount of debt should be reduced ප 
Option B: In the near future a smaller part of debt should be reduced and in the far 
future a larger part of debt should be reduced 
ප 
Option C: In the near future a larger part of debt should be reduced and in the far 
future a smaller part of debt should be reduced 
ප 
Don’t know ප 
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[Automatic filtering: The following question was only applicable if the interviewed expressed 
that the state should take on additional public debt] 
 
4C What should the state do with the additional funds? Please name a maximum of three 
alternatives you prefer the most. 
 1st choice   2nd choice   3rd choice 
Decrease taxes ප ප ප 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security ප ප ප 
… public safety ප ප ප 
… education ප ප ප 
… infrastructure ප ප ප 
… economic development ප ප ප 
… defence ප ප ප 
… other areas ප ප ප 
No response ප ප ප 
Note: Please check only one box per column 
 
 
5 In 2016 the federal debt brake comes into force. From this moment on, the federal 
government can take on almost no additional public debt. Exemptions are allowed only in 
times of economic crises or natural disasters. What is your opinion on the debt brake? 
I am against the debt brake – the incurrence of public debt should not be restricted ප 
I am in favour of the debt brake in the aforementioned form ප 
The debt brake is still not enough – the government should not be allowed to incur 
public debt at all 
ප 
No response ප 
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6 Between 2008 and 2012, we have seen a rapid acceleration of public debt. Did this 
increasing reliance on debt financing lead to changes in the way you spend or save? 
Yes, I now spend a smaller proportion of my income and save a larger proportion ප 
Yes, I spend a larger proportion of my income and save a smaller proportion ප 
No, I did not change my behaviour in consequence to the rapid increase in public debt ප 
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7 Next, we would like to conduct some experiments concerned with financial decisions. In 
the first experiment, you make your decisions according to the following table (Interviewer: 
please show the table below). In each row you see two alternatives. You can choose between 
a certain payoff and participation in a lottery, which follows the principle ‘all or nothing’: You 
have a 50% chance of winning €1,000 and a 50% chance of winning €0. 
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the 
certain payoff (column A) and participation in the lottery (column B). The lottery remains the 
same in all rows. Only the certain payoff increases from row to row.  
 
 You get…  You get… 
 Safe  1,000€ or nothing Chance of winning 50:50 
 A or B 
1 €0  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
2 €100  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
3 €200  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
4 €300  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
5 €400  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
6 €500  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
7 €600  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
8 €700  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
9 €800  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
10 €900  Chance of winning €1,000/€0 
 
Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question ‘What do you choose? €0 safe or 
chance of winning €1,000/€0?’. If the interviewee chooses option B, please proceed to row 2 
and the question ‘How do you choose? €100 safe or chance of winning €1,000/€0?’. The 
experiment ends when the interviewee chooses option A for the first time. Please write down 
the number of the row where the respondent chose option A for the first time. 
 
Option A was first chosen in row number:  
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8 In the next experiment you decide according to the following table (Interviewer: please 
show the table below). In each row, you see two alternatives. You can choose between a 
certain payoff of €1,000, which is paid to you immediately and a higher certain payoff, which 
will be paid to you in 6 months.  
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the 
payoff of €1,000 to be paid immediately (column A) and the higher payoff to be paid in 6 
months (column B). The payoff on the left remains the same in all rows. Only the payoff on 
the right increases from row to row. 
 
 You get…  You get… 
 Immediately  In 6 month 
 A or B 
1 €1,000  €1,000 
2 €1,000  €1,010 
3 €1,000  €1,020 
4 €1,000  €1,030 
5 €1,000  €1,050 
6 €1,000  €1,075 
7 €1,000  €1,100 
8 €1,000  €1,150 
9 €1,000  €1,200 
10 €1,000  €1,300 
11 €1,000  €1,400 
12 €1,000  €1,500 
13 €1,000  €1,750 
14 €1,000  €2,000 
 
Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question ‘What do you choose? €1,000 
immediately or €1,000 in 6 months?’. If the interviewee chooses option A, please proceed to 
row 2 and the question ‘What do you choose? €1,000 immediately or €1,010 in 6 months?’. 
The experiment ends when the interviewee chooses option B for the first time. Please write 
down the number of the row where the interviewee chose option B for the first time. 
 
Option B was first chosen in row number:    
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9 In the last experiment, you decide according to the following table (Interviewer: please 
show the table below). In each row, you see two alternatives. You can choose between a 
certain payoff of €1,000, which is paid to you in 6 months and a higher certain payoff, which 
will be paid to you in 12 months.  
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the 
payoff of €1,000 to be paid in 6 months (column A) and the higher payoff to be paid in 12 
months (column B). The payoff on the left remains the same in all rows. Only the payoff on 
the right increases from row to row. 
 
 You get…  You get… 
 In 6 month  In 12 month 
 A or B 
1 €1,000  €1,000 
2 €1,000  €1,010 
3 €1,000  €1,020 
4 €1,000  €1,030 
5 €1,000  €1,050 
6 €1,000  €1,075 
7 €1,000  €1,100 
8 €1,000  €1,150 
9 €1,000  €1,200 
10 €1,000  €1,300 
11 €1,000  €1,400 
12 €1,000  €1,500 
13 €1,000  €1,750 
14 €1,000  €2,000 
 
Interviewer: Please start with row 1 and the question ‘What do you choose? €1,000 in 6 
months or €1,000 in 12 months?’. If the interviewee chooses option A, please proceed to row 
2 and the question ‘What do you choose? €1,000 in 6 months or €1,010 in 12 months?’. The 
experiment ends when the interviewee chooses option B for the first time. Please write down 
the number of the row in which the interviewee chose option B for the first time. 
Option B was first chosen in row number:    
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For the following questions I will hand you the console so that you can answer the questions 
on your own. Please answer honestly. I assure you that all your answers are treated 
confidentially and anonymously. Data evaluation will be based on all interviews so that 
nobody will be able to associate your answers with you. 
 
If you have questions, I would be happy to offer my help. 
 
Interviewer: Please hand over the console to the interviewee. 
 
 
10 Below you find a battery of contradictory statements about the state and politics. Please 
indicate with which statement you agree the most.  
All in all, I have confidence 
in politicians in Germany ප ප ප ප ප 
I do not have any confidence 
in politicians in Germany 
Most politicians in 
Germany act in line with 
the general public’s 
interest 
ප ප ප ප ප 
Most politicians in Germany 
only serve the interests of 
particular groups 
Most politicians are 
concerned about the 
country’s long-term well-
being 
ප ප ප ප ප 
Most politicians are only 
concerned about the next 
elections 
The government manages 
tax revenues 
conscientiously 
ප ප ප ප ප The government wastes tax revenues  
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions ප ප ප ප ප 
The state should not interfere 
with people’s living 
conditions 
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11 Which party would you vote for if federal elections were held this Sunday? 
CDU/CSU ප 
SPD ප 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen ප 
FDP ප 
Piraten ප 
Linkspartei/PDS ප 
NPD ප 
Other party ප 
I would not vote ප 
 
 
12 Are you a union member? 
Yes ප 
No ප 
 
 
13 Do you have children? If yes, how many children do you have? 
Yes පPlease state how many͗ͺͺͺͺ 
No ප 
 
 
14 How satisfied are you with your overall economic situation? 
Absolutely satisfied ප ප ප ප ප Absolutely dissatisfied 
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15 We would now like to ask some questions related to knowledge. Please indicate the 
answer you deem correct. 
How large was the budget deficit 
of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% 
ප 
3% 
ප 
5% 
ප 
7% 
ප 
What is the current interest rate 
on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years), 
approximately? 
1.5% 
ප 
3% 
ප 
5.5% 
ප 
10% 
ප 
How large was the inflation rate 
in 2012, approximately? 
0% 
ප 
2% 
ප 
5% 
ප 
10% 
ප 
 
 
 
At the beginning of 2013, contribution rates to the statutory pension system have been 
reduced. In effect, this reduces the overall tax burden. We are interested in your responses 
to the rate cut. 
 
16 To ask you the correct questions, we need information on your employment situation. 
Which answer best applies to you?  
Employee ප 
Apprentice ප 
Unemployed ප 
Employer ප 
Public servant ප 
Pupil ප 
Insignificantly employed ප 
Pensioner ප 
Other ප 
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[Automatic filtering: the following question is only applicable if question 16 was answered by 
‘Employer’ or ‘Insignificantly employed’] 
 
17 Do you currently contribute to the public pension system in order to acquire your own 
pension entitlements? 
Yes ප 
No ප 
 
 
[Automatic filtering: questions 18 to 22 are only applicable if question 16 was answered by 
‘Employee’ or ‘Apprentice’ or question 17 was answered by ‘Yes’] 
 
 
18 Thinking about your household’s financial situation, will you use the additional budget 
mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt? 
Increase spending ප 
Repay debt ප 
Increase savings ප 
 
 
19 Will the recent cut in pension insurance contribution rates lead to higher contribution 
rates in the future? 
Yes ප 
No ප 
 
 
20 Will the recent cut in pension insurance contribution rates lead to lower pension 
payments? 
Yes ප 
No ප 
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21 Some households have different approaches to household budgeting. What best 
describes yours? 
I try to use a fixed amount to save or to repay debt ප 
I try to use a fixed amount for expenditures ප 
Something else ප 
 
 
22 We would now like to ask you some general questions. 
How do you expect your economic 
situation to be in one year? 
Much worse than 
today 
   Much better than 
today 
 ප ප ප ප ප 
      
In your opinion, how will inflation 
develop over the next five years? 
Much lower than 
today 
   Much higher than 
today 
 ප ප ප ප ප 
      
How secure do you think savings are in 
Germany today in comparison to ten 
years ago? 
Much more insecure 
than ten years ago 
   Much more 
secure than ten 
years ago 
 ප ප ප ප ප 
      
How profitable do you think savings 
are in Germany today compared with 
ten years ago? 
Much less than ten 
years ago 
 
   Much more than 
ten years ago 
 ප ප ප ප ප 
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[Automatic filtering: The following question is only applicable if question 16 was answered by 
‘Employee’, ‘Apprentice’, ‘Unemployed’, ‘Employer’ or ‘Insignificantly employed’] 
 
23 Does the tax burden usually matter for your job-related decisions? 
Yes ප 
No ප 
 
 
[Automatic filtering: The following question is only applicable if question 23 was answered 
‘Yes’] 
 
24 What impact does the contribution rate cut have on your general job-related efforts? 
I substantially decreased my job-
related efforts ප ප ප ප ප 
I substantially increased my job-
related efforts 
 
 
Please hand the console back to the interviewer. 
 
  
43 
 
Appendix B: Descriptive statistics1 
Item 1: On which policy areas should the state spend more? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Social security 0.427 0.011 [0.406, 0.449] 872 
Education 0.606 0.011 [0.585, 0.627] 1,238 
Public security and order 0.316 0.010 [0.296, 0.337] 646 
Infrastructure 0.179 0.008 [0.162, 0.195] 365 
Economic development 0.208 0.009 [0.190, 0.225] 424 
Defense 0.016 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 33 
Other areas 0.101 0.007 [0.088, 0.114] 206 
State should not spend more 0.155 0.008 [0.139, 0.170] 316 
No response 0.000   0 
Notes: Multiple answers were possible. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 1A: How should the increase in public spending be financed?  
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Tax increase 0.098 0.007 [0.084, 0.113] 170 
Incurrence of public debt 0.122 0.008 [0.107, 0.138] 211 
Decrease in public spending 0.858 0.008 [0.842, 0.875] 1,481 
No response 0.000   0 
Notes: Multiple answers were possible. Table is based on 1,726 responses. 
 
  
1 Tables report standard errors (S.E.) and confidence intervals (C.I.) for proportions. Confidence intervals are 
based on 95 percent level of confidence. Proportions may not sum to one due to rounding error, or because 
multiple answers were possible. 
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Item 2: On which policy areas should the state spend less? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Social security 0.120 0.007 [0.106, 0.135] 246 
Education 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 19 
Public security and order 0.026 0.004 [0.019, 0.033] 54 
Infrastructure 0.069 0.006 [0.058, 0.080] 140 
Economic development 0.159 0.008 [0.143, 0.175] 325 
Defense 0.615 0.011 [0.594, 0.636] 1,256 
Other areas 0.362 0.011 [0.341, 0.383] 739 
State should not spend less 0.105 0.007 [0.092, 0.118] 214 
No response 0.000   0 
Notes: Multiple answers were possible. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 2A: How should the excess funds be used? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Tax decrease 0.354 0.011 [0.332, 0.376] 647 
Reduction of public debt 0.483 0.012 [0.460, 0.506] 883 
Increase in public spending 0.503 0.012 [0.480, 0.526] 919 
No response 0.000   0 
Notes: Multiple answers were possible. Table is based on 1,828 responses. 
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Item 3: How should the state use the additional 23 bn €? (Proportions) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Decrease taxes 0.302 0.137 0.118 
Reduce public debt 0.200 0.203 0.138 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security 0.121 0.136 0.108 
… public safety and order 0.055 0.115 0.103 
… education 0.218 0.211 0.143 
… infrastructure 0.018 0.047 0.079 
… economic development 0.027 0.064 0.080 
… defense 0.006 0.011 0.021 
… other areas 0.021 0.028 0.095 
No response 0.032 0.049 0.115 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Item 3: How should the state use the additional 23 bn €? (S.E.) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Decrease taxes 0.010 0.008 0.007 
Reduce public debt 0.009 0.009 0.008 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security 0.007 0.008 0.007 
… public safety and order 0.005 0.007 0.007 
… education 0.009 0.009 0.008 
… infrastructure 0.003 0.005 0.006 
… economic development 0.004 0.005 0.006 
… defense 0.002 0.002 0.003 
… other areas 0.003 0.004 0.006 
No response 0.004 0.005 0.007 
Total    
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Item 3: How should the state use the additional 23 bn €? (C.I.) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Decrease taxes [0.282, 0.322] [0.122, 0.152] [0.104, 0.132] 
Reduce public debt [0.182, 0.217] [0.185, 0.220] [0.123, 0.153] 
Expand public expenditures on …    
… social security [0.107, 0.136] [0.121, 0.151] [0.095, 0.122] 
… public safety and order [0.045, 0.065] [0.101, 0.128] [0.090, 0.117] 
… education [0.200, 0.236] [0.193, 0.228] [0.128, 0.158] 
… infrastructure [0.012, 0.024] [0.038, 0.056] [0.068, 0.091] 
… economic development [0.020, 0.034] [0.053, 0.074] [0.069, 0.092] 
… defense [0.003, 0.009] [0.006, 0.015] [0.014, 0.027] 
… other areas [0.014, 0.027] [0.021, 0.036] [0.082, 0.108] 
No response [0.024, 0.039] [0.040, 0.059] [0.101, 0.128] 
Total    
 
Item 3: How should the state use the additional 23 bn €? (Counts) 
 1st choice   2nd choice   3rd choice   
Decrease taxes 617 279 240 
Reduce public debt 408 414 282 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security 248 278 221 
… public safety and order 113 234 211 
… education 445 430 292 
… infrastructure 37 96 162 
… economic development 55 130 164 
… defense 12 22 42 
… other areas 42 58 194 
No response 65 101 240 
Total 2,042 2,042 2,042 
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Item 4: What should the state do with public debt? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Reduce debt 0.747 0.010 [0.728, 0.766] 1,525 
Keep debt at current level 0.237 0.009 [0.219, 0.255] 484 
Take on additional debt 0.016 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 33 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 4A: How should the state reduce public debt? (Proportions) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Increase taxes 0.049 0.041 0.117 
Cut public spending on …    
… social security 0.110 0.055 0.064 
… public safety and order 0.018 0.040 0.030 
… education 0.023 0.025 0.018 
… infrastructure 0.018 0.066 0.052 
… economic development 0.075 0.138 0.073 
… defense 0.410 0.201 0.058 
… other areas 0.165 0.210 0.161 
No response 0.133 0.224 0.428 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Item 4A: How should the state reduce public debt? (Standard errors) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Increase taxes 0.006 0.005 0.008 
Cut public spending on …    
… social security 0.008 0.006 0.006 
… public safety and order 0.003 0.005 0.004 
… education 0.004 0.004 0.003 
… infrastructure 0.003 0.006 0.006 
… economic development 0.007 0.009 0.007 
… defense 0.013 0.010 0.006 
… other areas 0.009 0.010 0.009 
No response 0.009 0.011 0.013 
Total    
 
Item 4A: How should the state reduce public debt? (Confidence intervals) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Increase taxes [0.038, 0.059] [0.031, 0.051] [0.101, 0.133] 
Cut public spending on …    
… social security [0.094, 0.125] [0.044, 0.067] [0.051, 0.076] 
… public safety and order [0.012, 0.025] [0.030, 0.050] [0.021, 0.038] 
… education [0.015, 0.030] [0.017, 0.033] [0.012, 0.025] 
… infrastructure [0.011, 0.024] [0.053, 0.078] [0.041, 0.064] 
… economic development [0.062, 0.088] [0.121, 0.156] [0.060, 0.086] 
… defense [0.386, 0.435] [0.181, 0.221] [0.046, 0.069] 
… other areas [0.146, 0.183] [0.189, 0.230] [0.143, 0.180] 
No response [0.116, 0.150] [0.203, 0.245] [0.403, 0.452] 
Total    
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Item 4A: How should the state reduce public debt? (Count) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Increase taxes 74 62 178 
Cut public spending on …    
… social security 167 84 97 
… public safety and order 28 61 45 
… education 35 38 28 
… infrastructure 27 100 80 
… economic development 114 211 111 
… defense 626 307 88 
… other areas 251 320 246 
No response 203 342 652 
Total 1,525 1,525 1,525 
 
Item 4B: How should the burden of debt reduction be distributed over time? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Evenly 0.622 0.012 [0.598, 0.647] 949 
First less, then more 0.108 0.008 [0.092, 0.123] 164 
First more, then less 0.205 0.010 [0.184, 0.225] 312 
No response 0.066 0.006 [0.053, 0.078] 100 
Total 1.000   1,525 
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Item 4C: For what purpose should the state incur additional debt? (Proportions) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Cut taxes 0.303 0.061 0.091 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security 0.303 0.212 0.091 
… public safety and order  0.182 0.091 
… education 0.242 0.182 0.152 
… infrastructure  0.091 0.030 
… economic development 0.030 0.121 0.152 
… defense   0.030 
… other areas 0.030 0.061 0.212 
No response 0.091 0.091 0.152 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Item 4C: For what purpose should the state incur additional debt? (Standard errors) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Cut taxes 0.081 0.042 0.051 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security 0.081 0.072 0.051 
… public safety and order  0.068 0.051 
… education 0.076 0.068 0.063 
… infrastructure  0.051 0.030 
… economic development 0.030 0.058 0.063 
… defense   0.030 
… other areas 0.030 0.042 0.072 
No response 0.051 0.051 0.063 
Total    
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Item 4C: For what purpose should the state incur additional debt? (Confidence intervals) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Cut taxes [0.138, 0.469] [-0.025, 0.147] [-0.013, 0.194] 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security [0.138, 0.469] [0.065, 0.359] [-0.013, 0.194] 
… public safety and order  [0.043, 0.321] [-0.013, 0.194] 
… education [0.088, 0.397] [0.043, 0.321] [0.022, 0.281] 
… infrastructure  [-0.013, 0.194] [-0.031, 0.092] 
… economic development [-0.031, 0.092] [0.004, 0.239] [0.022, 0.281] 
… defense   [-0.031, 0.092] 
… other areas [-0.031, 0.092] [-0.025, 0.147] [0.065, 0.359] 
No response [-0.013, 0.194] [-0.013, 0.194] [0.022, 0.281] 
Total    
 
Item 4C: For what purpose should the state incur additional debt? (Counts) 
 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
Cut taxes 10 2 3 
Increase public spending on …    
… social security 10 7 3 
… public safety and order 0 6 3 
… education 8 6 5 
… infrastructure 0 3 1 
… economic development 1 4 5 
… defense 0 0 1 
… other areas 1 2 7 
No response 3 3 5 
Total 33 33 33 
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Item 5: What is your opinion on the debt brake? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
I am against the debt brake 0.081 0.006 [0.069, 0.093] 165 
I am in favor of the debt brake 0.606 0.011 [0.585, 0.627] 1,238 
The debt brake is still not enough 0.170 0.008 [0.154, 0.187] 348 
No response 0.143 0.008 [0.127, 0.158] 291 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 6: Did the recent increase in public induce changes in your spending behavior? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Spend less/save more 0.070 0.006 [0.059, 0.081] 143 
Spend more/save less 0.176 0.008 [0.160, 0.193] 360 
No change 0.754 0.010 [0.735, 0.772] 1,539 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 7: Which safe amount do you require to forego the 50/50 chance to win 1,000 €? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
0 € safe 0.088 0.006 [0.076, 0.100] 180 
100 € safe 0.131 0.007 [0.117, 0.146] 268 
200 € safe 0.067 0.006 [0.056, 0.078] 137 
300 € safe 0.075 0.006 [0.063, 0.086] 153 
400 € safe 0.071 0.006 [0.060, 0.082] 145 
500 € safe 0.177 0.008 [0.161, 0.194] 362 
600 € safe 0.036 0.004 [0.028, 0.044] 74 
700 € safe 0.030 0.004 [0.023, 0.038] 62 
800 € safe 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.024] 38 
900 € safe 0.256 0.010 [0.237, 0.275] 523 
Never accept 0.049 0.005 [0.040, 0.058] 100 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 8: For which amount paid in six month are you willing to forego payment today? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
1,000 € 0.000   0 
1,010 € 0.034 0.004 [0.026, 0.042] 69 
1,020 € 0.016 0.003 [0.010, 0.021] 32 
1,030 € 0.015 0.003 [0.010, 0.020] 31 
1,050 € 0.025 0.003 [0.019, 0.032] 52 
1,075 € 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.024] 38 
1,100 € 0.047 0.005 [0.037, 0.056] 95 
1,150 € 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.024] 38 
1,200 € 0.046 0.005 [0.036, 0.055] 93 
1,300 € 0.046 0.005 [0.036, 0.055] 93 
1,400 € 0.030 0.004 [0.023, 0.038] 62 
1,500 € 0.079 0.006 [0.068, 0.091] 162 
1,750 € 0.013 0.003 [0.008, 0.018] 27 
2,000 € 0.413 0.011 [0.392, 0.435] 844 
Never accept 0.199 0.009 [0.181, 0.216] 406 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 9: For which amount paid in twelve month would you forego payment in six month? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
1,000 € 0.000   0 
1,010 € 0.025 0.003 [0.019, 0.032] 52 
1,020 € 0.022 0.003 [0.015, 0.028] 44 
1,030 € 0.018 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 36 
1,050 € 0.022 0.003 [0.016, 0.028] 45 
1,075 € 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.025] 39 
1,100 € 0.025 0.003 [0.019, 0.032] 52 
1,150 € 0.020 0.003 [0.014, 0.026] 41 
1,200 € 0.038 0.004 [0.029, 0.046] 77 
1,300 € 0.042 0.004 [0.033, 0.051] 86 
1,400 € 0.026 0.004 [0.019, 0.033] 53 
1,500 € 0.105 0.007 [0.092, 0.119] 215 
1,750 € 0.016 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 33 
2,000 € 0.449 0.011 [0.427, 0.470] 916 
Never accept 0.173 0.008 [0.156, 0.189] 353 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 10: Please rate the following (Proportions) 
 -2 -1 0 1 2  
I have confidence in 
politicians 
0.309 0.298 0.222 0.147 0.024 I do not have confidence in 
politicians 
Most politicians serve 
general public interest 
0.300 0.319 0.216 0.139 0.026 Most politicians only serve 
particular interest 
Most politicians are 
concerned about the 
country’s well-being 
0.369 0.262 0.228 0.119 0.022 Most politicians are only 
concerned about the next 
elections 
The state manages tax 
revenues conscientiously 
0.450 0.302 0.179 0.060 0.008 The state is wasteful with 
tax revenues  
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions 
0.080 0.091 0.245 0.277 0.308 The state should not 
ensure equality 
Notes: Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 10: Please rate the following (Standard errors) 
 -2 -1 0 1 2  
I have confidence in 
politicians 
0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.003 I do not have confidence in 
politicians 
Most politicians serve 
general public interest 
0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.004 Most politicians only serve 
particular interest 
Most politicians are 
concerned about the 
country’s well-being 
0.011 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.003 Most politicians are only 
concerned about the next 
elections 
The state manages tax 
revenues conscientiously 
0.011 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.002 The state is wasteful with 
tax revenues  
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions 
0.006 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.010 The state should not 
ensure equality 
Notes: Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
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Item 10: Please rate the following (Confidence intervalls) 
 -2 -1 0 1 2  
I have confidence in 
politicians 
[0.288, 
0.329] 
[0.278, 
0.318] 
[0.204, 
0.240] 
[0.132, 
0.162] 
[0.018, 
0.031] 
I do not have confidence 
in politicians 
Most politicians serve 
general public interest 
[0.280, 
0.320] 
[0.299, 
0.340] 
[0.199, 
0.234] 
[0.124, 
0.154] 
[0.019, 
0.033] 
Most politicians only 
serve particular interest 
Most politicians are 
concerned about the 
country’s well-being 
[0.348, 
0.390] 
[0.243, 
0.281] 
[0.210, 
0.246] 
[0.105, 
0.133] 
[0.015, 
0.028] 
Most politicians are only 
concerned about the 
next elections 
The state manages tax 
revenues conscientiously 
[0.428, 
0.472] 
[0.282, 
0.322] 
[0.163, 
0.196] 
[0.050, 
0.071] 
[0.004, 
0.012] 
The state is wasteful with 
tax revenues 
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions 
[0.068, 
0.092] 
[0.078, 
0.103] 
[0.226, 
0.264] 
[0.257, 
0.296] 
[0.288, 
0.328] 
The state should not 
ensure equality 
Notes: Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 10: Please rate the following (Counts) 
 -2 -1 0 1 2  
I have confidence in 
politicians 
630 609 453 300 50 I do not have confidence in 
politicians 
Most politicians serve 
general public interest 
612 652 442 283 53 Most politicians only serve 
particular interest 
Most politicians are 
concerned about the 
country’s well-being 
754 535 466 243 44 Most politicians are only 
concerned about the next 
elections 
The state manages tax 
revenues conscientiously 
919 617 366 123 17 The state is wasteful with tax 
revenues  
The state should ensure 
equal living conditions 
163 185 500 565 629 The state should not ensure 
equality 
Notes: Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
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Item 11: Opinion poll: Which party would you vote for? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
CDU/CSU 0.225 0.009 [0.207, 0.243] 459 
SPD 0.243 0.009 [0.224, 0.262] 496 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 0.137 0.008 [0.122, 0.152] 280 
FDP 0.037 0.004 [0.029, 0.045] 76 
Piraten 0.017 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 35 
Die Linke 0.059 0.005 [0.049, 0.069] 120 
NPD 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 19 
Other party 0.048 0.005 [0.039, 0.057] 98 
I would not vote 0.225 0.009 [0.207, 0.243] 459 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 12: Are you a member of a labor union? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.091 0.006 [0.896, 0.921] 186 
No 0.909 0.006 [0.079, 0.104] 1,856 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 13: How many children do you have? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
0 0.363 0.011 [0.342, 0.384] 741 
1 0.223 0.009 [0.205, 0.241] 455 
2 0.300 0.010 [0.280, 0.320] 613 
3 0.082 0.006 [0.070, 0.094] 167 
4 0.025 0.003 [0.018, 0.032] 51 
5 0.004 0.001 [0.001, 0.007] 8 
6 0.003 0.001 [0.001, 0.005] 6 
7 0.000 0.000 [0.000, 0.001] 1 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 14: How satisfied are you with your overall economic situation? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Very satisfied 0.071 0.006 [0.060, 0.074] 146 
Satisfied 0.349 0.011 [0.328, 0.157] 712 
Neutral 0.375 0.011 [0.354, 0.396] 765 
Dissatisfied 0.142 0.008 [0.127, 0.157] 290 
Very dissatisfied 0.063 0.005 [0.053, 0.074] 129 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 15: Knowledge questions (Proportions) 
How large was the budget deficit 
of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% 3% 5% 7% 
0.090 0.428 0.315 0.167 
What is the current interest rate 
on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years) 
approximately? 
1.5% 3% 5.5% 10% 
0.371 0.375 0.209 0.045 
How large was inflation in 2012 
approximately? 
0% 2% 5% 10% 
0.015 0.636 0.287 0.062 
Notes: Correct answers in bold letters. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 15: Knowledge questions (Standard errors) 
How large was the budget deficit 
of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% 3% 5% 7% 
0.006 0.011 0.010 0.008 
What is the current interest rate 
on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years) 
approximately? 
1.5% 3% 5.5% 10% 
0.011 0.011 0.009 0.005 
How large was inflation in 2012 
approximately? 
0% 2% 5% 10% 
0.003 0.011 0.010 0.005 
Notes: Correct answers in bold letters. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
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Item 15: Knowledge questions (Confidence intervals) 
How large was the budget deficit 
of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% 3% 5% 7% 
[0.078, 
0.103] 
[0.407, 
0.449] 
[0.295, 
0.335] 
[0.151, 
0.183] 
What is the current interest rate 
on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years) 
approximately? 
1.5% 3% 5.5% 10% 
[0.350, 
0.392] 
[0.354, 
0.396] 
[0.191, 
0.226] 
[0.036, 
0.054] 
How large was inflation in 2012 
approximately? 
0% 2% 5% 10% 
[0.010, 
0.020] 
[0.615, 
0.657] 
[0.267, 
0.307] 
[0.052, 
0.073] 
Notes: Correct answers in bold letters. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 15: Knowledge questions (Counts) 
How large was the budget deficit 
of the federal government in 
2012? 
1% 3% 5% 7% 
184 874 643 341 
What is the current interest rate 
on long-term government bonds 
(maturity 10 years) 
approximately? 
1.5% 3% 5.5% 10% 
758 766 426 92 
How large was inflation in 2012 
approximately? 
0% 2% 5% 10% 
31 1,298 586 127 
Notes: Correct answers in bold letters. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
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Item 16: What is your employment situation? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Employee 0.432 0.011 [0.411, 0.454] 883 
Apprentice 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.025] 39 
Unemployed 0.041 0.004 [0.033, 0.050] 84 
Employer 0.077 0.006 [0.065, 0.088] 157 
Public servant 0.023 0.003 [0.016, 0.029] 46 
Pupil 0.063 0.005 [0.053, 0.074] 129 
Insignificantly employed 0.027 0.004 [0.020, 0.034] 55 
Pensioner 0.283 0.010 [0.264, 0.303] 578 
Other 0.035 0.004 [0.027, 0.043] 71 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 17: Do you currently contribute to the public pension scheme? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.486 0.034 [0.418, 0.554] 103 
No 0.514 0.034 [0.446, 0.582] 109 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   212 
 
Item 18: How do you use the additional budget? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Spend 0.551 0.016 [0.521, 0.582] 565 
Repay debt 0.179 0.012 [0.155, 0.202] 183 
Save 0.270 0.014 [0.243, 0.297] 277 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   1,025 
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Item 19: Do you think the current cut will lead to higher contribution rates in the future? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.581 0.015 [0.551, 0.612] 596 
No 0.419 0.015 [0.388, 0.449] 429 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   1,025 
 
Item 20: Do you think the current cut will lead to lower pensions in the future? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.703 0.014 [0.675, 0.731] 721 
No 0.297 0.014 [0.269, 0.325] 304 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   1,025 
 
Item 21: Approach to household budgeting 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Fixed saving 0.453 0.016 [0.422, 0.483] 464 
Fixed spending 0.331 0.015 [0.302, 0.360] 339 
Other 0.217 0.013 [0.191, 0.242] 222 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   1,025 
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Item 22: Statement battery (Proportions) 
How do you expect your economic 
situation to be in one year? 
Much worse    Much 
better 
0.033 0.134 0.607 0.194 0.032 
What do you think, how is inflation going 
to be over the next five years? 
Much lower    Much 
higher 
0.025 0.110 0.242 0.489 0.134 
What do you think, how secure are 
savings in Germany today in comparison 
to ten years ago? 
Much more 
insecure 
   Much 
more 
secure 
0.237 0.388 0.252 0.101 0.021 
What do you think, how profitable are 
savings in Germany today compared with 
ten years ago? 
Much less 
 
   Much 
more 
0.411 0.311 0.208 0.060 0.010 
Notes: Table is based on 1,025 observations. 
 
Item 22: Statement battery (Standard errors) 
How do you expect your economic 
situation to be in one year? 
Much worse    Much 
better 
0.006 0.011 0.015 0.012 0.006 
What do you think, how is inflation going 
to be over the next five years? 
Much lower    Much 
higher 
0.005 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.011 
What do you think, how secure are 
savings in Germany today in comparison 
to ten years ago? 
Much more 
insecure 
   Much 
more 
secure 
0.013 0.015 0.014 0.009 0.005 
What do you think, how profitable are 
savings in Germany today compared with 
ten years ago? 
Much less 
 
   Much 
more 
0.015 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.003 
Notes: Table is based on 1,025 observations. 
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Item 22: Statement battery (Confidence intervals) 
How do you expect your economic 
situation to be in one year? 
Much worse  Much better 
[0.022, 
0.044] 
[0.113, 
0.155] 
[0.577, 
0.637] 
[0.170, 
0.218] 
[0.021, 
0.043] 
What do you think, how is inflation 
going to be over the next five years? 
Much lower  Much higher 
[0.016, 
0.035] 
[0.091, 
0.129] 
[0.216, 
0.268] 
[0.458, 
0.519] 
[0.113, 
0.155] 
What do you think, how secure are 
savings in Germany today in 
comparison to ten years ago? 
Much more 
insecure 
 Much more secure 
[0.211, 
0.263] 
[0.358, 
0.418] 
[0.225, 
0.278] 
[0.083, 
0.120] 
[0.013, 
0.030] 
What do you think, how profitable 
are savings in Germany today 
compared with ten years ago? 
Much less 
 
 Much more 
[0.381, 
0.441] 
[0.283, 
0.340] 
[0.183, 
0.233] 
[0.046, 
0.075] 
[0.004, 
0.016] 
Notes: Table is based on 1,025 observations. 
 
Item 22: Statement battery (Counts) 
How do you expect your economic situation 
to be in one year? 
Much worse    Much 
better 
34 137 622 199 33 
What do you think, how is inflation going to 
be over the next five years? 
Much lower    Much 
higher 
26 113 248 501 137 
What do you think, how secure are savings in 
Germany today in comparison to ten years 
ago? 
Much more 
insecure 
   Much 
more 
secure 
243 398 258 104 22 
What do you think, how profitable are 
savings in Germany today compared with ten 
years ago? 
Much less 
 
   Much 
more 
421 319 213 62 10 
Notes: Table is based on 1,025 observations. 
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Item 23: Do taxes matter for your general job-related efforts? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.406 0.014 [0.567, 0.622] 494 
No 0.594 0.014 [0.378, 0.433] 724 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   1,218 
 
Item 24: Which influence did the recent payroll tax change have on your job-related 
efforts? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
I substantially decreased my job-related efforts 0.034 0.008 [0.018, 0.051] 17 
I decreased my job-related efforts 0.089 0.013 [0.064, 0.114] 44 
Neutral 0.709 0.020 [0.668, 0.749] 350 
I increased my job-related efforts 0.136 0.015 [0.105, 0.166] 67 
I substantially increased my job-related efforts 0.032 0.008 [0.017, 0.048] 16 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   494 
 
Item 25: East/West 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
East 0.222 0.009 [0.204, 0.240] 454 
West 0.778 0.009 [0.760, 0.796] 1,588 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 26: State 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Schleswig-Holstein 0.036 0.004 [0.028, 0.044] 74 
Hamburg 0.021 0.003 [0.014, 0.027] 42 
Bremen 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 18 
Lower Saxony 0.102 0.007 [0.089, 0.116] 209 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.186 0.009 [0.169, 0.202] 379 
Hesse 0.083 0.006 [0.071, 0.095] 169 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.043 0.004 [0.034, 0.051] 87 
Saarland 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
Baden-Württemberg 0.121 0.007 [0.107, 0.135] 247 
Bavaria 0.166 0.008 [0.149, 0.182] 338 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 0.023 0.003 [0.017, 0.030] 47 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.030 0.004 [0.023, 0.038] 62 
Brandenburg 0.039 0.004 [0.030, 0.047] 79 
Thuringia 0.031 0.004 [0.023, 0.038] 63 
Saxony 0.057 0.005 [0.047, 0.067] 117 
Berlin 0.042 0.004 [0.033, 0.051] 86 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 27: Current occupation of interviewed person 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Unskilled labor 0.045 0.005 [0.036, 0.054] 91 
Skilled tradesman 0.097 0.007 [0.084, 0.110] 198 
Employee without managerial authority 0.181 0.009 [0.164, 0.198] 370 
Employee with managerial authority 0.090 0.006 [0.078, 0.103] 184 
Senior executive 0.026 0.004 [0.019, 0.033] 54 
Public servant in the lower grade of the civil service 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 19 
Public servant in the middle grade of the civil service 0.006 0.002 [0.003, 0.010] 13 
Public servant in the higher grade of the civil service 0.004 0.001 [0.001, 0.007] 8 
Self-employed 0.052 0.005 [0.043, 0.062] 107 
Self-employed farmer 0.001 0.001 [0.000, 0.003] 3 
Freelancer 0.022 0.003 [0.016, 0.028] 45 
No response 0.465 0.011 [0.444, 0.487] 950 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 28: Current occupation of head of household 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Blue-collar worker 0.163 0.008 [0.147, 0.179] 333 
White-collar worker 0.345 0.011 [0.325, 0.366] 705 
Public servant 0.031 0.004 [0.023, 0.038] 63 
Self-employed 0.101 0.007 [0.088, 0.114] 207 
Farmer 0.002 0.001 [0.000, 0.005] 5 
No occupation/unemployed 0.357 0.011 [0.336, 0.378] 729 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 29: Occupational situation of interviewed person 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Full time occupation 0.392 0.011 [0.371, 0.413] 801 
Part time occupation 0.143 0.008 [0.127, 0.158] 291 
Currently unemployed 0.057 0.005 [0.047, 0.067] 117 
Non-working (E.g. pensioners) 0.279 0.010 [0.260, 0.299] 570 
Housewife/househusband 0.044 0.005 [0.035, 0.053] 90 
In apprenticeship/compulsory military service 0.017 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 34 
Visiting school/university 0.067 0.006 [0.056, 0.077] 136 
No response 0.001 0.001 [0.000, 0.003] 3 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 30: Occupational situation of head of household 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Full time occupation 0.585 0.011 [0.563, 0.606] 1,194 
Part time occupation 0.052 0.005 [0.043, 0.062] 107 
Currently unemployed 0.050 0.005 [0.041, 0.060] 103 
Non-working (E.g. pensioners) 0.287 0.010 [0.267, 0.307] 586 
Housewife/househusband 0.008 0.002 [0.004, 0.012] 17 
In apprenticeship/compulsory military service 0.005 0.002 [0.002, 0.008] 10 
Visiting school/university 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 31: Family status 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Single 0.219 0.009 [0.201, 0.237] 448 
Unmarried, but living together with partner 0.096 0.007 [0.083, 0.109] 196 
Married 0.505 0.011 [0.484, 0.527] 1,032 
Widowed/divorced/separated 0.179 0.008 [0.163, 0.196] 366 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 32: Gender 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Male 0.469 0.011 [0.447, 0.491] 958 
Female 0.531 0.011 [0.509, 0.553] 1,084 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 33: Size of household 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
1 person 0.244 0.010 [0.225, 0.263] 498 
2 person 0.400 0.011 [0.378, 0.421] 816 
3 person 0.165 0.008 [0.149, 0.181] 337 
4 person 0.143 0.008 [0.128, 0.159] 293 
5 or more persons 0.048 0.005 [0.039, 0.057] 98 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 34: Is respondent mainly responsible for the household? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.610 0.011 [0.589, 0.631] 1,246 
No 0.390 0.011 [0.369, 0.411] 796 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 35: Is respondent head of household? 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Yes 0.608 0.011 [0.587, 0.629] 1,241 
No 0.392 0.011 [0.371, 0.413] 801 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 36: Internet access 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
At home 0.745 0.010 [0.726, 0.764] 1,522 
At work 0.224 0.009 [0.206, 0.242] 458 
At school/university 0.047 0.005 [0.037, 0.056] 95 
Mobile access 0.152 0.008 [0.137, 0.168] 311 
Other 0.050 0.005 [0.041, 0.060] 103 
No internet access 0.219 0.009 [0.201, 0.237] 447 
No response 0.000   0 
Notes: Multiple answers in row 1 to 5 were possible. Table is based on 2,042 responses. 
 
Item 37: Internet use 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Daily 0.369 0.011 [0.348, 0.390] 754 
More than once a week 0.278 0.010 [0.258, 0.297] 567 
Once a week 0.057 0.005 [0.047, 0.067] 116 
Two- or three times a month 0.028 0.004 [0.021, 0.036] 58 
Once a month 0.006 0.002 [0.003, 0.010] 13 
Less than once a month 0.026 0.004 [0.019, 0.033] 53 
Never 0.236 0.009 [0.217, 0.254] 481 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 38: Children below 15 living in the household 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
1 children 0.136 0.008 [0.121, 0.151] 278 
2 children 0.082 0.006 [0.070, 0.094] 167 
3 or more children 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.024] 38 
None 0.763 0.009 [0.745, 0.782] 1,559 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 39: Net income of interviewed person 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
0 to 499 € 0.115 0.007 [0.101, 0.128] 234 
500 to 749 € 0.047 0.005 [0.038, 0.056] 96 
750 to 999 € 0.131 0.007 [0.117, 0.146] 268 
1,000 to 1,249 € 0.076 0.006 [0.064, 0.087] 155 
1,250 to 1,499 € 0.159 0.008 [0.143, 0.175] 325 
1,500 to 1,999 € 0.123 0.007 [0.109, 0.138] 252 
2,000 to 2,499 € 0.082 0.006 [0.070, 0.094] 168 
2,500 to 2,999 € 0.024 0.003 [0.017, 0.030] 48 
3,000 to 3,499 € 0.017 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 35 
3,500 to 3,999 € 0.005 0.002 [0.002, 0.009] 11 
More than 4,000 € 0.017 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 34 
No response 0.204 0.009 [0.186, 0.221] 416 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 40: Net household income 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
0 to 499 € 0.015 0.003 [0.009, 0.020] 30 
500 to 749 € 0.015 0.003 [0.010, 0.020] 31 
750 to 999 € 0.050 0.005 [0.041, 0.060] 103 
1,000 to 1,249 € 0.035 0.004 [0.027, 0.043] 71 
1,250 to 1,499 € 0.095 0.006 [0.082, 0.107] 193 
1,500 to 1,999 € 0.100 0.007 [0.087, 0.113] 205 
2,000 to 2,499 € 0.143 0.008 [0.128, 0.159] 293 
2,500 to 2,999 € 0.104 0.007 [0.091, 0.117] 212 
3,000 to 3,499 € 0.099 0.007 [0.086, 0.112] 202 
3,500 to 3,999 € 0.040 0.004 [0.031, 0.048] 81 
More than 4,000 € 0.084 0.006 [0.072, 0.096] 172 
No response 0.220 0.009 [0.202, 0.238] 449 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 41: Town size 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
0 to 1,999 0.058 0.005 [0.048, 0.068] 118 
2,000 to 2999 0.045 0.005 [0.036, 0.054] 91 
3,000 to 4999 0.065 0.005 [0.054, 0.076] 133 
5,000 to 9999 0.113 0.007 [0.099, 0.127] 231 
10,000 to 19,999 0.148 0.008 [0.133, 0.164] 303 
20,000 to 49,999 0.211 0.009 [0.193, 0.228] 430 
50,000 to 99,999 0.069 0.006 [0.058, 0.080] 141 
100,000 to 199,999 0.060 0.005 [0.050, 0.071] 123 
200,000 to 499,999 0.060 0.005 [0.050, 0.071] 123 
More than 500,000 0.171 0.008 [0.155, 0.187] 349 
No response 0   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 42: Education of interviewed person 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
No certified apprenticeship training 0.064 0.005 [0.054, 0.075] 131 
Certified apprenticeship 0.296 0.010 [0.276, 0.316] 604 
Secondary school 0.421 0.011 [0.400, 0.443] 860 
University-entrance diploma 0.104 0.007 [0.091, 0.118] 213 
University degree 0.091 0.006 [0.078, 0.103] 185 
No response 0.024 0.003 [0.017, 0.031] 49 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 43: Education of head of household 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
No certified apprenticeship training 0.042 0.004 [0.033, 0.051] 86 
Certified apprenticeship training 0.330 0.010 [0.309, 0.350] 673 
Secondary school 0.411 0.011 [0.390, 0.432] 839 
University-entrance diploma 0.093 0.006 [0.080, 0.106] 190 
University degree 0.121 0.007 [0.107, 0.136] 248 
No response 0.003 0.001 [0.001, 0.005] 6 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 44: Social class 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Highest 0.142 0.008 [0.126, 0.157] 289 
2nd highest 0.171 0.008 [0.155, 0.187] 349 
Average 0.459 0.011 [0.437, 0.480] 937 
2nd lowest 0.182 0.009 [0.165, 0.199] 372 
Lowest 0.047 0.005 [0.037, 0.056] 95 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 45: Interest on new trends 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
I am highly interested in new trends  0.236 0.009 [0.217, 0.254] 481 
New trends do not interest me particularly 0.488 0.011 [0.466, 0.509] 996 
I do not care about new trends 0.277 0.010 [0.257, 0.296] 565 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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Item 46: Living conditions 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
Owner-occupied house 0.457 0.011 [0.436, 0.479] 934 
Owner-occupied flat 0.070 0.006 [0.058, 0.081] 142 
On rent 0.473 0.011 [0.451, 0.495] 966 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
 
Item 47: Age 
 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
14 0.011 0.002 [0.007, 0.016] 23 
15 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 19 
16 0.007 0.002 [0.004, 0.011] 15 
17 0.010 0.002 [0.006, 0.015] 21 
18 0.008 0.002 [0.004, 0.012] 17 
19 0.008 0.002 [0.004, 0.012] 17 
20 0.006 0.002 [0.003, 0.010] 13 
21 0.006 0.002 [0.003, 0.010] 13 
22 0.013 0.003 [0.008, 0.018] 27 
23 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.016] 24 
24 0.011 0.002 [0.007, 0.016] 23 
25 0.015 0.003 [0.009, 0.020] 30 
26 0.011 0.002 [0.006, 0.015] 22 
27 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
28 0.010 0.002 [0.006, 0.014] 20 
29 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
30 0.015 0.003 [0.009, 0.020] 30 
31 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.016] 24 
32 0.010 0.002 [0.006, 0.015] 21 
33 0.008 0.002 [0.004, 0.012] 17 
34 0.011 0.002 [0.007, 0.016] 23 
35 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
36 0.015 0.003 [0.010, 0.020] 31 
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 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
37 0.010 0.002 [0.006, 0.014] 20 
38 0.014 0.003 [0.009, 0.019] 29 
39 0.014 0.003 [0.009, 0.019] 29 
40 0.016 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 33 
41 0.016 0.003 [0.010, 0.021] 32 
42 0.021 0.003 [0.015, 0.027] 43 
43 0.015 0.003 [0.009, 0.020] 30 
44 0.023 0.003 [0.016, 0.029] 46 
45 0.024 0.003 [0.017, 0.030] 48 
46 0.024 0.003 [0.017, 0.030] 48 
47 0.025 0.003 [0.019, 0.032] 52 
48 0.020 0.003 [0.014, 0.026] 40 
49 0.024 0.003 [0.017, 0.030] 48 
50 0.029 0.004 [0.022, 0.037] 60 
51 0.024 0.003 [0.017, 0.031] 49 
52 0.020 0.003 [0.014, 0.026] 41 
53 0.022 0.003 [0.015, 0.028] 44 
54 0.016 0.003 [0.010, 0.021] 32 
55 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.025] 39 
56 0.018 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 36 
57 0.016 0.003 [0.010, 0.021] 32 
58 0.013 0.003 [0.008, 0.018] 27 
59 0.016 0.003 [0.010, 0.021] 32 
60 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.024] 38 
61 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
62 0.017 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 34 
63 0.017 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 35 
64 0.017 0.003 [0.011, 0.022] 34 
65 0.012 0.002 [0.007, 0.017] 25 
66 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.025] 39 
67 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 18 
68 0.013 0.002 [0.008, 0.018] 26 
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 Proportion S.E. C.I. Count 
69 0.013 0.003 [0.008, 0.018] 27 
70 0.018 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 36 
71 0.016 0.003 [0.010, 0.021] 32 
72 0.018 0.003 [0.012, 0.023] 36 
73 0.013 0.002 [0.008, 0.018] 26 
74 0.015 0.003 [0.010, 0.020] 31 
75 0.019 0.003 [0.013, 0.024] 38 
76 0.011 0.002 [0.006, 0.015] 22 
77 0.007 0.002 [0.003, 0.010] 14 
78 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 18 
79 0.008 0.002 [0.004, 0.012] 17 
80 0.006 0.002 [0.003, 0.009] 12 
81 0.005 0.002 [0.002, 0.009] 11 
82 0.009 0.002 [0.005, 0.013] 19 
83 0.003 0.001 [0.001, 0.005] 6 
84 0.003 0.001 [0.001, 0.006] 7 
85 0.003 0.001 [0.001, 0.005] 6 
86 0.002 0.001 [0.000, 0.004] 4 
87 0.001 0.001 [0.000, 0.003] 3 
88 0.000 0.000 [0.000, 0.001] 1 
89 0.001 0.001 [0.000, 0.003] 3 
90 0.000 0.000 [0.000, 0.001] 1 
91 0.000 0.000 [0.000, 0.001] 1 
92 0.001 0.001 [0.000, 0.002] 2 
No response 0.000   0 
Total 1.000   2,042 
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